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FOREWORD
This Design Survey Report was prepared in accordance with the Statement of Work
of NASA/_RC Contract Number NAS 12-586 by the McDonnell Astronautics Company,
division of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation.
The report summarizes McDonnell's design experience in developing Stability,
Guidance and Control Systems for the Mercury and Gemini programs.
Preparation of this report was by direction of C. V. Wolfers and H. L. Motchan.
The effort was supervised and coordinated by E. L. Nieman, D. C. Hilty, and
R. G. Malchow. Major sections were prepared by: D. L. Bradt, R. C. Brunnert,
S. T. Dozier, P. H. Fultz, F. D. Hockett, C. E. Moyers, and J. W. Whiteside.
Additional contributors of technical content were: J. E. Hallemann,
F. P. Hercules, E. H. Johnson, D. J. Leemann, R. F. Pannett, H. H. Routberg,
C. J. Scherrer, L. M. Warren, A. J. Wiegand, and F. H. Zengel. The above named
engineers were either assigned to or closely associated with the engineering
activity of the Mercury or NASA Gemini project.
The design survey was prepared for the NASA/ERC Design Criteria Office, directed
by F. J. Carroll. Guidance on contents, format, and organization was provided
by Curtis H. Spenny of _RC, with technical assistance from Ronald Madigan.
,
CORPOR_TDON
i
ERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEY
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
Section
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
1.1 General Description
1.2 System Descriptions
Sensors
2.1 Rate Gyros
2.2 Inertial Measurement Unit
2.3 Horizon Sensor System
2.4 Rendezvous Radar System
Computers
3.1 Digital Computer
Activation Devices
4.1 Attitude Control and Maneuver Electronics
Pilot Controls and Displays
5.1 Attitude and Maneuver Hand Controllers
5.2 Manual Data Insertion Unit
5.3 Incremental Velocity Indicator
5.4 Attitude Display Group
5.5 Range and Range Rate Indicator
System Design
6.1 System Integration Design Changes and Problems
6.2 Switching Device Design Considerations
Conclusions and Program Philosophy
7.1 SG&C Design Conclusions
7.2 Program Philosophy and Conclusions
References
Page
1
1
4
3o
3o
36
55
77
lO0
J.k2k)
122
122
15o
150
163
165
167
176
178
178
19h
198
198
201
207
4
MCDONNELL DOUGLAI_
CO_4mO_T'BON
ii
MERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEY
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
Figure
1.2-1
1.2-2
1.2-3
1.2-4
1.2-5
1.2-6
2.1-1
2.2-1
2.2-2
2.2-3
2.2-4
2.3-1
2.3-2
2.4-1
2.4.-2
2.4-3
3-1-1
3.1-2
3.1-3
4.1-I
4.1-2
LIST OF FIGURES
Title
Mercury Attitude Stabilization Control Functional
Block Diagram
Gemini Guidance and Control Functional Block
Diagram
Reentry Module Left Hand Equipment Bay (Mockup)
Reentry Module Center Bay (Mockup)
Adapter Module (Mockup)
Rendezvous Radar Installation (Mockup)
Agena Target Docking Adapter (Mockup)
Rate Gyro Package (Cover Removed)
IMUProgramTime History
IMU Platform (Cover Removed)
IMU System Electronics (Exploded View)
IGS Power Supply
Horizon Sensor Program Time History
Horizon Sensor System
Rendezvous Radar Program Time History
Rendezvous Radar (Cover Removed)
Radar Transponder (Cover Removed)
Digital Computer Program Time History
Digital Computer (Covers Removed)
Auxiliary Tape Memory (Cover Removed)
ACMEProgramTime History
Attitude Control Electronics (Cover Removed)
Page
?
lO
ll
12
13
14
33
37
42
43
44
59
6o
83
84
85
102
103
ll5
124
_7
t
MCDONNELL DOILIOLAJ _
CORPORATION
L
MERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEY
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
4.1-4
5.0-1
5.0-2
5.0-3
5.1-1
5.4-1
LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)
Title
Orbit Attitude and Maneuver Electronics
(Cover Removed)
Power Inverter (Cover Removed)
Left Hand Instrument Panel
Right Hand Instrument Panel
View of Cabin Mockup
Hand Controller Program Time History
Attitude Display Group Program Time IIi_tory
p___/e
128
129
151
152
153
158
172
--COO~~.LL OOUGL 
CORPORATION
iv
MERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEY
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
Table
2.1-1
2.3-1
2.4-1
3.1-1
4.1-1
LIST OF TABLES
Title
Rate Gyro Package Functional Requirements
Horizon Sensor System Functional Requirements
Rendezvous Radar System Functional Requirements
Digital Computer Functional Requirements
Attitude Control and Maneuver Electronics
Functional Requirements
Page
31
56
78
lO1
123
CORPORATION
V
MERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEY
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
LIST OF EFFECTIVE
PAGES
Title Page
i through vi
1 through 208
ft
MCDONNELL DOUGLAB_
¢OIII_flATIOI_
vi
1.0
i.i
ERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEY
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
Introduction
General Description - This report was prepared for the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), Electronics Research Center (ERC), Cambridge,
Massachusetts. It relates the Mercury and Gemini program design experience
of McDonnell Astronautics Company (MCASTRO), division of McDonnell Douglas
Corporation, to the NASA/ERC Design Criteria Program for Stability, Guidance,
and Control (SG&C). Technical data has been assembled for Mercury and Gemini
guidance and control equipments and their system integration, to assist in
the production of design criteria monographs that will facilitate unification
of design approaches by NASA/ERC.
The success of the Mercury and Gemini programs has been well documented.
However, problems had to be overcome to achieve this success. This report
documents significant problems, particularly those related to stability,
guidance and control, and the evolution of the equipment design.
The report has the following objectives:
a. To identify important SG&C design considerations and problems encountered
in the design, development, test, and flight of space vehicles.
b. To discuss techniques of corrective action for problems encountered.
c. To note performance and reliability constraints imposed by mass property
limitations.
d. To reveal limitations of specific design techniques.
e. To relate special factors required for a final design that complies with
performance, reliability, and environmental requirements.
f. To demonstrate the type of comprehensive pre-flight testing necessary to
ensure flightworthiness.
To present special design considerations applicable to space environments.g.
/
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h. To provide information on research and development approaches taken where
techniques were not readily available.
i. To illustrate the potential of contributions resulting from related past
experience.
J. To yield basic information required for equipment design criteria
checklists.
k. To reflect the effects of state-of-art constraints on program scheduling.
In formulating the design survey, McDonnell reviewed reports, design notes,
technical notes, in-house correspondence, and subcontractor control documents
to identify significant SG&C design considerations and problems. This data
was supplemented by discussions with project personnel. Emphasis was placed
on gathering data on the following specific items:
a. Environmental and performance requirements as related to hardware design.
b. Trade-offs and design decisions.
c. Failures, malfunctions, and near-miss incidents.
d. Unique problems encountered, and how they were solved or circumvented.
e. New concepts and hardware that evolved.
f. Major design changes and design evolution.
g. Suggested changes, "if one had it to do over again."
h. Unforeseen performance restrictions.
This survey documents the nature of each problem considered, the circumstances
under which it occurred, the technology required to solve it, the design
considerations and data involved in decisions, and the final solution,
whether it be redesign, institution of procedures to circumvent the problem,
or, in some instances, lessons learned or solutions that were not implemented.
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The survey has been primarily directed toward the Gemini program because of
the complexity of its equipment as compared to the Mercury equipment; however,
related Mercury experience is reflected in the Gemini design.
All design survey material is cataloged chronologically to reflect the design
evolution process through design, development, test, and flight. In some
cases explicit design criteria have been extracted and are presented.
Some of these criteria may appear to be too well known to bear repeating in
this type of document. However, we have included them here as a convenient,
unified reference for future designers.
Sections 2 through 5 are devoted to equipment design. In Section 6, design
criteria associated with equipment interface or integration aspects are
reported, together with design data on SG&C systems. Section 7 collects
conclusions, based on our experience, applicable to all SG&C and spacecraft
design. The references listed in Section 8 contain further detailed informa-
tion on the operation and requirements of the equipment discussed in this
report.
i
MCDONNELL DOUOLAL __
CORPORATION
3
1.2 System Descriptions
1.2.1
MERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEY
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
Mercury Spacecraft Stabilization Control System - The Mercury Spacecraft
Stabilization Control System was designed to provide automatic stabilization
and orientation of the capsule continuously from booster separation until
landing parachute deployment. These requirements were accomplished by the
Automatic Stabilization Control System (ASCS) in conjunction with two
subsystems, the Horizon Scanners and the Reaction Control System. In
addition, manual capability was provided to increase reliability and system
flexibility, and an independent Rate Stabilization and Control System (RSCS)
was provided for backup rate damping. The system is best understood by
considering the operational requirements demanded of it.
were:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
These requirements
Provide rate damping in early abort situations.
Provide rate damping and vehicle orientation for high altitude and
orbital aborts.
Maintain orbit orientation for a 28-hour period.
Align and maintain vehicle attitude during retrofire.
Place the vehicle in the reentry attitude following retrorocket
firing.
Provide rate damping during reentry, after sensing 0.05 g longitudinal
acceleration, and provide a steady lO°/sec roll rate thereafter until
parachute deployment.
(f)
Automatic Stabilization Control System - The Automatic Stabilization Control
System (ASCS), shown in block diagram form in Figure 1.2-1, employed the
following components:
/
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Three single degree of freedom rate _vros sensed angular rates about
the pitch, roll, and yaw axis of the spacecraft and switched electrical
circuits at specific angular rates.
(b) Two attitude gyros (vertical and directional) were utilized to deter-
mine attitude angles between a set of fixed axes in the spacecraft
and the local vertical reference. Both attitude gyros were "free"
gyroscopes with slaving capabilities.
(c) An acceleration switch capable of sensing a 0.05 g acceleration force
initialised the reentry mode.
(d) The calibrator unit contained the switching logic, attitude repeaters,
summing and erection circuitry, relays, and power supply to integrate
all elements of the system. The output signals of this unit included
thrust control solenoid signals and attitude signals for visual
display and/or telemetry.
(e) The attitude and rate indicator visually indicated spacecraft rate
and attitude for all three axes.
Horizon Scanner System - Operation of the Horizon Scanner was based upon
the infrared radiation received from the earth as compared to the essen-
tially zero radiation from space. The system incorporated two identical
scanning units. One unit was used as a roll sensor, the other as a pitch
sensor. Each unit was capable of a llO ° conical scan. The system provided
a roll and pitch reference during the orbital phase of the normal mission.
The scanners produced an output signal that slaved the ASCS attitude gyros
to the proper angles upon command from an external programmer.
/
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(Continued)
Reaction Control System - The Reaction Control System (RCS) was used for
spacecraft yaw, pitch, and roll control. The system utilized 90% hydrogen
peroxide as an energy source. Nitrogen gas was used to expel the propellant
from a bladder into the thrust chamber catalyst beds. The system was
divided into two independent portions, one for automatic control, and one
for manual control. In addition, a reserve fuel system could be connected
to the automatic portion.
Fly-By-Wire System - The fly-by-wire (FBW) system disabled the automatic
feature and permitted the RCS solenoid control valves to be electrically
operated by movement of the control stick. Stabilization was accomplished
by moving the control stick in the desired plane. Two thrust level
selections were provided to save fuel.
Manual Proportional System - The Manual Proportional (MP) system regulated
fuel flow to a set of thrusters, independent of those used for other control
modes, by deflection of the control stick. This was accomplished by
mechanical linkages which transmitted the control stick movement to
proportional control valves. Thrust output was directly proportional to
hand controller displacement.
Rate Stabilization Control System - The Rate Stabilization Control System
(RSCS) included a separate control electronics package and utilized inde-
pendent rate gyros. Summing of stick positions and rate gyro outputs
provided rate control.
/
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Gemini Guidance and Control Syst_ - The mission requirements of the Gemini
program dictated that a Guidance and Control System provide the spacecraft
with the following capabilities:
(a) Backup launch vehicle guidance
(b) Three-axis attitude control
(c) Orbit adjust and rendezvous
(d) Vehicle rate and attitude display
(e) Retrograde time determination and update
(f) ReentrTT steering
The Guidance and Control System, shown in block diagram form in Figure
1.2-2, consisted of two major subsystems: an Inertial Guidance System and
an Attitude and Maneuver Control System. These subsystems in turn inter-
faced with the additional spacecraft systems defined in Section 1.2.3.
The spacecraft mounting locations of the guidance and control equipment
are shown in Figures 1.2-3 through 1.2-6. Figure 1.2-3 is a view of a
reentry module mockup, showing the location of the IMU (3 packages), the
digital computer, the horizon sensor electronics (2 packages), and the
auxiliary computer power unit, mounted in the module's left-hand equipment
bay. Also shown in this view is the location of the horizon sensor heads
on the side of the module. Figure 1.2-A shows components of the Attitude
Control and Maneuver Electronics (ACME) in the reentry module center equip-
ment bay. Figure 1.2-5 is a view of the adapter module mockup, showing the
locations of the Orbit Attitude and Maneuver Electronics and Auxiliary
Tape Memory. Figure 1.2-6 shows the rendezvous radar installation on the
front of the spacecraft. The mounting of the transponder and its associated
antennas in the Target Docking Adapter is shown in Figure 1.2-7.
/
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I.I General Description - This report was prepared for the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), Electronics Research Center (ERC), Cambridge,
_ssachusetts. It relates the Mercury and Gemini program design experience
of McDonnell Astronautics Company (MCASTRO), division of McDonnell Douglas
Corporation, to the NASA/ERC Design Criteria Program for Stability, Guidance,
and Control (SG&C). Technical data has been assembled for Mercury and Gemini
guidance and control equipments and their system integration, to assist in
the production of design criteria monographs that will facilitate unification
of design approaches by NASA/ERC.
The success of the Mercury and Gemin_ programs has been well documented.
However, problems had to be overcome to achieve this success. This report
documents significant problems, particularly those related to stability,
guidance and control, and the evolution of the equipment design.
The report has the following objectives:
a. To identify important SG&C design considerations and problems encountered
I
I
in the design_ development, test, and flight of space vehicles.
!
b. To discuss techniques of corrective action for problems encountered.
g
I
c. To note perfo_ance and reliability constraints imposed by mass property
limitations. _
d. To reveal limitations of specific design techniques.
e. To relate special factors required for a final desio_T,that complies with
performance, reliability, and auviro_mental requirements.
f. To demonstrate the type of comprehensive pre-flight testing necessary to
ensure flightworthiness.
g. To present specia!desig n considerations applicable to space environments.
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The major components of the guidance and control system and associated
systems are described below:
Inertial Guidance System - The Inertial Guidance System (IGS) contained
the following components: the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), the Digital
Computer, the Auxiliary Computer Power Unit (ACPU), the Manual Data
Insertion Unit (MDIU), the Incremental Velocity Indicator (IVl), and the
Auxiliary Tape Memory (ATE).
Inertial Measurement Unit - The Inertial Measurement Unit (11@3) consisted
of three separate packages: the inertial platform, the system electronics,
and the IGS power supply including the gimbal control electronics. All
three packages functioned together to provide inertial attitude and
acceleration information. Attitude measurements were utilized for auto-
matic control, guidance computations, and visual display. Acceleration
measurements were utilized for insertion, rendezvous, and retrograde
computations and displays. In addition to attitude and acceleration
references, the IMU provided AC and DC power to additional spacecraft
equipment. A brief description of the components comprising the IMU
follows :
(a) The inertial platform utilized three floated miniature integrating
(b)
gyros and three floated pendulous accelerometers supported by a
four-gimbal assembly. Major components of the platform were: a
housing, gimbal structure, torque motors, gimbal angle synchros,
resolvers, gyros, and accelerometers.
The system electronics package contained the circuitry necessary to
operate the IMU. Circuits were provided for gyro torque control,
IWICDONNBLL DOUIGILA j/_m_..__
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(c)
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timing logic, spin motor power, accelerometer logic, accelerometer
rebalance, and malfunction detection.
The IGS power supply contained gimbal control electronics and the
static power supply unit. Gimbal control electronics drove torquer
motors in the platform while the static power supply provided the
electrical power (AC and DC) for the IMU, Computer, ACFU, MDIU, IVI,
ACME and Horizon Sensors.
The seven modes of operation that could be selected were:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
OF___EF-Platform not energized.
SEF Cage - The IMU had to be caged before it could be aligned. Two
cage positions were provided so that the spacecraft could be posi-
tioned either small end forward (SEF) or blunt end forward (BEF)
for platform alignment. The SEF cage position was used for warmup
of platform gyros and for electrical caging of the platform by
aligning the platform at 0°, 0°, 0 ° or 180 °, 180 °, 180 ° with respect
to the spacecraft coordinates (small end of spacecraft forward).
The electrical caging rate was 0.83°/second.
BEF Ca_e - This mode was used to align the platform gimbals at 0°,
180 °, 0°, or 180 °, 0°, 180 ° with respect to the spacecraft coor-
dinates (blunt end of spacecraft forward). Other functions and
characteristics were identical to the SEF cage position.
SE__EF- This mode provided platform fine alignment. The platform was
slaved to the horizon sensor output signals for pitch and roll
alignment. In addition, a gyrocompassing logic system converted roll
angular error signals into yaw gimbal alignment signals. The signal
,
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1.2.2.1 (Continued)
phases were set for correct alignment in the spacecraft small end
I forward position. An orbital rate signal (nominally 4°/rain) wassummed with the horizon sensor error signal to the pitch gyro
torquer. A sensor ignore signal would automatically cause the plat-
I form to function as in the orbit rate mode. A loss of sensor
i attitude signals without an ignore signal placed the platform in a
pseudo cage mode. (Pitch would not cage properly. )
I (e) BEF - This mode, which also provided platform fine alignment, was
identical to SEF, except that phases were set for correct alignment
in the spacecraft blunt end forward condition. An orbital rate
signal (nominally %°/rain) was summed with the error signal to the
pitch gyro torques. Horizon scanner functions were identical to SEF.
i (f) Orbit Rate - This mode was used to maintain attitude reference during
spacecraft maneuvers. In this mode the platform was inertially free
in roll and .yaw, but pitch was torqued at a preset orbital rate for
constant platform attitude with respect to the local vertical. The
nominal rate was approximately 4°/rain pitch down.
(g) FREE_ - The platform was gyro-stabilized in this mode and thus
inertially fixed except for gyro drift. This mode was selected
automatically at lift-off, during the ascent phase, and at retrofire.
Digital Cbmputer - The Gemini Digital Computer was a binary, fixed-point,
stored program, general purpose computer that operated at a 500 KC bit
rate. It interfaced with the Inertial Platform, Platform Electronics,
IGS Power Supply, Auxiliary Computer Power Unit, Manual Data Readout,
Manual Data Keyboard (via Manual Data Readout), Incremental Velocity
/
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I.2.2.1 (Continued)
Indicator, Radar, Time Reference System, Digital Commnd System, Data
Acquisition System, Attitude Control and Maneuver Electronics, Munch
Vehicle Autopilot, Aerospace Ground Equipment, and Pilot Controls and
Displays (e.g. Attitude Group Display, Computer Mode Switch, etc. ).
From the inputs and its stored program, the computer provided the guidance
and control outputs required for the Gemini spacecraft during the
prelaunch, catch-up, rendezvous, and reentry phases. In addition, the
computer provided backup guidance for the launch vehicle during ascent.
The computer memory was capable of random access and nondestructive
readout. The memory array provided for &096 memory words, each with
39 bits, or a total storage of 159,7&& bits. All memory words were
divided into three syllables of 13 bits each. The syllables were
designated O, l, and 2. Syllable 2 could not be altered after being
loaded by ground equipment. Data words (25 bits plus sign) Were
normally coded in the first two syllables, and instruction words (13 bits)
were intermixed in all three syllables. Limited modification of the
stored data was possible at the launch site through interface with the
Manual Data Insertion Unit or the Digital Command System.
The operational computer program contained interleaved diagnostic sub-
routines that permitted malfunction detection during operation. _en a
fault was detected, a discrete was issued by the computer to light a
computer malfunction indicator lamp on the control panel. The circuit
had a manual reset capability to insure that it was not set by a
transient type malfunction.
/
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1.2.2.1 (Continued)
The computer was controlled by means of four switches located on the
astronaut,s control panel - a seven-position computer mode switch, a
two-position computer off/on switch, a pushbutton start computation
switch, and a pushbutton malfunction reset switch. The computer was
turned on or off by the computer switch on the control panel.
The computer received the AC and DC power required for its operation from
the IGS power supply. The regulated DC power supplied to the computer
was buffered in the IGS power supply to eliminate any loss in regulation
due to transients that might have occurred in the prime spacecraft power
source. Actual power interruptions and depressions lasting as long as
lO0 milliseconds were buffered by the IGS power supply and Auxiliary
Computer Power Unit.
Auxiliary Computer Power Unit - The Auxiliary Computer Power Unit (ACPU)
was used in conjunction with the IGS power supply to maintain the correct
DC voltage at the computer. The ACPU furnished power which enabled the
computer to operate during low voltage transients of as long as lO0 milli-
seconds. If power was interrupted for a longer period, the ACPU shut
down the computer in a controlled manner. The ACPU consisted of the
required sense circuitry, a battery, and a trickle charger.
Manual Data Insertion Unit - The Manual Data Insertion Unit (MDIU) con-
sisted of the Manual Data Keyboard (MDK) and the Manual Data Readout (MDR)
units. The MDIU permitted the astronauts to insert data into the computer
memory and read data from it. The unit accepted and displayed decimal
data and converted the data to and from computer binary language.
/
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(Continued)
Incremental Velocity Indicator - The Incrmnental Velocity Indicator (IVI)
visually indicated incremental velocities for the longitudinal (forward -
aft), lateral (left - right) and vertical (up - down) axes of the space-
craft. These incremental velocities corresponded to the amount and direc-
tion of additional thrust necessary to achieve correct orbit. In addition,
the IVI displayed the tape position words and module words from the
Auxiliary Tape Memory.
1.2.2.2
Auxiliary Tape Memory - The Auxiliary Tape Memory (h_[) was a self-
contained magnetic tape sys+em _-_ stored an ^;;'*-"........
words for the digital computer. The A_C was used to store operational
programs for in-flight loading in the spacecraft digital computer memory.
Automatic and manual modes of loading the computer via the A_,._ were
available.
Attitude and Maneuver Control System - The Attitude and Maneuver Control
System contained the Attitude Control and _neuver Electronics, the
Attitude Display Group, and the Horizon Sensor System.
Attitude Control and _neuver Electronics - The Attitude Control and
_neuver Electronics (ACME) provided closed loop rate stabilization and
attitude control and/or manual control, when utilized with the horizon
sensors, computer, platform and attitude control handle. The ACME system
converted the input signals into thruster firing commands necessary to
attain and maintain an attitude or velocity. For the orbital phase, the
Orbit Attitude and _neuvering System (OHMS) thrusters were used for
attitude and maneuvering, while during the reentry phase, attitude control
/
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1.2.2.2 (Continued)
was provided by the Reentry Control System (RCS) thrusters. The ACME
system consisted of the Attitude Control Electronics (ACE), Orbit Attitude
and Naneuver Electronics (OAME), AC_:_ Power Inverter, and two identical
Rate Gyro packages. The attitude control system had both automatic and
manual modes of operation while the maneuvering control system had only
a manual mode.
(1) Attitude Control Electronics - The Attitude Control Electronics (ACE)
subsystem consisted of power supplies, mode logic circuits, propor-
tional circuits, control torque logic circuits, RCS relay drivers,
and a pulse generator. These circuits converted the commands or
error signals from the computer, platform, horizon sensors, rate
gyros, and attitude hand controller into thruster firing commands.
The firing commands were routed by a valve driver select system to
the RCS or the OAMS attitude valve drivers.
(2) Orbit Attitude and _&%neuver Electronics - This package consisted of
the attitude solenoid valve drivers, maneuver solenoid valve drivers,
spike suppression circuits, and single pulse generator. The OAME
accepted signals from the ACE and maneuver controllers for conversion
to drive commands to the OAI._ solenoids.
(3) ACI_E Power Inverter - The power inverter converted spacecraft DC
power into 26V, 400 Hz (the IGS power supply provided the primary
source of AC excitation).
(4) Rate Gyros - The two rate gyro packages (RGP) contained three single-
degree-of-freedom, spring restrained rate gyros. The gyros were
orthogonally mounted for rate sensing in all three axes. The rate
gyro package provided AC analog outputs proportional to attitude
MCDONNELL DOUGLA_
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rate inputs to (1) the ACE when used in the rate command mode,
(2) the attitude display group, and (3) telemetry.
(5) Attitude Hand Controller - Spacecraft attitude was manually control-
led by use of an attitude hand controller and a visual reference.
Controller outputs were rate, pulse, and direct command signals,
depending upon the control mode selected. Output signals were
produced by positive or negative handle movements from the center
position. Rate signals were proportional to the amount of handle
displacement from a center deadband. Direct and/or pulse signals
were produced when the hand controller was displaced past a preset
threshold or deadband. Pulse signals triggered a pulse generator
in ACE to produce a fixed increment firing signal. In this mode,
the control handle had to be returned to a neutral position before
another single pulse could be commanded.
(6) _&%neuver Hand Controller - Translational maneuvers of the spacecraft
in the horizontal, longitudinal, and vertical planes were commanded
by either of the two nmneuver hand controllers that were provided.
Displacement of a hand controller, from the centered or neutral
position in any of the six translational directions, produced a
firing command to the respective solenoid valves.
Attitude Control Selector - The attitude control selector provided
the following operational modes for attitude control:
(a) The direct mode, a backup control mode, controlled spacecraft
angular acceleration. Switches activated by attitude control
handle displacements provided discrete signals to the AC_.
which were converted into on-off commands to the OA_ thrusters.
(7)
i
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_en used with the RCS, the direct mode was instrumented by two
independent methods. In the first method, switches on the
attitude hand controller provided on-off commands directly to
the RCS solenoid valves. In the second method, switches on the
attitude hand controller provided discrete signals to the AC_
which were converted into on-off commnds to the RCS solenoid
valves.
In the pulse mode, the spacecraft angular rate could be changed
in incremental steps. Switches activated by attitude control
handle displacements triggered a pulse generator in the ACI_.
The pulses were converted to firing signals commanding thrust
for 20 ms (nominal) for each handle displacement. The pulse
mode was effective in each of the three major spacecraft axes
and was used for fine attitude control, e.g. during platform
alignment.
The horizon scan mode provided automatic control of the space-
craft about its pitch and roll axes during the orbital phase
and was used in establishing an intermediate reference during
platform alignment. The capabilities of the pulse mode were
maintained to provide manual .yawattitude control and pitch
and roll manual override control. The horizon sensors provided
a reference in pitch and roll. A nose down pitch bias was
applied so that the nominal pitch attitude variation maintained
the earth's horizon with the astronauts' field of view. The
IGS and rate gyros were not used in this mode.
fl
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(d) The rate command mode maintained attitude control during manual
attitude control operations and during velocity change maneuvers.
This mode was effective about each of the three major spacecraft
axes. Vehicle angular rates were controlled such that they were
proportional to the attitude control handle displacements. Rate
gyro outputs were compared in the attitude control electronics
(ACE) with the signals generated by control handle displacements.
_'_en the difference between the two signals exceeded the damping
deadband, the proper reaction control jets were fired.
(e) In the reentry mode, the spacecraft pitch and yaw rates were
automatically maintained within the damping dead zone by the
AC_. In addition, the AC_ utilized inputs from the computer
to control the spacecraft about the roll axis. The computer
input _,_s a signal corresponding to either a roll attitude
error or a fixed roll rate, depending upon the relationship
between the predicted touchdown point and the desired touchdown
point. The ACI<E maintained the commanded roll attitude or rate
vrithin a deadband about the command value. The reentry mode
was utilized _rith RCS thrusters.
(f) The reentry rate command mode was utilized for manual reentry
attitude control and had the same operational characteristics
as the rate command mode except that the damping deadbands
corresponded to the reentr-/ mode values.
(g) The platform mode was used to maintain spacecraft attitude, in
all three axes, with respect to the inertial platform. A
horizontal attitude, with respect to earth, could be maintained
/
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with the inertial platform in either the orbit rate or
alignment mode of operation.
Attitude Display Group - The Attitude Display Group (ADG) consisted of
two Flight Director Indicators (FDI) and two Flight Director Controllers
(FDC). The attitude display group provided the required reference or
rate information to achieve the desired spacecraft orientation.
(1) The flight director indicator consisted of a three-axis sphere with
360 ° of freedom in each axis with superimposed flight director
needles. The sphere was slaved to the inertial platform gimbals and
represented the spacecraft body angles relative to platform orienta-
tion. Information displayed on the needles was provided by the
computer, platform, radar, or rate gyros via the FDC. A scale
selector on the FDI allowed the selection of high or low scale
indications on the needles.
(2) The flight director controller contained the electronics to provide
needle drive signals and switching to permit selection of needle
display information. The FDC reference switches selected the source
of infoEration supplied to the indicators; i.e., radar, platform or
computer, while the mode switch selected the type of information to
be supplied; i.e., attitude rates, attitude, or attitude plus rate
(mix).
Horizon Sensor System - The horizon sensor system consisted of a sensor
head, an electronics package, and the required controls and indicators.
The system was used to establish a spacecraft attitude reference to earth
/
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local vertical and to generate error signals proportional to the
difference between spacecraft attitude and horizontal attitude.
1.2.3
The horizon sensors used an azimuth scanning method (160° scan) to track
the infrared (IR) gradient between earth and space at the horizon. The
horizon sensor system converted the horizon tracking information to analog
signals proportional to spacecraft pitch and roll attitude errors with
respect to the earth's local vertical. The roll and pitch output signals
were used by ACME for attitude control (horizon scan mode) and by the IMU
for platform alignment (SEF, BEF modes). Two complete and separate
horizon sensors were provided.
InterfacinK Spacecraft Systems - In performing in-flight navigation and
control, the guidance and control system operated in conjunction with the
following spacecraft systems: Rendezvous Radar System, Command Link,
Propulsion System, Time Reference System, Digital Command System, Electrical
System, Coolant System, Instrumentation System, and Launch Vehicle.
Rendezvous Radar System - The rendezvous radar system was comprised of two
units, an L-band radar system located in the Gemini Spacecraft and a
transponder located in the target vehicle. Cooperative operation of the
two units enabled the Gemini spacecraft to detect the target vehicle and to
determine the range, range rate, and angular relationship of the two
vehicles. An interferometer system was used to derive target elevation and
azimuth angles. The radar transmission was also used to carry the command
link messages. Visual indications of radar 10ck-on and command link message
acceptance were provided. Analog indications of the target vehicle range
/
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and relative velocity were displayed on a range and range rate indicator.
Analog indications of the elevation and azimuth position of the target
vehicle, with respect to the Gemini spacecraft, were presented on the
flight director indicators. Digital indications of range, elevation, and
azimuth were available to the computer for calculating the corrective
thrusts required for the rendezvous maneuver.
Command Link - The command link provided the capability to control the
target vehicle via the spacecraft. Command link control was used to posi-
tion the target vehicle in the desired attitude and orbital path and to
activate target vehicle equipment. Commands were sent via the radar P_F
link.
Time Reference System - The Time Reference System (TRS) performed all
timing functions aboard the spacecraft. The system was comprised of an
electronic timer, an event timer, a time correlation buffer, a mission
elapsed time digital clock, an Accutron clock, and a mechanical clock.
The electronic timer provided: (1) an accurate countdown of time-to-go to
retrofire, (2) time-to-go to equipment reset, (3) a record of elapsed time
from lift-off, and (&) time correlation for the PCM data system and the
bio-med tape recorder. It was the basic time reference for the computer
guidance calculations.
The eventtimer provided a display for timing of various short-term func-
tions. It was started at lift-off, in conjunction with the electronic
timer, and displayed elapsed time during the ascent phase of the mission.
l
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The additional clocks provided back-up capability, while the time correla-
tion buffer conditioned certain output signals from the electronic timer.
Propulsion System - Spacecraft control was accomplished by three separate
propulsion systems: the Orbit Attitude and Maneuver System (OAMS), the
Reentry Control System (RCS), and the Retrograde Rocket System. The (DAMS
controlled the spacecraft's attitude and provided maneuver capability from
the time of launch vehicle separation until the initiation of retrograde.
The RCS provided attitude control for the reentry module during the reentry
phase of the mission. The retrograde rocket system imparted the impulse to
the reentry module to permit safe reentry into the earth's atmosphere. The
OAMS and RCS responded to electrical conmmnds from the ACME and the hand
controllers.
Digital Command System- The Digital Command System, the command link
between the ground and the spacecraft, enabled the ground to update the
computer and the time reference system, in addition to performing other
spacecraft functions.
Electrical System- The electrical system was divided into two subsystems,
the power system and the sequential system. The electrical power system
supplied unregulated direct current for all systems of the spacecraft. The
sequential system activated displays and performed switching functions to
provide the proper sequence of events.
Coolin_ System - The spacecraft cooling system consisted of two identical
temperature control fluid systems which functioned independently to cool or
MCDONNELL DOUGLA_
CORPORATION
28
MERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEY
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
1.2.3 (Continued)
heat the spacecraft equipment. The Guidance and Control System components
which were coldplate mounted were: the IMU, Computer, ATM, ACE, OAME,
Power Inverter, and Rate Gyros.
Instrumentation System - The instrumentation system acquired data on the
performance and operation of all spacecraft systems, including the Guidance
and Control System, throughout the mission. The instrumentation system
documented significant events and data throughout the entire mission by
three methods: real-time transmission, delayed transmission, or onboard
recording.
Launch Vehicle - During ascent, the spacecraft computer performed guidance
computations in parallel with the launch vehicle guidance and control system.
Automatic and manual guidance switchover capabilities were provided. In
back-up ascent guidance the spacecraft computer provided the steering and
booster cut-off conmmnds to the secondary booster auto pilot.
1.2.h References - More complete descriptions of the Mercury and Gemini Guidance
and Control equipment and also their detailed performance and environmental
requirements may be found in the references included in Section 8.
CORII_)RATION
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2.0 Sensors
2.1 Rate Gyros
2.1.1 Requirements - The requirements for the Gemini rate sensors were more
stringent than those for the Mercury spacecraft, and therefore a better
quality rate gyro was necessary. The rate gyro requirements are shown in
Table 2.1-1. These requirements were considered as being within the state-
of-the-art, although they did dictate use of high precision parts and
technique s.
The differences in the original requirements and final specifications are
primarily due to the following factors:
(a) Further analysis on the control system requirements indicated that the
performance requirements could be relaxed for certain conditions
(e.g. at large rates). Asking for such performance would have pushed
the state of the art and driven costs up unnecessarily.
(b) Requirements for operation at temperature extremes could be relaxed,
since, under most conditions, coldplates would maintain equipment at
between +40 ° and +90°F.
The addition of the modulation specification is discussed in the following
paragraphs.
2.1.2 Early Design Tradeoffs and Decisions - Considerable trouble had been
experienced with the Mercury rate gyro pickoffs. The Mercury employed a
digital control system, and therefore the sensors, including the rate
gyros, used electromechanical encoders as pickoffs. The rate gyros used
sector switches which switched in at _0.5 degrees per second, +2 degrees
m
per second, and _10 degrees per second. However, noise created by the
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2.1.2 (Continued)
sliding of the wiper arm caused a significant widening of the attitude
control deadbands.
Therefore, a new rate gyro design was selected for Gemini. An analog pick-
off device was employed, in keeping with the Gemini control system philos-
ophy of using analog pickoff devices for its sensors. The time history of
the rate gyro development is as shown for the Attitude Control and Maneuver
System, in Figure _.l-l.
Two three-axis rate gyro packages were installed. The gyros were switched
to allow selection by individual axis, rather than selection by package,
resulting in greater reliability. Figure 2.1-1 shows the mounting of the
three gyros in the package.
2.1.3 Rate Gyro Development and Design Problems
Rate Gyro Contamination - A problem was encountered early in the manu-
facture of the rate gyros in that gimbal hang-up caused high outputs with
no input rate. The problem was caused by contaminants within the gyros,
which interfered with the gimbal movement. Although this problem was
caused primarily by a combination of poor quality control and manufactur-
ing procedures, the gyro design also contributed. The Gemini gyro
contained a self-test torquer. The subassembly containing this torquer
and the pickoff was extremely difficult to clean because of its geometric
complexity. Particles not removed during final cleaning could easily cause
a gyro hang-up after final assembly. The problem was compounded by the
extremely tight clearance between the gimbal and gyro case.
l
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FIGURE 2.1-1 RATE GYRO PACKAGE (COVER REMOVED) 
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The solution to this problem consisted mainly of establishing new cleaning
procedures, including a continual flow of flushing material through the
pickoff and torquer assembly during its final cleaning. The flushing was
continued until the contamination was reduced to a satisfactory level as
determined by microscopic inspection.
The previously high rejection rate at the gyro manufacturer was greatly
reduced by the new cleaning procedures, and no further concrete evidence of
contamination was seen. Some isolated hang-ups were experienced during
testing at the control system vendor, and one time during McDonnell space-
craft system testing, but the cause was never exactly determined. No
problems were encountered during any of the flights, however.
Poor Service Life - Early in 1963, several gyro motors were found to be
wearing out before the required service life of 670 hours. This problem
was traced to the motor bearings' metal retainers, which did not hold
sufficient lubricant. The problem was solved by substituting phenolic
bearing retainers, which acted as lubricant reservoirs. After this change,
a significant increase in motor life resulted, far exceeding service life
requirements, and no further problems were encountered.
Modulation - The outputs of the rate gyros contained a time varying compo-
nent at zero or constant input rates. This phenomenon was apparent only at
very low input rates. As input rates built up, the amplitude would
diminish or become insignificant. The modulation was an oscillation in the
range of 29 to 37 Hz with, in some cases, a beat frequency of approximately
2 Hz and a long-term amplitude modulation at approximately 0.2 Hz. The
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amplitude of these oscillations was not repeatable, and appeared to
increase or decrease at random. The maximum observed amplitude of the
modulation was a voltage equivalent to about 0.I degrees per second.
Extensive testing was conducted at the vendor, utilizing an isolated rate
table, from which it was concluded that the spin motor was a contributing
factor.
The cause of this modulation was never determined; however, several theories
were advanced. One hypothesis advanced was that the gyro gimbal was acting
as a cantilever beam whose natural frequency was thought to be approximately
that which was measured. The outputs would have been produced by varia-
tions in the gap between the pickoff rotor and stator.
The concern about the modulation was due to the requirements of the high
gain rate command mode used with the OAMS propulsion system. This mode
originally controlled the spacecraft rate within +O.1 degrees per second of
m
the commanded rate. It was feared that a high value of modulation would
cause instability in the rate loop. The OAMS rate command mode deadband
was subsequently raised to +0.2 degrees per second, partially as a result
of this concern, and the problem never materialized in systems tests or
flights.
l
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Requirements - The performance requirements of the Inertial Measurement
Unit (IMU) are classified, but can be obtained from the McDonnell Speci-
fication Control Drawing 52-87717.
Initial Design Tradeoffs and Decisions - The Gemini mission required a
reference that could provide stabilization about the three spacecraft body
axes and measurement of spacecraft velocity changes. A platform was
selected over a strapdown system because the gimballed system reduced
spacecraft digital computer operations for coordinate transformations and
because the platform represented the lesser technical and schedule risk.
Figure 2.2-1 provides a time history for IMU design, development, and
flight operation. This figure establishes significant milestones in the
design and development of the equipment.
Platform Modifications - The platform chosen was a modified version of a
miniature four-gimballed unit used on the Centaur program. These Gemini
modifications were included:
(1) An improved optical access and larger porro prism were incorporated.
(2) The GG 49 gyros were replaced with GG 8001's for increased reliability
and gyro torquing capability.
(3) Mechanical changes were made to permit the platform to be hard-
mounted. Vibration tests on a hard-mounted Centaur platform indicated
that added gimbal 3 and 4 torque capability was desirable. This was
incorporated. To reduce vibration transmission, a high damping
magnesium alloy was used in making the gimbals and case.
jl
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The accelerometer pulse rebalance circuitry was redesigned for
improved reliability and performance. The new design for Gemini
reduced the number of parts to about two-thirds of those of the old
Centaur design. The new design added new rate compensation networks
and external phase adjustments to compensate for lead lengths between
the accelerometer and electronics.
Fast heat block heaters were removed. The change to the GG 8001 gyro
made this possible because it had dual heating elements. One heating
element was used for _^-_ warmup _........_i,_u_._r_-for fine temperature
stabilization when operating temperature was reached. The accelero-
meter also had this dual heater arrangement.
The following slip ring changes were implemented:
(a) Ring and brush alloys were changed to reduce noise and increase
operating life.
(b) "V" groove rings were used instead of "U" grooves for better
brush alignment and tracking.
(c) The number of circuits through the slip rings was increased
from 32 to 38.
(d) New brush forms and forming processes were incorporated to avoid
brush "memory" distortion due to temperature.
(e) Different plastics were used for insulation barriers to minimize
outgas sing.
(f) Stiffer and more rigid ring assemblies were used to reduce ring
deflections in vibration and acceleration environments.
/
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2.2.2 (Continued)
(7) Phase shift resolvers were added to the pitch, yaw and roll gimbals
to provide attitude information to the digital computer. Centaur had
used servo repeaters with digital pickoffs which were located in the
computer. Further discussion of this method will appear under
Paragraph 6. i. 4.
(8) A malfunction detection system was added to denote gross failures in
the IMU accelerometer and gimbal control loops. Two malfunction
lights marked "ACCEL" and "GCA" were located on the instrument panel
(9)
to inform the astronauts of gross errors. The following is a list of
parameters monitored by the malfunction system:
(a) Presence of gyro signal generator excitation
(b) Absence of gimbal stabilization signals for loops l, 2, and B
(c) Presence of 57.6 KHz timing reference
(d) Presence of accelerometer rebalance pulses
(e) Presence of critical power supply voltages
The platform gimbal sequence on Gemini was changed from Centaur by
interchanging the pitch and yaw gimbals. This resulted in the third
gimbal in the Gemini configuration providing yaw axis rather than
pitch axis freedom. This change was desirable because, with a
standard gimbal sequence, a 90 ° displacement of the third gimbal would
have required an outer roll fllp (180 ° rotation) or an equivalent
outer roll torque motor reversal to maintain inertial stabilization.
A gimbal flip requires better servo response and more torque if
performed under high linear acceleration, such as in re-entry. During
re-entry, the platform was left inertially fixed, and pitch angles
jl
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2.2.2 (Continued)
exceeded 90 ° due to earth curvature and vehicle pitch. Therefore,
gimbal flip was avoided during re-entry with reorientation of the
gimbals.
(lO) Incorporation of the spin motor interruption technique (SMIT) was
planned to improve the drift rate repeatability of the gyro. One fac-
tor which affects gyro drift is spin motor magnetic pole location.
The gyro drift rate will vary with the changes in the point of rotor
"lock on" with the synchronous rotating field. Each time the spin
motor is energized it may lock on a different point on the rotor giving
a different drift rate. With SMIT, the spin motor excitation is
interrupted periodically causing the lock-on point to vary. The drift
rate will visit all points within the drift band and thereby have a
more predictable drift rate. Phase angle shift technique (PAST) was
later incorporated in place of SMIT because of its higher reliability.
(ll)
This technique accomplished the same purpose as SMIT, but was more
reliable because it rotated each phase of the gyTo three-phase excita-
tion 30 ° at predetermined intervals instead of interrupting the spin
motor excitation.
An active conductive cooling system was used on Gemini instead of the
radiation cooling system of Centaur. This necessitated the use of a
platform mount which contained the coldplate for the platform.
IMUPackaging - The IMUwas divided into four basic packages: platform,
system electronics, gimbal control electronics (GCE), and static power
supply (SPS). The SPS and GCE were bolted together to form one package.
The SPS also contained the DC power supplies for the computer and a 400 Hz
MCDONNELL DOUGLA_
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source for the entire G&C system. This common power supply design was used
to minimize weight and volume. Figures 2.2-2 through 2.2-4 show the
construction of these packages.
Abort From Orbit Study - An abort from orbit would require fast alignment
of the platform assuming worst case condition with the platform off. The
requirement was that alignment be such that yaw axis would be gyro compassed
to within 1° of 180 ° azimuth prior to initiating retrograde. The sequence
of events was (1) platform fast heat warmup, (2) platform cage BEF (blunt
end forward) with the spacecraft manually oriented to local horizontal BEF
using the ACME system, and (3) platform alignment BEF. The time required
to perform this sequence is about 44 minutes.
Since over half the time required to align the platform is consumed in the
fast heat warmup cycle, trickle heating of the platform was considered.
However, too much power would have been required to trickle heat the plat-
form to operating temperature and would have reduced the time in orbit
approximately one day in a 14-day mission.
Another modification considered was to increase the gimbal torque
amplifier (GTA) and torquer capability to lO0 ma. With this modification
I and trickle heating of the platform, alignment time would have been reducedto approximately lO minutes. This modification would have required a major
redesign of the platform.
i A fast heat cycle change was also considered. It would have reduced thenormal warm-up time from 2B minutes to 17 minutes by adding 50 more watts
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2.2.2 (Continued)
to fast heat heaters. This change would have required an increase in the
capacity of the +40 VDC power supplies and additional slip rings on the
platform to carry the additional heater current.
A fast heat override switch was also considered for use with the fast heat
cycle modification. The astronauts could override the fast heat cycle at
approximately ii minutes and start alignment of the platform with degraded
accuracy.
I
I
I
I
2.2.3
It was concluded at the end of this study in December 1962, that no design
changes were required. If an abort from orbit in less than 60 minutes was
necessary, a manual re-entry would have to be performed.
Development Problems, Tradeoffs, and Design Decisions -
Gyro and Accelerometer i00 Hour Run-ln - A lO0-hour run-in was initiated on
gyros and accelerometers to eliminate infant mortality failures and to
provide stability data over run-up, cool-down, run-up periods. When
accelerometers or gyros indicated stable characteristics, they were accepted
for platform installation. Acceptance percentages using this method were
approximately 75 for the gyros and 85 for the accelerometers. This run-in
program was initiated in early 1963 and applied to all production hardware.
Conclusion - We recommend that inertial components be operated period-
icallywhile in storage. If inertial parameter changes occur after
non-operating periods, further operation of the device prior to recheck-
ing characteristics may be advisable.
i
MCDONNELL DOI.IGLA,I__
CORPO_Alr#oltl
_5
2.2.3
MERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEY
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
(Continued)
Gyro Eutectic Melt Temperature Instability - A eutectic capsule was mounted
on the gyro gimbal for balance trimming. A problem caused by this capsule,
appearing as a large mass unbalance drift, was detected by the subcontractor
on two gyros. The cause was traced to the tin lining of the capsule.
Ternary alloying had occurred due to the migration of the tin into the
eutectic alloy, lowering the eutectic melt temperature. When the gyro was
at operational temperature, creeping of the contaminated eutectic alloy
occurred and caused mass unbalance of the gyro. This problem was corrected,
on gyros built after the Gemini gsTos, by gold plating the trim capsule to
prevent ternary alloying. The change was not incorporated during the
Gemini program because the infrequent occurrence of the problem did not
warrant the added expense of modifying existing gyros.
Fluorolube Leakage (Gyro Main Header Seal Failure) - Fluorolube was used as
a gyro floatation fluid. Leakage of the Fluorolube ultimately resulted in
gas bubbles forming in the gyro's fluid cavity. These bubbles introduced a
transient mass instability, causing erratic performance, and excessive
drift rates. Two gyros exhibited this type of failure. The first, the
pitch gyro on the Spacecraft 3 platform, caused excessive gyro drift during
launch, accentuated by the motion of the bubbles due to the launch accelera-
tion. The second was discovered after removal of the header dust cover
when dismantling a gyro to look for another failure. The subcontractor
stated that the leakage was caused by seal failures due to inadvertent
handling abuse or to the method by which the epoxy sealent was applied. As
corrective action, three pressure leak checks were made prior to assembly
l
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of the dust cover at the gyro level. A dynamic tilt test was instituted
at the IMU level to determine if bubbles were present in the fluid cavity.
Conclusion - Gyros and accelerometers should be designed so that the
Fluorolube seal can be visually observed. An output axis tumble test
should be performed at the gyro level, along with the dynamic tilt
test at IMU level. Repetitive thermal cycling tests should also be
performed, with visual checks for fluid leakage at the component
level.
Oscillatory Drift - During acceptance testing on the first production unit,
drift trim difficulty was encountered because the gyro drift changed
continuously. The amplitude of this oscillation was approximately 1 arc
minute with a period of 2 to 35 minutes. The amplitude and frequency of
this cyclic drift was dependent on gimbal orientation. This problem was
caused by a 400 Hz voltage from the spin motor coupling into the gyro sig-
nal generators. This set up a mechanical oscillation in the gimbals via
the gimbal torquers. This oscillation beat with the rotation of the other
two spin motors to produce a drift whose period was determined by the beat
frequency, and an amplitude that was a function of the magnitude of the
gimbal oscillation and spin-motor imbalance. The oscillating drift observed
was the result of the difference in the rotational speed of the gyros.
Variation in synchronous speed appeared to be caused by the phase angle
shift technique (PAST), which varied the synchronous speed slightly from
gyro to gyro.
l MCDONNELL DOUGLA_
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This cyclic drift was eliminated by placing a 400 Hz notch filter in
parallel with the sum amplifier for gimbal loops l, 2, and 3. The best
approach would have been to eliminate the spin motor noise pick-up in the
gyro; however, schedule pressure did not allow this approach.
Slip Ring Problems - Numerous slip ring problems were observed on the plat-
form during the Gemini Program. The original slip rings, used on engineer-
ing models and the first four production models, exhibited high brush-to-
ring resistance. Construction of the brushes and brush blocks made it
difficult to control alignment of the brushes during assembly. Contamina-
tion of the rings caused by brush block chips and bearing lubricant also
contributed to the problem.
In August 1963, a new slip ring assembly, employing some concepts from
Saturn slip rings, was incorporated in Gemini platforms. However, inter-
mittently open and noisy signals were still obse_ed. Intermittently and
continuously open slip rings were caused by the polymerization and deposi-
tion of organic materials on the slip ring contact surfaces. To prevent
organic contamination, the following changes were incorporated:
(i) The slip ring assembly material was changed to reduce epoxy outgassing.
(2) The amount of lubricant in rotary component and slip ring bearings was
reduced.
(3) Procedures were initiated in late 1964 to prevent build-up of organic
material on the slip rings by wiping the rings periodically (i0 rota-
tions of platform CW and CCW around each axis).
j,
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The platform pressurizing gas mixture was changed from 30 percent
helium and 70 percent nitrogen to 30 percent helium, 50 percent nitro-
gen, and 20 percent oxygen. The added oxygen apparently kept
"Loctite" (organic staking material for platform screws) from harden-
ing and adhering to the rings. The "Loctite" was an outgassing product
deposited on the slip rings. This change, incorporated in March 1965,
noticeably reduced noise on slip rings.
Another anomaly involved shorted slip rings due to dielectric breakdown of
insulation material on the leads leading into the slip ring assembly. The
primary cause of this problem was the elevated temperature in which the
rings operated in the platform. The design of internal leads was changed to
reduce breakdowns, and temperature cycling and soak tests were initiated to
check dielectric characteristics of each slip ring assembly prior to
installation.
A hard gold plate finish was incorporated on the slip rings in April 1965,
to reduce galling. A run-in test was added with a subsequent visual inspec-
tion of the slip rings for galling prior to installation.
Conclusion - The use of organic materials whose outgassed residues
are nonconductive should be minimized. In addition, the initial
design and usage of slip rings should be closely monitored.
Addition of Horizon Sensor Ignore Light - In June 1963, a spacecraft display
light was added to inform the astronauts that the platform was not aligning.
This light was controlled by the ignore relay in the system electronics
package which was activated by the ignore signal from the horizon sensor.
/
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The ignore relay's function was to open the pitch and roll horizon sensor
signals to the X and Y gyro torquer loops. This light also informed the
astronauts of horizon sensor failure if the light failed to extinguish
after a reasonable time period.
Horizon Sensor Ignore Delay Problem - During Electronic System Test Unit
(ESTU) testing, an incompatibility was observed between the IMU and horizon
sensor following a horizon sensor loss of track. It was observed that the
horizon sensor had to track the horizon approximately 3 to 6 seconds before
its pitch and roll error signals were stabilized. This anomaly was
corrected by adding a 6-second time delay in system electronics which
delayed the dropout of the ignore relay.
Synchro Phase Shift Problem - During ESTU testing, it was noted that
excessive phase shift in the platform synchro outputs widened the ACME
control deadband. The problem was corrected by adding an inductance-
capacitance network to the synchro rotor circuit, which reduced the phase
shift from approximately 15 ° to 9° or less.
Conclusion - Interface characteristics should be closely coordinated
between subcontractors during the initial design phase and interface
tests should begin as early in the program as possible.
2.2.4 Problems and Design Changes During Development and Qualification Testing -
Platform Vibration Problems - In April 1963, exploratory tests on the test
bed platform showed the platform's performance to be degraded when
exposed to a vibration environment. These tests consisted of low level
jr
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(+2 g peak) sinusoidal and random (to 6.B g RMS) vibration. Limited per-
formance information was obtained because of excessive electrical lead
breakage on the inner gimbal. The platform resonance was determined to be
approximately i00 Hz with a corresponding transmissibility to the inner
gimbal of 17 g's per g input.
The corrective action taken after this Phase I vibration testing was as
follows:
(1) Inner gimbal wiring was improved by rerouting, incorporation of stress
loops, and addition of stainless steel wire bundle stiffeners.
(2) Various capacitors and resistors were attached more securely.
(3) Rotary component screw torques were increased and staked with cement.
Phase II testing, started after incorporation of the above modifications,
consisted of low level sinusoidal vibration and random vibration up to
]2.6 g RMS. Fewer mechanical problems were encountered than during the
Phase I tests, but wire breaks occurred after some high level vibration
exposure. In addition, a phase shift resolver capacitor broke loose and
there was loss of mechanical integrity in the gimbal rotary components.
Platform performance indicated excessive gyro drift rates, and gimbal 3
lost its inertial reference at approximately 9-10 g's RMS. The loss of
reference condition was partially due to the fact that the higher torque
capability gimbal drive motors mentioned previously were not incorporated
in the test bed platform.
Phase I and Phase II testing indicated that the majority of the platform
vibration problems could be attributed to the rotary components.
jl
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Phase III and Phase IV (mock-up) tests were initiated at the subcontractor's
facility immediately after the Phase II tests. These tests revealed the
rotary components were introducing the equivalent of relatively weak spring
constants into the gimbal support system. In addition, unequal spring rates
across a gimbal were observed. These conditions indicated extensive inner
gimbal motion with cross-talk and rocking. The low rotary component spring
rates indicated little stressing of the high damping capability of the
"KIA" magnesium gimbals. Thus, the gimbals were not absorbing energy as
the design intended.
A parallel study by the McDonnell structural dynamics group confirmedthe
hypothesis that the rotary components were the major problem, and the
following platform modifications were incorporated:
(1) Rotary components were stiffened and their spring rates matched by
adhesive bonding of stainless steel discs.
(2) Rotary component bearings were changed, incorporating higher contact
angles and preloading was increased.
Phase V testing on the test bed platform with stiffened rotary components
consisted of sinusoidal vibration up to +2 g's peak and random vibration
up to 12.6 g's RMS.
Results showed losses of reference by gimbal 3, high gyro drift rates, and
non-repeatability of data. The platform did not meet specification of
].2.6 g's RMS, but the Phase V testing was considered to have verified the
platform's structural integrity through 6.3 g's RMS, and performance
through this vibration level was considered acceptable.
jl
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Phase VI tests were performed to evaluate possible platform vibration isola-
tion. Annular isolators were installed between the platform case and
gimbal 4. Vibration tests indicated this approach would permit satisfactory
performance up to 12.6 g's RMS. However, cost and schedule considerations
did not permit incorporation into the production units.
The original vibration specification (12.6 g's RMS) for the Gemini was
lowered to 8.8 g's RMS; the IMU still did not exhibit specified performance
at this new level. Acceptance tests on each unit were performed to 6.2 g's
RMS with the requirement that the platform would not lose reference at this
vibration level. In June 1965, the acceptance vibration spectrum was
notched at platform resonance frequencies, as flight data indicated g levels
at these frequencies could be reduced.
Conclusion - Exploratory vibration tests should be performed as early
in a platform's _ "'^_ ....e,= ment phase _o possible. Specified test vibra-
tion levels must be realistic. The addition of vibration isolators
now available would permit the Gemini platform to be qualified at
12.6 g's RMS.
2.2.5 Problems and Design Changes Associated With Flights
GT-2 Flight Failure - Comparison of tracking data with the IGS outputs dur-
ing the ascent phase indicated errors in these outputs. The anomaly was
evidenced as an out-of-tolerance value for downrange velocity. This
velocity increased rather than decreased at booster and second stage engine
cutoffs.
i
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The cause of the error was determined to be due to an accelerometer loop
problem, later defined as "pulse lockup." The problem was evidenced by
saturation effects, such that the loop introduced a significant lag prior to
responding to an accelerometer polarity reversal. This lag was sufficient
to cause the accelerometer pendulum to be torqued in the wrong direction.
Post-flight centrifuge testing confirmed the saturation problem encountered
during the GT-2 flight. The accelerometer rate compensation network was
modified to correct this situation.
Conclusion - Dynamic tests should be initiated as early as possible
on new designs using realistic acceleration inputs.
GT-3 Flight Problem - An excessive drift rate in the pitch gyro during
ascent caused saturation of the pitch steering signal from 290 seconds
after liftoff through second stage engine cutoff. This failure was caused
by b_oble migration in the Fluorol_oe of the pitch gyro, which is discussed
in Section 2.2.3.
l
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2.3 Horizon Sensor System
2.3.1 Requirements - The initial performance requirements for the Gemini horizon
sensor system and its final capability are shown in Table 2.3-1.
2.3.2 Mercury Horizon Sensor Experience - Mercury horizon sensor experience
greatly influenced Gemini design. On Mercury, two sensors were employed,
one each for the pitch and roll axes. A conical scan technique was used to
detect the infrared discontinuity between earth and space. The scan's
intersection of the earth's radiation level produced a square wave output
from the IR detector for each rotation of the scanner. Processing the out-
put signal by "slicing" reduced the effects of the higher amplitude
intensity variations and lower amplitude noise. The relation of the portion
of the waveform produced by earth's radiation and a fixed spacecraft
reference was used to produce a positive or negative DC output corresponding
to the misalignment of the spacecraft axis with respect to local vertical.
The IR detector was a germanium immersed thermistor bolometer with a pass-
band of 5 to 20 microns. The original design called for a 2 to 20 micron
passband (produced by germanium filtering). The assumption that this
wide band was satisfactory was based on a lack of knowledge, at that time,
of the earth's IR characteristics. It was found later that variations were
present at 2 microns, because solar reflection was greater than expected.
Therefore, the passband was reduced to 5 to 20 microns.
The output of the thermistor bridge circuit was highly noise sensitive,
since its output was only 50 to lO0 microvolts. Shielding and filtering
were added to the spacecraft to protect the sensors from transients on power
lines, caused primarily by relay actuation, and from interference from the
/
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high frequency transmitter. One of the causes of this latter problem was
the mounting of the sensors on and near the front of the spacecraft, which
was the ground plane of the antennas.
Two major horizon sensor problem areas were encountered on Mercury flights -
errors due to cold clouds and errors due to the sun. Cold clouds have a
radiant energy level (in the IR bandpass used on Mercury) which is only
about 10% to 30% of the radiant energy of the earth. The cloud temperatures
were found to be as low as 150°K, compared to a normal horizon temperature
of 240 ° to 280°K. This lower radiation produced notches in the bolometer
output which could cause attitude errors of 2° to 35 ° in the sensor output.
The exact magnitude of the error was dependent upon size and location of
the cloud and its temperature.
These errors were reduced by lowering the slicing, or limiting, level of
the bolometer output to 20% of the peak output. This level corresponded to
a temperature of 190°K. Further reduction of the slicing level was not
feasible due to limitations in the state of the art of bolometers, to the
Johnson noise generated in the bolometers, and to the noise generated in
the pre-amplifiers.
The sun-caused errors were of two types. The first occurred when the sun
was near the edge of the horizon at the point intersected by the sensor's
scan. The sensors contained an "ignore" circuit which was triggered by
normal sun intensity in the field of view. However, with the sun near the
horizon, its intensity was attenuated by the atmosphere and would not trigger
the ignore circuit. The sun, therefore, gave the effect of "moving" the
jr
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horizon edge out by about 3° to 6°, giving an effective 1.5 ° to B° output
error.
The second sun-caused error resulted when the sun, although not directly
in the field of view, was near enough for sun-radiated energy to reach the
bolometer and cause an output error. This error was referred to as "sun-
tail-off" error and lasted for several minutes intermittently throughout
the daylight portion of the Mercury orbits.
2.3.3 Gemini Horizon Sensor Early Design Decisions and Trade-Offs - The time
history of the Gemini horizon sensor design is shown in Figure 2.3-1. In
addition to supplying attitude control reference, the Gemini horizon sensor
was required to provide an accurate reference for alignment of the inertial
platform for on-board guidance. The original concept utilized both a
coarse and a precision horizon sensor. The precision sensor would have
been employed for alignment of the inertial measurement unit, and the coarse
one for attitude control in orbit (Section 4.1). However, the system, as
mechanized, employed a single precision sensor to fulfill all mission
requirements. Two identical systems were included for redundancy. Each
system consisted of two packages, a head and an electronics package, shown
in Figure 2.3-2.
In order to avoid some of the pitfalls of the Mercury sensors, a system
employing edge tracking was chosen rather than the conical scan method
employed on Mercury. With the "across-the-earth" type scanning inherent
in a conical scanner, there was no method of eliminating anomalies being
i caused by the sun near the horizon. The edge tracking concept employed a
/
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tracker which locked onto the earth-space IR gradient. The output signal
therefore was not a direct function of the magnitude of the IR gradient.
Also, cold clouds on the face of the earth would not affect the edge tracker
as much as they would a conical scan device. Section 2.3.5 discusses some
of the sun and cold cloud problems that were still evidenced with the
Gemini sensors. These proved not as large an error source as that on
Mercury.
Azimuth scanning was used to derive pitch and roll information from a single
sensor. This method derived its outputs from a 160 ° azimuth scan rather
than from single points on the horizon, and thus provided higher accuracy.
Selection of the optimum IR spectral bandpass was important in designing
the horizon sensors. The IR horizon varies less at certain wavelengths than
at others. The most consistent bandpass is known to be 14-16 microns, but,
at the time of initial design, no filters were available for this bandpass.
Filters were available for the next best choice - 13.5 to 22 microns -
but these filters were subject to deterioration when subjected to high
humidity. Since the Gemini environmental requirements dictated that the
sensor must not be affected by humidity, this second-best bandpass was
rejected. The bandpass of 8 to 22 microns was finally selected as the best
compromise. This bandpass eliminated the effects of reflected solar energy
(wavelengths less than 4 microns) and the vibrational absorption bands of
water (6.33 to 6.85 microns). Later in the program, a 13.5 - 22 micron
system was developed and flown. It is discussed in Section 2.3.5.
4
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Mounting Location - The following considerations influenced the ultimate
location of the horizon sensors on the spacecraft re-entry module (shown
in Figure 1.2-3) :
(a) Platform orbital alignment accuracy requirements.
(b) Astronaut and sensor field of view requirements during various phases
of the missions.
(c) Aerodynamic heating effects from horizon sensor head projection.
(d) Crosscoupling and non-linearity errors introduced by offsetting the
horizon sensor axes from the spacecraft axes.
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
Due to configuration and field of view requirements, the heads containing
the optics were mounted so as to project beyond the side of the spacecraft.
A fairing was therefore required during launch, to prevent aerodynamic
heating. (The fairing was Jettisoned after launch.) The heads were
jettisoned just prior to re-entry, for the same reason.
The location of the sensors was changed twice during the early stages of
the program. Since the heads could not re-enter with the re-entry module,
the most desirable location was on the adapter, which was jettisoned prior
to re-entry. However, in order for the sensors to align the inertial plat-
form with the required accuracy, the physical alignment error between the
sensors and the platform had to be as small as possible. A maximum mis-
alignment of 0.05 ° was hoped for. In this location, the alignment
uncertainties in mating the adapter and re-entry module were too great,
so the sensors were moved to the side of the re-entry module, near the IMU.
However, a thermodynamic analysis indicated that air flow around the
jl
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horizon sensor fairing might cause severe aerodynamic heating of the
adapter during launch. Therefore, in mid 1962, the horizon sensors were
moved to the re-entry module, near the RCS thrusters, with a slight
sacrifice in platform alignment accuracy.
At this time, it was planned to mount the sensors with a 5° offset in pitch
and a lO ° offset in yaw. The pitch offset was through to provide the
astronauts with the best view of the horizon during various phases of the
mission, while allowing the sensors to be operated in a linear portion of
their field of view, even though the offset necessitated a bias network in
the IMU. Studies conducted in late 1962, however, indicated that better
performance would be obtained with the horizon sensor pitch axis aligned
with the spacecraft pitch axis, so that alignment would be performed at
horizon sensor null. This orientation was still compatible with the astro-
naut and radar field of view requirements for rendezvous, pre-retro fire,
and attitude control, since the astronauts would still have a good view of
the horizon with the spacecraft horizontal.
The yaw offset was introduced to minimize the fairing size. In 1962, the
yaw offset was increased to 14 ° to further reduce the fairing size
required. This necessitated a compensation network in the horizon sensors
to transform the angles detected by the horizon sensor into spacecraft
angles.
,
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Input Power for Horizon Sensors - The sensors were originally planned to be
supplied with spacecraft DC power. Early in the program (mid-1962), the
power source was changed to 26 volt 400 Hz AC from the IGS power supply or
ACHE inverter, to improve overall spacecraft power efficiency.
The use of 400 Hz power caused some difficulties when the horizon sensor's
azimuth drive "kick" pulses caused distortion on the IGS 400 Hz power.
These, however, did not affectother systems seriously enough to warrant
modification.
Problems and Design Changes During Development and Qualification Testing -
Output Circuit Changes - In late 1962, it was found that the 750 ohm output
impedance of the sensor was incompatible with the interfacing circuitry in
the IMU. Changes in the horizon sensor scale factor occurred as a result
of mode changes of the IMU. A new specification of less than lO0 ohms was
placed on the output impedance, and the design was modified incorporating
operational amplifiers instead of the previous emitter follower circuits.
The first operational amplifier design proved to be unstable when capac-
itively loaded by spacecraft cabling, so the circuit was redesigned to yield
a larger phase margin.
Horizon Sensor Electromagnetic Interference Problems - The horizon sensor
was highly susceptible to radiated and conducted electromagnetic inter-
ference (EMI), due largely to its requirement for handling the small signals
from the IR detector. The system originally did not have adequate protec-
tion from external interference sources.
• /
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Extensive testing was conducted on the horizon sensor in late 1962 to
determine means of reducing EMI with the least sacrifice in cost, size, and
weight. Results of early integrated system tests in late 1962 and early
1963 were also used to determine particular _41 problem areas. As a result
of this testing, more shielding was added to spacecraft wiring, and filter-
ing was incorporated.
The horizon sensor power supply was particularly susceptible to starting
transients from the 26 volt 400 Hz power sources, the IGS power supply, and
the ACMEpower inverter. The ACME inverter was modified to reduce its
starting transient to 60 volts (see Section 4), and a suppression network
was incorporated in the horizon sensor to eliminate the effects of these
transients. Most of these changes were added in late 1963 and early 1964.
Design changes were made to improve the horizon sensor signal processing,
which reduced the effects of EMI. Early in the program (late 1962) the
demodulator in the output signal processing was changed from half wave to
full wave. In addition to reducing the effects of noise, this change
provided better separation of the one and two Hz signals which corresponded
to the pitch and roll signals.
The pre-amplifier was redesigned in early 1964 to incorporate a field
effect transistor (FET) in its input stage. The FET's high input impedance
was more compatible with the varying low resistance of the bolometer, and
provided a better signal-to-noise ratio.
i
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The system's electromagnetic compatibility could have been improved further
by incorporating a separate power supply for the bolometer and pre-
amplifier. These low level circuits were the most noise sensitive, and
isolation of their bias power would have improved their noise tolerance.
Vibration Problem With Positor Springs - The Gemini horizon sensor tracked
the horizon by means of a device called a Positor, which was developed by
the horizon sensor subcontractor. The Positor consisted of a mirror mounted
on the rotor of a permanent magnet type torquer. Rotating with the mirror
were two drive coils, moving in a cylindrical air gap. Superimposed on the
DC flux from the permanent magnet was a high frequency AC flux, introduced
by field coils. The Positor was driven by a current through the drive
coils and the high frequency "field coil" EMF induced in these same coils
provided an indication of mirror position. The Positor was driven at 2 cps
over the entire elevation scan of the sensor while searching for the horizon
and was dithered at 30 cps about the edge of the horizon while tracking.
When tracking, the Positor, together with the detected IR signal from the
bolometer, formed a closed loop so that the mirror would track the edge of
the horizon.
The Positor mirror was originally pivoted by means of flexure springs, which
gave promise of long operational life since no bearing friction was present.
These springs, however, fractured during 12.6 g RMS vibration tests. The
Positor was redesigned, using bearing mounts with coil springs to better
withstand the vibration. However, during this redesign, the spacecraft
vibration test level was reduced first to 9.5 g's RMS and subsequently to
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8.8 g's RMS, because of additional knowledge gained about the booster's
characteristics. The flexure pivots were never restored to the Gemini
sensor, but the feeling was that they could have withstood the lower vibra-
tion level. Since the time of the redesign (early 1964), flexure pivots
have been designed to withstand much higher vibration levels than the
original 12.6 g's, and therefore their use would now be recommended on a
similar device, especially for long-term missions.
Lubrication of the Positor pivots posed a unique problem. The proximity
of the bearings to the mirror surface dictated a lubricant with extremely
low outgassing properties, since any film deposited on the mirror would
attenuate the IR input to the sensor. Proper lubricant selection eliminated
problems due to this phenomenon.
Conclusions:
(1) Bearingless pivots are preferable for supportir_ exposed m__nving
parts, contingent on satisfaction of environmental requirements.
(2) Materials with low outgassing properties should be used near
exposed optical devices, to avoid optical attenuation by
deposition of outgassed products.
Breakage of Azimuth Drive Torsion Rod - The azimuth drive consisted of a
yoke assembly which rotated in a 160 ° arc at a natural frequency of 1 cps.
The drive force was applied by "kick" pulses near the center of each swing.
A torsion rod was employed to impart the restoring force. The rods were
machined from an extremely hard spring material and, due to its brittleness
and the difficulty in machining it, breakage was frequent during
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development. In an effort to reduce the breakage susceptibility, the
torsion rod was lengthened, increased in diameter, and changed from a
brazed-on end rod to a barbell configuration. Some of the breakage had
been due to "cork-screwing" scratches resulting from grinding the rods to
"tune" the oscillatory yoke drive to 1 Hz. A new centerless grinding
technique was developed which eliminated this defect.
Bearing Problems - In designing equipment for the space environment,
exposed moving parts are avoided where possible. In the case of the Gemini
horizon sensor, this was impractical because of the requirement for
azimuth-scanning the horizon. Problems were experienced in operating the
azimuth yoke bearings at temperature extremes, and also in finding a
suitable lubricant.
It was found during testing that after a long time in a vacuum at cold
temperatures, the yoke assembly would tighten up and the azimuth drive motor
would not drive the yoke to its proper limits. This problem was due to a
combination of lubricant aging, outgassing of the lubricant, the tight
bearing clearance, and the differential expansion of the stainless steel
bearings and the surrounding magnesium casting. A change was incorporated
to the system in early 1965 which increased the clearances of the drive
bearings.
Conclusions -Recommendations for future systems, regarding bearings,
would include :
(1) Isolate moving parts from the space environment where possible.
l
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(2) Provide adequate drive power to overcome any bearing friction
due to environmental extremes.
(3) Pay particular heed to outgassing properties of lubricants.
Hermetic Sealing of Horizon Sensor Head - The head of the horizon sensor
was exposed to the space environment. The primary reason for not sealing
it was the difficulty in designing a cover which would be transparent to the
IR wavelengths of the sensor. The problem was complicated by the geometry
of the sensor. A window would have to be curved to accommodate the 160 °
azimuth scan. Germanium would have been optically the best, but machining
it would have been difficult. Also it is easily scratched, and oxidation
due to fingerprints would have been unrepairable.
"Saran Wrap" was found to be a suitable cover to avoid contamination
during ground handling, but would have been difficult to use as a permanent
cover. It possessed an IR opaque critical angle of 38°, so anomalies were
introduced when its surface was wrinkled. Also, in its conventional form,
it was fragile and easily scratched.
Obviously, a suitable sealed cover would go far in solving the bearing
problem, and also would eliminate contaminants.
Horizon Sensor Ignore Circuit - The Horizon Sensor would send out an
ignore command to interfacing subsystems whenever the sensor would lose
track of the horizon and go into its search mode. This command was
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extinguished when the sensor regained track, and at this time the pitch
and roll signals were again transmitted. A problem developed because the
outputs took some time to settle when the sensor regained track. When
the ignore command was extinguished, the inaccurate signals transmitted
immediately after regaining track caused perturbations in the interfacing
subsystems (IMU and ACME). To solve this problem, a time delay was
incorporated in the I_which delayed the receipt of the horizon sensor
signals after track was regained.
Conclusion - In a future system, this time delay function could be
performed in the horizon sensor by incorporating two track check
circuits - a fast acting one to control signals internal to the
horizon sensor, and a slower one to ensure valid signals before they
are sent out to interfacing subsystems.
2.3.5 Problems and Design Changes Associated With Systems Tests and Flights -
Spacecraft 3 Performance - The flight of Spacecraft 3 provided the first
opportunity to evaluate horizon sensor performance under actual conditions.
The inability to predict exactly the varying nature of the earth's infra-
red transmissions precluded an accurate appraisal in ground tests, and
made the data from this first orbital flight extremely significant.
The post-flight analysis of Spacecraft 3 data indicated many anomalies.
These included 382 losses of track totaling 366 seconds (out of the 4 hour,
28 minute, 3 second duration of the mission) and several instances of
wandering outputs, both of which degraded sensor performance. Of the losses
of track, 265 were explainable by coincidence with spacecraft pitch or roll
/
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attitude beyond the limits of sensor performance, or by switching between
redundant sensors. An extensive analysis was conducted to determine the
causes of the remaining losses of track and the wandering outputs. The
factors taken into account included:
(a) Thruster plumes falling into the sensor field of view.
(b) The sun and moon in the sensor field of view.
(c) Weather conditions (cold fronts).
(d) Spacecraft switching transients.
(e) RFI from ground tracking stations.
The thruster firing and spacecraft switching transients showed a low
probability of causing losses of track. Moon rise and set and activity of
ground tracking stations showed no correlation at all.
The analysis of sun in the sensor field of view gave 100% correlation to
the occurrence of wandering outputs and losses of track. These both
occurred when the sun was between 0° and lO ° above the horizon. The
possibility of either of these occurrences can be explained by considering
the relative position of the sun to the earth/space gradient, and the
sensor's field of view. It was shown that the sun being as far as lO°
above the sensor's field of view could produce output errors when the sun's
_R energy is less than the earth's. When the sun's IR energy appears equal
to the earth's, the earth/space gradient disappears and a loss of track
occurs. When the sun's energy exceeds the earth's, a reversal of phase
occurs, driving the Positor toward space and producing an error, or the
detector circuit saturates, giving a wandering sensor output.
J
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During the flight of Spacecraft 4, relatively few losses of track occurred
which did not correlate with the excessive spacecraft attitudes or sun
conditions. The weather conditions at these occurrences corresponded to
the same type of cloud formations that caused problems on Spacecraft 3.
The reduction in occurrences was explained by the seasonal weather varia-
tions. Spacecraft 4 flew in June, under relatively clear conditions,
whereas Spacecraft 3 flew in March, when clouds were frequent.
The data from the flights of Spacecraft 5 through 8 was not analyzed in
the same detail as those from Spacecraft 3 and 4.
Spacecraft 9 Narrow Band Optics Modification - As stated previously in
Section 2.3.2, the original horizon sensor design utilized optics with a
8 to 22 micron IR spectral bandpass. At the time of the Gemini design, it
was known that this bandpass was not ideal, but tradeoffs dictated its use
at the time. The performance on Spacecraft 3, discussed above, indicated
deficiencies in the sensor's performance under certain conditions, and in
order to reduce these effects, a modification was made to the sensor
system to use a narrower IR bandpass, 13.5 to 22 microns.
The 8 to 22 micron bandpass contains two frequency bands which are more
variable than others in the bandpass. They are the ozone absorber and
water absorption bands, between 8.9 to lO.1 microns; and the water continuum
window and high altitude dust particles, between 10.75 and 11.75 microns.
These bands vary the radiant intensity contour and altitude as a function
of the earth's seasonal and climatic conditions. These variations are
more erratic in the presence of cloud formations, and are responsible for
jl
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The remaining anomalies were compared with weather data, and showed a high
correlation to cumulus cloud formations. The distorted spectral radiant
energy contour between space and earth will contain two major gradients,
cloud/space and earth/cloud, when certain clouds appear near the earth's
horizon. The sensor tracks the largest of the two gradients. If the
space/cloud gradient is predominant, output variations will be minor, but
major output wanderings or losses of track occur when the earth/cloud
gradient predominates. At this time, the sensor will track the earth/cloud
gradient instead of the earth/suace _radient Tf _ _v+h/_l_,,_ ._ _-_
ends, the sensor will view the steady state earth IR radiation, and the
system loses track. If the earth/cloud gradient ends with the true horizon
in the tracking sensor's field of view, the Positor jumps to the true
horizon, producing an output error.
Spacecraft 4 Performance - In order to confirm the post-flight analysis of
Spacecraft 3 data, instrumentation was added to the Spacecraft 4 primary
sensor system to monitor the amplified bolometer signal, Positor position
detector output, and the sensor track check light. Special in-flight
tests were conducted to evaluate sensor performance at sunrise and sunset
and at moonrise and moonset, and the effect of thruster plumes. Telemetry
data and pilot comments confirmed the sun's interference, with output
variations and losses of track occurring with the sun between lO ° above
and 1/2 ° below the horizon. The moonrise and set and thruster plume tests
indicated no interference from these sources.
_
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the behavior described under Spacecraft B performance. Thus, the blocking
of these bands by the 13.5 to 22 micron bandpass optics could be expected
to improve tracking accuracy of the sensor.
In addition to the improvement _hile tracking through clouds, the new
optics could be expected to improve performance at sunrise and sunset,
since the sun's irradiance is reduced by a factor of 4 with this bandpass.
The opt imumbandpass would have been l_.l to 15.6 microns, which contains
+_o very stable carbon dioxide o_÷_ _ _ ......... +_ _ac_
reduces the available IR energy by a factor of 4 over the 8-22 micron band-
pass, and thus major modifications would have been required to the sensor
optics and electronics to compensate for the low input energy. The
modified sensor, with the 13.5 to 22 micron bandpass had approximately
the same total IR energy available at the sensor's bolometer as with the
8-22 micron bandpass, so no change to the electronics was necessary. The
total IR energy contained in the narrower bandpass was actually less, but
transmission through the sensor's optics was improved by depositing the
filter directly on the collimating lens, eliminating one element in the
optical path. This change was possible because of improvement in deposi-
tion techniques from those available at the beginning of the program.
On Spacecraft 9, one wide band (8-22 micron bandpass) and one narrow band
(13.5-22 micron bandpass) horizon sensors were flown. No quantitative
/
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analysis of the narrow band versus wide band performance could be made
during the flight because both sensors could not be operated simultaneously,
but a qualitive analysis, based on astronaut comments, telemetry data,
and evaluation of known losses of track, showedthat the narrow band optics
exhibited superior performance° The narrow band sensor experienced no
losses of track or wandering output due to sun or cloud effects, as had
occurred with the wide band sensor.
Conclusion - Based on this experience, we recommend employment of
narrow band optics on a future sensor design. The very stable I_-16
micron bandpass would be optimum for a new design, where the signal
processing could be designed to compensate for the lower input energy.
Failure of Azimuth Drive on Spacecraft 5 Sensor - During the Spacecraft 5
mission, the primary horizon sensor's azimuth drive ceased operating. An
exact failure analysis could not be done because the sensor heads were
jettisoned before the spacecraft's return to the earth. Based on analysis
of available data, the failure was postulated to be caused by either a
mechanical failure of part of the azimuth drive, by an obstruction that
restricted yoke motion, or by an electrical failure in the drive circuit.
Corrective actions were taken on all of these possibilities on systems in
production.
jr
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A later failure of the same nature was experienced during production test-
ing of Spacecraft lO. This time, the horizon sensor head was available
for dismantling, and the cause of the failure was found to be the breakage
of the azimuth drive band, which was made of extremely brittle "Elgiloy"
spring metal. A small piece of epoxy, used during construction, was found
on the drive band, which caused it to fatigue at that point where the band
rolled over the drive pulley. This sensor was the only unit built previous
to the Spacecraft 5 failure, and had not undergone a cleaning procedure
instituted after that failure. Thus, it was felt that the failures of
both units were caused by the same thing.
Conclusion - Based on these failures, a recommendation can be made,
for future systems, to institute rigorous cleaning procedures for
moving parts where metal fatigue may be caused by interference of
small particles. Such mechanisms should be designed, where possible,
so that foreign materials cannot enter the mechanism.
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2.4 Rendezvous Radar System
2.4.1 Requirements - Rendezvous with an orbiting target vehicle dictated a
system which measured range, range rate, and angle to the target vehicle,
and was operable over the range of environments required. The initial
functional performance requirements, together with the final demonstrated
capability, are given in Table 2.4-1.
2.4.2 Initial Design Tradeoffs and Decisions - The following design approaches
were investigated. Selection of the last, the angle-measuring (interfer-
ometer type) radar, was influenced by the tradeoff considerations which
follow its description.
a. Hybrid 1 (Radar & Optics ) - In this approach a fixed radar would have
obtained range and range rate data while a simple optical system deter-
mined angular target data. The optical system consisted of an optical
sight parallel to the radar boresight (longitudinal axis of space-
craft). Target angles would then be determined by manually aligning
the spacecraft along the llne of sight to the target and measuring
body angles with respect to the inertial reference. Range, range
rate, and platform angle data would have been automatically sampled by
the computer at fixed intervals, or angular data could have been
manually inserted by an astronaut.
b. Hybrid 2 (Radar & Optics) - Again, a fixed radar would have obtained
range and range rate data, and an optical system with a first order
manual rate correction would have been used to gather angular target
data. This more sophisticated optical system was more accurate than
that of hybrid 1 and would have included movable cross hairs so that
sensed motion of the target could have been added to the gimbal
i
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angles. The astronaut was then required to insert angle and angle
rate data into the computer manually when the target was centered.
Range and range rate were inserted automatically as for Hybrid i.
I Gimbaled optics were also considered, with angular data inserted inthe computer as stated above.
c. Angle-Measuring Radar - Both gimbaled and interferometer types of
radars were considered. The interferometer type provided the follow-
ing advantages: l) less volume, weight, and power; and (2) much
simpler mechanization, which decreased suscep_]_y to v_+_
and facilitated sealing of lubricated parts against vacuum. While
these advantages were offset by the higher accuracy capability of a
gimbaled radar, the interferometer's accuracy was .... _ored suf-
ficient for the Gemini mission.
When these three systems were considered only in terms of sensors, both
hybrid systems appeared to have a definite weight advantage. However, this
advantage was offset by the additional fuel required to maintain the
tighter attitude control essential to these hybrid systems. We believed
the accuracy of Hybrid 2 to be comparable to that of the angle-measuring
radar. However, the angle-measuring radar was less subject to human error
and appeared to represent a lesser technical and schedule risk. The
relatively poor accuracy of the less complex Hybrid 1 would have increased
maneuver fuel consumption sufficiently to make this system the heaviest
by far.
Since optical system reliability would have been in series with radar
reliability for both hybrids, it was questionable if any gain in overall
/
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system reliability would really have been achieved over the angle measur-
ing radar system. Use of a range and range rate only radar would still
have required that all the transponder circuitry and much of the radar cir-
cuitry function properly; so its reliability was considered only slightly
better than that of the range and angle radar.
Development and qualification of a first order correction optical system,
in addition to the range and range rate radar, would have cost consider-
ably more than development of a range and angle radar.
Based on past Mercury experience, we questioned whether optical tracking
could be maintained in daylight, especially when the sun shone into the
cabin. We could not rule out the possibility of optical tracking being
lost during a critical portion of rendezvous. The radar did not share this
problemand hence had a better proven tracking capability. Also, target
acquisition by radar was much easier.
The angle measuring radar offered greater flexibility and growth potential
for future missions, and left the astronaut more time to perform other
functions and experiments. Rendezvous would have required 2 to 4 hours of
tedious, repetitive effort with the long-range optical angle measuring
systems.
All radars considered used radomes and pressurized packages to avoid pro-
blems associated with lubrication of moving parts and unsealed operation
in space.
jl
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2.4.3
In summary, the greater mission growth potential, proven tracking cap-
ability, improved human factors, and fuel savings of the angle measuring
radar outweighed the possible but small advantage of the hybrid systems in
reliability and radar system weight. An interferometer device was chosen
over a gimbaled radar for angle measurement because of simpler mechanization
and a size, weight and power advantage.
Development Problems, Tradeoffs and Design Decisions - Figure 2.4-1 provides
a time history of the radar design, development and flight operations. This
figure may be used to establish the occurrence of significant milestones in
the design and development of the equipment. The radar is shown in Figure
2.4-2 and the transponder in Figure 2.4-3. The following paragraphs discuss
early design tradeoffs and decisions, and any problems resulting from
those decisions.
Servo Response - Preliminary studies of angle accuracy and angular tracking
rate capability by the radar subcontractor stated that a 2 Hz servo response
was required. Although McDonnell studies indicated that a lesser servo
response should have been adequate, the initial design was allowed to
proceed on this basis. However, angle accuracy measurements on engineer-
ing model units revealed that angular error was excessive with a 2 Hz
response. The response of the flight units was reduced to 0.5 Hz without
degrading the mission tracking capability.
Angle Ambiguity - Any phase-measuring device has an ambiguity if the phase
relationship between the two received signals exceeds 180 °. For the Gemini
interferometer radar, the ambiguity occurred at a line-of-sight angle of
i
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37.6 ° off the boresight. We recognized that if the radar locked on beyond
37.6 °, ambiguous angle data would be furnished to the Gemini computer. To
prevent a false null, operational procedures were initiated in which the
astronauts would try to null the Flight Director Indicator (FDI) needles
while changing the spacecraft attitude in the direction indicated by the
needles. However, these procedures were never required in any mission be-
cause ground tracking data provided more accurate pointing information than
was originally expected.
Conclusion - If a decision is made to use an interferometer type
radar where pointing is not expected to be accurate enough to prevent
ambiguities, consideration should be given to incorporating electronic
circuitry to detect them.
RF Phase Shifters - To track a target located off boresight, an interfero-
meter can be used only in conjunction with a variable phase shifter. When
the Gemini rendezvous radar was conceived, high reliability electronic phase
shifters were not available. The scheme decided upon was to rotate a
spiral antenna to produce the required phase shifting for angle tracking.
Transponder Voltage Regulation - The transponder required a regulated
voltage source for efficient power supply operation. Such a source was
available on the Agena. But line losses from current drains across the
Agena target docking adapter (TDA) interface were greater than originally
anticipated. Thus the voltage available at the transponder was less than
desired. This resulted in the transponder operating on an unregulated
voltage. A boost regulator was subsequently added to the TDA which, in
jl
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turn, furnished the transponder with the proper regulated voltage level.
This change took place in September 1963.
Conclusion - Determine line losses across vehicle interfaces before
evaluating the use of remote voltage sources.
Redundant Desi_nFeatures - The MTBF requirements on the radar and trans-
ponder were lOOO and 10,OOO hours, respectively. The design mechanization
as originally conceived was solid state, with the exception of the trans-
mitter and the local oscillator. Planar triodes were selected for the
local oscillator and transmitter RF sources. To meet the transponder MTBF
requirement, redundant local oscillators were originally considered, as well
as a solid state local oscillator using a varactor multiplier. Both design
concepts were pursued for the first four months of the engineering develop-
ment. As reliability data was gathered on the local oscillator, a single
planar triode type proved to be sufficiently reliable for system MTBF
requirements. Further development of the solid-state local oscillator
was therefore stopped.
Conclusion - Where possible, pursue more than one design approach to
meeting key requirements until the solution is clearly in hand.
Pressurization - Size, weight, and reliability were the primary considera-
tions in the decision to pressurize the radar. Pressurization would
obviously add weight. On the other hand, the radar required moving parts
for angle tracking, and it was felt that the lubricants available at the
time would not survive 1A days in a hard vacuum environment. The decision
was therefore made to pressurize the radar in spite of the weight penalty
//
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of approximately six pounds. This decision was rendered prior to contract
go-ahead, and the original mechanical design was compatible with this
[ requirement.
I A decision was made not to pressurize the transponder on the basis that it
contained no moving parts and would survive the long duration exposure to
a hard vacuum. This decision resulted in the occurrence of electrical
breakdown during qualification testing. Changes required to correct this
problem are discussed 2._.h.
in Section
Thermal Control - During the preliminary spacecraft design phase, we deter-
mined the optimum location for radar installation to be the front of the
spacecraft. This location was far removed from the spacecraft active cool-
ing system, and it was undesirable to provide active cooling for the radar.
The radar ground plane area that was available as a radiator was found to
be more than adequate to prevent the radar from overheating during the
rendezvous exercises. Prior to contract go-ahead, the decision was made
that the thermal control of the radar would be passive. A flight failure
due to low temperature operation of the radar is discussed in Section 2.h.5.
An active coolant system was not available on the Agena, thus necessitating
passive temperature control of the transponder. To conform with this design
constraint, the transponder was hard mounted on the mold line of the TDA to
allow one side of the unit to function as a radiator.
Frequency Chan_es - The rendezvous radar system was originally conceived as
an L-band system. The early system performance studies were performed with
/
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the frequencies of IOOOMHz for the radar and 1060 MHz for the transponder.
I This selection of frequencies was thought to be within the interference
I region of the IFF frequency hand, so the original development frequencies
chosen for the engineering model radar and transponder were I_28MHz and
I
1368MHz respectively. In August 1962, the FCC approved the frequencies
L of 1528NHz for the radar and 1428MHz for the transponder. This change
I occurred during the initial deliveries of the microwave components for
the engineering model equipments. The microwave components were redesigned
for the allocated frequencies, but the system antennas also required
i redesign. Subsequent analysis and evaluation showed that the RF gain
was lower at these frequencies than at those originally planned, and the
I maximum range capability was reduced to 180 nm. However, this range was
still compatible with the requirements of the rendezvous mission, and the
radar antennas were not redesigned.
I Conclusion - Press for an FCC frequency allocation at the earliest
possible date.
Incorporation of Co--and Link - The decision to ignite the Agena engine
subsequent to rendezvous required that the astronauts have command control
of the Agena vehicle. Studies of the communications equipment already on
board Gemini revealed that multipath problems existed for these lower
frequency systems. Further studies showed that the radar could be pulse-
position-modulated for the transmission of commands to the Agena and that
pulse width modulation of the transponder could be used for command
verification, i
/
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Go-ahead to incorporate the co.and link in the radar system was given in
September 1962 after the drawing release to build the engineering model
equipment. Extensive changes were required to the radar system. The radar
modulator was redesigned to accommodate the pulse position modulation by the
vehicle time reference system. The command link encoder and the encoder
controller were added in the cabin. These units allowed the astronauts to
select and generate the appropriate command for transmission by the radar
to the Agmna. A sub-bit detector was added to the transponder which
provided for detection of the sub-bits contained in the transmitted command
2.4.4
word. All changes were incorporated in the design, and the production
prototypes were delivered with full command capability.
Problems and Design Cha es During Development and _n Testin E -
Radome Seal - The original studies of the radar angle tracking performance
indicated that use of radomes over both the angle-tracking and the
reference antenna assemblies would cancel radome-induced phase errors.
The reference antenna assembly was stationary and did not require a
pressurized radome as did the azimuth and elevation antenna assemblies.
Thus, the radcme over the reference antenna was not sealed, resulting in
the exposure of the reference antenna to the ambient environment. During
humidity qualification tests, a boresight shift was noted in both angle
tracking channels. The shift was found to be due to moisture absorption
in the epoxy laminate board on which the reference antenna was etched.
Design changes were incorporated in the flight units to seal the reference
antenna from the humid ground test environment at the Cape.
/
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Range Processing - The origlnalrange processing technique utilized by the
radar established a composite range value from four range readings. This
technique provided smoothing of the range data. During the engineering
development phase, we realized that a false alarm that occurred during the
four range count interval could result in a gross error in the range reading
that was supplied the spacecraft computer. At the conclusion of the
engineering development phase, the radar design was modified such that tar-
get range was determined with each transmitted pulse instead of with an
average of four pulses. The change from four range word accumulation to
one range word accumulation caused t_e bias error to increase from 50 ft to
75 ft, and the minimum range specification was increased to 500 ft. During
the rendezvous exercise, each range reading was transferred to the computer_
and provisions were incorporated in the math flow to check the validity of
each range reading before the computer processed the radar data.
Conclusion - Accomplish data smoothing in a device inherently capable
of discriminating against grossly inaccurate single data points.
Coaxial Switch - A coaxial switch was required in the Agena transponder to
switch between the spiral antennas and the dipole antenna to accommodate
changing Agena to Gemini look angles during rendezvous. A solid state
switch was chosen initially, but it failed during engineering development
testing. It was found that the microwave diodes could not handle the
transponder peak power while the switch was changing state. Rather than
redesign the transponder video section to preclude switching while the
transmitter was firing, we decided to incorporate a coaxial relay in the
/
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2.4.4 (Continued)
transponder. This change was incorporated in the production prototype
units in the summer of 1963.
Conclusion - If antenna switching is necessary, either preclude
transmission during the switching action or specify a switch capable
of handling the expected peak power when the switch is in the changing
state.
Pressure Sealing of Transponder Coax Switch - As part of the general change
to vent outgassed elements from RF co_mponents a_nr_ated with the
transponder, the coaxial relay was vented to prevent these entrapped gases
from causing glow discharge breakdown. No problem was anticipated from this
change; however, when the relay was installed in the transponder sm.d tested
in a vacuum chamber, we observed a new phenomena. When the relay was
cycled, it would start to switch from one port to the other, and halfway
through switching it would return to the initial port. The problem was
traced to a large transient which was generated by the switch in the vacuum.
This energy was coupled back into the electronics driving the switch,
causing the switch to return to the initial state. The phenomena producing
the problem was described as "vacuum chop," where the spark generated by the
contacts is extinguished much faster in a vacuum than at ambient, causing
the induced transient to be lO0 times greater. Suppression of the
transient by filtering was impractical because the switching mechanism
became unreliable when enough filtering was added. Instead, minor modi-
fications were made to the existing humidity seal so that the transponder
coaxial switch was not vented, and a satisfactory vacuum seal was obtained.
/t
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Radar Vibration - The basic structural member of the radar was the ground
plane that mounted flush with the front of the spacecraft. This member
served as an RF ground plane and all the system electronics were hard
mounted to it. In May 1962, the thickness of this member was reduced during
an overall spacecraft weight reduction effort. In the fall of 1963, during
engineering development tests, the ground plane was found to "oil can"
when subjected to a vibration level of 12.6 g's RMS perpendicular to the
plane of the ground plane. This problem was corrected by increasing the
_"-_ ...... _ the ...... _ pl by _+_^_ _ -_÷_^_ _1o÷_ to61 _ s_ue and the _.
the radar mounts. These changes were incorporated in the production proto-
type units, and the radar was successfully qualified at an 8.8 g's RMS
.I-_:: V i_J_.
Transponder Humidity - The original chassis design of the transponder did
not incorporate provisions to prevent the electronics from being exposed to
the 100_ humidity test environment. The electronic assemblies and
components were coated and finished to preclude corrosion and moisture
absorption. However# moisture that was trapped between heat sinks and
printed circuit boards resulted in leakage current paths that rendered por-
tions of the equipment inoperative. This problem was discovered in
September 1964, and seals were incorporated in the chassis to prevent the
transponder electronics from being exposed to the high humidity test
environment.
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Transmitter Discharge- A characteristic of a planar triode transmitter
tube is that occasionally a discharge occurs between the tube elements at
the initial turn on. This discharge may couple energy back into the cir-
cults that can only dissipate small amounts of power. In the rendezvous
and modulator circuits failed result of thisradar, telemetry as a discharge
and the radar was rendered inoperative. This problem was solved with the
addition of a diode conductive path between the tube grid and ground in
I units used in Spacecraft 6 and up.
I Conclusion - Carefully isolate low power level circuits from the
effects of directly connected or coupled power surges.
Radar Accuracy - The original radar angle accuracy requirement was _3 milli-
radians. Early in the development, it became apparent that this requirement
could not be met. Several factors were responsible for the degraded per-
formance. The installation of the radar in the spacecraft required the
addition of protrusions to the ground plane that degraded system perfor-
mance. The effects of ellipticity of the target antenna had not been
properly assessed. Also, the phase stability of the microwave components
was not as good as preliminary design studies had shown. These factors con-
tributed to the final on-axls performance of _9.0 milllradians. For angle
off axis, the error increased to _24 milllradians at 25 °.
To minimize the effects of radar errors on the rendezvous mission, the
astronauts flew "boresight" during radar data gathering periods.
i /
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Antenna Switching - The design of the radar system was based on the Agena
vehicle being stabilized so that initial radar acquisition would be via the
transponder's dipole antenna. Later mission definitions, however, called
for the spacecraft to approach the target from above, and resulted in
initial radar contact via the spiral antennas. Design changes were incor-
porated in the flight transponders to initiate switching between the spiral
and dipole antenna by ground com_nd. Initial radar acquisition could then
be accomplished either via the spiral or the dipole antennas.
Flashing Lights - As an aid to rendezvous navigation, an acquisition light
was proposed for the Agena. After study of various types of lights, it was
decided to procure a flashing Xenon gas discharge light. It was determined
during system testing that an excessive amount of interference to the
L-Band transponder was being generated due to the characteristics of this
light. Both conducted and radiated interference were present. Two steps
were taken to minimize the interference: l) RF filtering was added to the
light leads, and 2) a wire screen was placed over the light to minimize
radiated interference. The intensity of the lamp was increased to
compensate for the reduction in intensity caused by the screen.
Voltage Breakdown - Voltage breakdown occurred in the non-pressurized
transponder when qualification tested in a vacuum. This was attributed to
materials outgassing under high temperature conditions within the
transmitter cavity. The problem was eliminated by pressurizing the
transmitter cavity. In addition, all RF components, with the exception of
the coaxial relay, were vented to prevent partial pressure buildup. Two
/
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flight failures were attributed to depressurization of the transponder
transmitter. During the Spacecraft ii flight, degradation of the
transponder's transmitter output began in the latter stages of rendezvous,
with the transmitter failing later in the flight. This failure was
attributed to a leak in the transmitter cavity, which allowed the
pressure
I to decay to the critical point where RF arcing occurred. Corrective actionwas taken n Spacecraft 12 by cem nting the screws that seal the transmitter
I cavity. This procedure was considered a valid corrective action because of
observations made when one of the seal screws was removed for a 24-hour
leak test on each transponder and later replaced. Although a vacuum test
was conducted on the transponder after the leak test, vlbration-induced
leaks would not be detected.
I flight, target acquisition, range and angle
During the Spacecraft 12 after
information was sporadic. The most probable cause was again considered to
be arcing in the transmitter cavity.
Failure analysis of these two cases had to be performed using flight data
only, because the transponders were never recovered after the flights.
Conclusio___n- Whenever feasible, pressurize the power generating and
handling sections ofRF equipment. Additionally, it should be
recognized that maintenance of an adequate pressure seal may in
itself be a problem for long duration space missions.
/
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Analog Range and Range Rate Accuracy - The differences between the analog
range and range rate initial requirements and final capabilities were due
to the sensitivity of the analog range circuits to temperature extremes.
The accuracy attained was adequate for the braking maneuvers, and therefore
additional temperature compensation was not incorporated into the unit.
2.4.5 Problems and Design Changes Associated With Systems Test and Flights -
Transmitter Filament Voltage - Frequency drift was encountered in the radar
transmitter during the extensive prelaunch test. Frequency drift did not
occur in the transponder, and extensive investigation showed the problem to
be due to differences in the backheating of the cathode. The filament
voltage was the same for the radar and transponder; however, the radar
utilized a 1.0 microsecond pulse and the transponder used a 6.0 microsecond
pulse. The transponder cathode temperature was higher due to the wider
pulse width, resulting in stable frequency operation. The filament voltage
was increased on the radar and stable frequency operation resulted. The
effectivity of this change was Spacecraft 6.
Conclusion - Excessive component de-rating in this type of applica-
tion can lead to a transient cathode temperature and subsequent
frequency drift.
RF Bonding of Radar in Spacecraft - Several factors influenced the mounting
of the radar in the spacecraft. The radar required an optical alignment
with respect to the inertial guidance system, dictating a nominal
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separation between the spacecraft structure and the radar ground plane to
accomplish necessary adjustments. A high temperature rubber gasket was
provided between the radar ground plane and adjacent structure to provide
the necessary thermalprotection.
Prelaunch boresight testing showed that RF leakage around the radar ground
plane could produce boresight shifts. RF bonding of the radar ground plane
to the adjacent structure was done without compromising the optical align-
ment or the thermal protection. The effectivity of this change was
Spacecraft 6.
Tracking Tumbling Target - The rendezvous radar was designed to track a
stabilized target. Stabilized targets were not used with Spacecraft 5 and
9. A characteristic of the tumbling target was misslngpulses, which
produced excessive range rate transients on the astronauts display. The
Spacecraft 5 and 9 radars were modified to filter these transients to an
acceptable level.
Digital Interface Problem on Spacecraft 9 - In preparation for the Gemini 9
mission, computer software was changed so that range rate could be deter-
mined from the radar digital range information.
To mechanize this routine, data had to be obtained from the radar at a
faster rate than that originally specified. In a feasibility study, we
found that logic in the radar had to be modified to accommodate the faster
/
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readout rates, and the computer program had to be changed to accommodate
the final maximum readout capability of the radar. These changes were
made in subsequent flight units.
Digital Range Failure on Spacecraft 5 - The minimum temperature for
reliable turn-on of the radar was O°F, and in-spec performmnce was required
at 2OAF. On Spacecraft 5, the temperature of the radar decayed to
approximately 5°F and cycled about this value. On the third day of the
mission, the radar would not gather digital range information during an
air-to-ground evaluation. The radar unit was not recoveredvhowever,
post-flight analysis of possible failure modes indicated a low-
temperature-induced failure of a diode in the range logic circuitry.
-_erefore, Spacecraft 6 and subsequent units were performance tested
at O°F.
/i
MCDONNELL OOUI_IL_
C_OIIIPOflATION
99
MERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEY
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
3.0 ComDutera
3.1 Digital Computer
3.1.i Recuirements - The functional requirements for the Gemini Digital Computer
are shown in Table 3.1-1.
3.1.2 Early Design Decisions and Tradeoffs - The requirements to performs
rendezvous with an orbiting target and to guide the reentering spacecraft
to a predetermined landing point made a computer a necessary component of
the Inertial Guidance System (IGS). Eventually, the computer was called
upon to perform other tasks, as will be seen in Section 6.1.1 and this
section.
The time history of the Gemini Computer Program development is shown in
Figure 3.1-1. The internal layout of the computer is shown in the photo
of Figure 3.1-2.
Factors which influenced the initial design of the computer were:
(a) Computational speed
(b) Memory type
(c) Memory capacity
Cgm_utational Speed - The computational speed of the computer was primarily
determined by the reentry guidance requirement. This requirement, however,
was not overly stringent because the entering ballistic vehicle response
was slow enough that one solution every 2 seconds was considered adequate.
The initial specification also required a rendezvous computation in
2 seconds or leas. The chosen computer had been under development for the
STINGS program; and its speed, as given in Table 3.l-l, was more than
adequate to perform these functions. In actual operation, navigation
/
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TABLE 3.1-1
Memory Capacity
Clock Rate
Arithmetic Opera-
tion Times :
Add
Subt ract
Transfer
Mult iply
Divide
DIGITAL COMPUTER
FUNCTIONAL RE_UI_TS
Final Capability
_O96 39-bit words (divided into 3
syllables of 13 bits each) (third
syllable read only)
- Plus -
85,000 13-bit word Auxiliary Tape
Memory
500 KC
iAO _sec.
1AO _sec.
IAO _sec.
420 _sec ._
8_Opsec .J
Mult. or Divide opera-
tions my be progran_ned
concurrently with Add,
Subtract, or Transfer
operations
Initial Requirement
*AO96 39-bit words
(3 syllables each)
_,'-Same
_ot specified
_ot specified
_Not specified
*Not specified
* Original specification
specified sufficient arith-
metic computation capacity
and speed to perform re-
entry computation and pro-
vide output commands at
least once every two seconds.
i
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Acceleration pulses had to be collected at a high
so as not to lose data, but total navigation solu-
' one per 16 seconds during nondyn_mic periods to
i second during high thrust or drag conditions.to have a random-access memory for programming
I drum type memory was undesirable because ofThe chosen memory used multiaperture cores
been developed for the STINGS program about
the Gemini program. At the time of the
core was the best means of achieving a
desired for added reliability. However,
temperature range (18°F _t) over which
current. A temperature compensation
drive current to compensate for the
at temperatures beyond the above
to extend the computer's operating
estimate of requirements tomemory
ns was 1700 words, including a
use." However, in mid-1963, the
j required 6739 13-bit words to perform
computer had a memory capacity of 4096 39-bit
I each, or an effective memory of 12,288 13-bit
considered ample, at the time of initial design,
I
I io4
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to absorb reasonable program expansions. Memory capacity problems which
later arose are discussed in Section 3.1.3.
Other vital factors in computer design were:
(a) Input/output interfaces
(b) Computer malfunction detection
Input/Output Interfaces - The computer had digital interfaces with the
Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), Rendezvous Radar, Time Reference System
(TRS), Digital Command System (DCS), and the Data Acquisition System (DAS),
in addition to the control/display interfaces with the Manual Data Insertion
Unit (MDIU), Incremental Velocity Indicator (IVI), and the computer ground
....equipment. Analog output interfaces were with the Attitude Control and
Maneuver Electronics (ACME), Attitude Display Group (ADG), and the Titan
Launch Vehicle. An analog input, representing IMU gimbal angles, was also
provided.
Each digital interface design was agreed upon separately, because of the
different timing and digital format requirements of the interfacing sub-
systems, and because of the different stages of development of these
subsystems. A more desirable method would be employment of a_"standard ''
interface design for all digital interfaces, but this was not feasible for
the above reasons.
Balanced line drivers, balanced line switches, and pulse transformers were
among the devices used to achieve ground isolation of the digital
interfaces.
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3.1.2 (Continued)
The Titan launch vehicle required a DC analog signal, which was achieved
by a "ladder" type D/A conversion in the computer.
The ACHE and ADG required AO0 Hz AC signals which were obtained from
magnetic modulators driven by the ladder circuits. The magnetic modulators
had advantages over other AC output devices in reliability, size, and
weight, but contributed significantly to the harmonics and quadrature
problems experienced with the ACE system. As is said in Section A.O,
these problems, although not serious on Gemini, could become so on a system
",ith more stringent control requlr_Lent s.
Computer Malfunction Detection - Early in the program it became apparent
that the astronauts would have to be kept aware of the computer's perform-
ance. Therefore, a light was placed on the astronaut's display panel to
indicate malfunctions detected by the computer's malfunction detection
system. Four self-checks were performed.
(a) A timing check, based on the non-coincidence of certain signals within
the computer under proper timing conditions. Any improper functioning
of any of the computer's basic timing pulses would cause coincidence
of these signals, and trigger the circuit.
(b) GO-NO-GO diagnostic test - This test, the most thorough, exercised
all of the computer's arithmetic operations during each computer cycle
in all modes.
(c) A "looping-check" to verify that the computer was following a normal
program loop. A counter in the output processor was designed to
overflow every 2.75 seconds. Each program was written to erase this
/
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3.1.2 (Continued)
counter to zero every 2.7 seconds; and thus, any change in the program
I flow would cause an overflow and indicate a malfunction.
(d) The pre-launch mode check would verify the contents of memory syllable
2 by summing them. Since this syllable was _'read only _' (after loading
the memory by ground equipment), the sums could be checked against
their known values to insure correct data.
3.1.3 Problems Encountered During Development and Qualification Tests
Functions of the Computer Running Light - The need for communications
_e_ween the as .....=_s =._ _he _,,_er became apparent early _. _.e pro-
gram. The _nual Data Insertion Unit (MDIU) and Incremental Velocity
Indicator (IVI) provided for data insertion and readout. However, it was
a_s_ necessary for _he _,_uter _ _ar_o_ points during the program to
signal the astronaut to perform an operation or to verify an operation just
performed. A very limited space was available on the control panel, so an
I array of indicators, each for a different point in the mission, was not
iiI feasible.
The indication was provided by the computer running light, driven by the
I '_computer running' discrete, which could be programmed to indicate various
events in the computer program. For example, during rendezvous, the
operation of the light was controlled by the accumulation of radar data.
I The light signaled the astronauts when to apply corrective maneuver thrust.
In conjunction with operation of the Auxiliary Tape Memory (ATM), it
illuminated to show the transfer of data from the ATM to the computer. In
addition to specialized functions such as these and others, it performed
I
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function of indicating the start and end of a computer program
and extinguishing, respectively.
I of providing these indications in this manner was
I required so that the astronauts would know theilluminations/extinctions. A more desirable
provided by a set of indicators, each assigned
stated previously, however, this was not
of space limitations, and our method of pro-
..... _ _ _+_,_o sy_+_ _a+_n_ _ndere_. ,,e.,_e_ for a ........... r ....... = --
display functions only when space-limited.
Pulses Upon Power Application - The computer's
power turn-on, output signals could be
outputs were eventually reset by either
!is"bi ut before resetting, output discretes,
to interfacing subsystems without
condition could not be tolerated.
1963 during early integrated system
Test Unit (ESTU). To prevent its
were made to prevent inadvertent data
steps were added early in the computer's
proper initial conditions.
the effect on input and output circuits of
down of the computer.
c_ io8
3.1.3 (Continued)
MERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEY
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
Manual Restart of Computer - The computer was protected from power depres-
sions and outages by the Auxiliary Computer Power Unit (ACPU), discussed
in detail in Section 6.1.3 of this report. The ACPU, at the time of its
incorporation, was to provide power for computer operation during short
power depressions, shutdown of the computer during prolonged depressions,
and automatic restart upon return of full power. An automatic restart,
however, was potentially more harmful than a power loss, since, at restart,
the computer _re-initialized" the problem it had been solving and generated
new answers (or control signals) having no relation to the pre-shutdown
conditions. This could have resulted in catastrophic error signals being
applied to the launch vehicle (in the event the Gemini IGS were being used
I
I
I
for backup launch guidance), or the loss of previously accumulated data
during rendezvous or reentry. Thus, in its original form, the ACPU was
capable of causing an initialization of the computer's program without
the astronauts' knowledge. This occurrence was prevented by changing the
ACPU circuitry so that the shutdown would be indicated by the computer
malfunction lamp, and the astronaut was required to reset the malfunction
lamp manually to restart the computer.
Conclusions
I
!
I
1. In a manned operation involving the use of a computer, the
astronaut must be made aware of any deviation from the computer's
expected operation.
2. The effect of automatic sequencing on computer output behavior
must be assessed and precautions taken to avoid application of
catastrophic error correction signals to interfacing systems.
/
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Pulse Timin_ - Because of the asynchronous computer/radar
radar data for the computer was buffered in the radar. The
out of the radar buffer by pulses originating in the
shift pulse, one data bit was received. During inter-
1963, an excessive round-trip delay between generation
receipt of the radar data by the computer was
t
the computer shift pulse logic, spacecraft cabling,
serial data logic, were found to be between
Original design allowed for total delays of
A computer logic change was made, which
0.5 microsecond, gi-_ng a total allo_Bble
radar interface problem. The
the radar in three bursts of
ii!!!_ i pulse transformer,
the amplitudes of
, due to energy storage
storage was due to an increase
the above timing change. This
the balanced line driver to
recovery time, such that saturation would
bursts of pulses were completed. However,
system as mechanized, the computer did not use
iv
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3-1.3 (Continued)
the last few radar pulses, so this condition did not cause a problem.
A specification change was made and the computer was not modified.
Conclusions
1. Conduct a thorough timing analysis of digital interfaces early
in the program.
2. Assess the effect of any timing change on other characteristics
of the circuits involved.
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Problems Encountered During Development
Testin_ - It was discovered early in the program that the computer was
highly susceptible to transients which altered the memory and/or caused
an indication of a computer malfunction. In early 1963, many problems were
encountered with memory alterations, and an intensive analysis was conducted
to isolate the areas of transient susceptibility and to minimize the tran-
sients. The areas in the computer found to be most susceptible to EMI were
the memory strobe circuits and the glass delay lines.
The strobe circuits were used to sample the memory output pulses so that
a "0_ noise output would not be interpreted as a 'T'. Originally, this
strobe had difficulty in distinguishing between noise and information, but
the circuit was changed so that the signal under the strobe gate was
integrated. This helped solve the EMI problem.
The glass delay lines were used as temporary storage devices (such as the
accumulator and address register). Because of their inherent low signal
levels, they were highly susceptible to noise. The wire routing within
the computer was changed to make the lines less susceptible to EMI.
//
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Grounding of the computer to its mounting was also reviewed during
subcontractor tests, and as a result, short ground straps were used. It
was believed that the straps reduced EMI susceptibility. Partially as a
result of this experience, a special short ground strap was installed
between the computer and the spacecraft structure on Spacecraft 3 through 12.
Redesign of Memory Drive Circuits - A problem occurred in the transition
between the engineering model and production configuration computer. The
production model utilized multilayer boards to interconnect the circuit
modules, whereas the engineering model used hand-,^_r_-_discrete components.
Difficulty in specifying a minimum and maximum tolerance on the thickness
of the insulating layers of the multilayer boards led to the capacitance
between conducting sides exceeding the worst case design. A major redesign
of the memory drive circuits was required to compensate for the added
capacitance.
Conclusion - This type problem is typical of those which must be
considered when proceeding from a breadboard design to a production
model.
.Exceeding of Memory Capacity and Incorporation of Auxiliary Tape Memory -
Computer memory requirements were increased significantly when the ascent
mode was added to the computer in May 1962 to mechanize the Gemini IGS
function of backup guidance for the Titan II launch vehicle. Another early
addition was the requirement for an orbit navigation mode. These additions,
plus numerous small features and improvements to existing programs which
required additional memory capacity, used up all the memory space by
/
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3.1.3 (Continued)
January 1963. The programming of the second operational math flow in
June 1963 revealed that the memory capacity was exceeded by over 700 words,
even after significant savings had been achieved by reprogramming.
The following solutions were available for this problem:
(a) Reduce progra._ng requirements, at the expense of accuracy and/or
versatility. This approach could have been accomplished by across-
the-board reductions in all modes, or by dropping one of the computer
modes (Rendezvous and Orbit Navigation were not required for the early
spacecraft ).
(b) Provide additional usable memory locations by hard wiring some
elementary functions presently programmed. Such an approach would
have gained 825 instructions.
(c) Provide an auxiliary tape memory external to the computer, under the
control of the astronauts. This unit would contain sufficient storage
to handle present requirements, as well as any contemplated future
requirements.
The solution chosen was a combination of alternatives (a) and (c). On
Spacecraft 2 through 7, the orbit navigation mode was not included. On
Spacecraft 8 through 12, an auxiliary tape memory (ATM) was added to the
spacecraft.
The development of the ATM was begun in mid-196&. This unit, located in
the spacecraft adapter as shown in Figure 1.2-7, provided an additional
capacity for storage of 85,000 13-bit words. It permitted a high degree
of computer flexibility, as evidenced by the inclusion of nine operational
/
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computer modes in the last four spacecraft. In addition to alleviating
the memory capacity problem, the ATM provided a memory reload capability
for use in the event of an in-flight memory alteration, such as occurred
during the flight of Spacecraft _. The ATM is pictured in Figure 3.1-3.
Conclusion - Allow ample margin for growth in a computer's memory
capacity (at least 200 to 300%). This margin should be a function of
how well the computer requirements have been defined. This criterion
is particularly important in a developmental type vehicle such as
Gemini, where expanded capabilities are added as the program progres-
ses. Consideration should be given to providing an onboard bulk
storage device, such as an ATM.
A_4 Static Discharge Problem - A problem resulted, during the development
of the ATM, from its being filled with dry nitrogen and hermetically
sealed. The dry nitrogen caused the tape to build up a static charge and
discharge at the tape head, producing erratic outputs. A dry Freon mixture
was substituted for the nitrogen, solving the problem. The Freon had a
heavy ion which captured electrons, preventing a buildup of static charge.
ATM Vibration Problem - h problem developed during ATM vibration qualifica-
tion tests, where the flutter output exceeded the specification of 3% under
2 g RMS random vibration. Various methods were tried to increase the ATM's
vibration tolerance, including the use of dampers, weights, and flywheels.
These methods reduced flutter but did not solve the problem entirely.
Finally, the flutter specification was widened to 5% at 1 g RMS and this,
in combination with the use of flywheels, enabled the unit to meet the
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vibration requirements. The original tight specification on flutter was
nmde because of the strict timing requirements of the computer. Widening
the specification was justified by analysis which showed that the ATM would
not be incompatible with computer timing requirements, but would have a
slightly decreased safety margin. When integrated with the computer, no
problems were encountered in this regard. The ATM was required to operate
only during orbit, and not under the more severe launch vibration
environment.
3 .l.A Problems Encountered During Systems Tests and Flights
Electromagnetic Interference - The computer experienced several EMI
problems during spacecraft production testing. A considerable number of
malfunction indications were experienced during Spacecraft 3 testing; and,
in an effort to correct them, the grounding of the computer to the space-
craft was changed. The Gemini grounding philosophy was based on a single
point ground (Section 6.1.6). This point on the spacecraft was located
approximately lO feet a_y from the computer. Although this method worked
well for DC and low frequency AC signals, the long wire from the computer
to the ground point acted as a high impedance at the frequencies used in
the computer. Previous subcontractor tests had indicated that short
ground straps reduced EMI susceptibility, so a short ground strap was
installed at the computer. However, no significant reduction in the EMI
problem was noted, but it is possible that greater problems would have
been encountered without it.
The most persistent F_I problem occurred in the computer HALT circuit.
HALT was an input discrete from the Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE),
• /
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(Continued)
provided by a manual switch closure, which nominally required a +8 (_+2)
volt DC signal for activation. With the receipt of a HALT discrete, the
computer program was initialized; thus the program variables, such as
position, velocity, etc., were set to initial values, disrupting the
operation in progress. Although the input circuit was designed to operate
at an 8-volt level, tests indicated that a 3-volt, i0 microsecond signal
on the HALT line would trigger the HALT circuit. The ambient noise on the
unshielded AGE HALT line was found to be as high as 2.0 to 2.5 volts, so a
small additional transient on the line could be interpreted by the computer
as a HALT command. The HALT circuit was identical to other internal
circuits, with a %O-nanosecond response time. Since the HALT was activated
by a manual switch closure, this response was unnecessarily fast and,
together with the lack of shielding on the AGE line, accounted for the
E_[I problem with this circuit. The problem was alleviated by adding a
decoupling capacitor on the HALT line as closely as possible to the com-
puter, which bypassed induced RF energy to ground.
The turn-on and turn-off of the spacecraft's rate gyros produced noise
spikes of up to approximately 150 volts. A problem was encountered during
production testing of Spacecraft 6 where these transients caused an excess
time counter overflow, inducing a malfunction in the computer. To reduce
the switching noise, back-to-back zener diodes were installed across the
400 Hz input lines to the rate gyros. This method of suppression effec-
tively corrected the problem.
Another E problem resulted in connection with the computer's interface
with the Incremental Velocity Indicator (IVI) and the Auxiliary Tape
l
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Memory (ATM). The 'tZ_'channel set-zero line from the computer to the IVI
was routed through a section on the ATM mode switch, because the ATM
"write" and the IVI "Z" channel set-zero signals were a shared discrete.
The ATM write mode wire was jumpered at the ATM mode switch to the IVI "Z"
channel set-zero line. However, the mechanization of the write mode was
deleted on the spacecraft, so the ATM side of the write wire was left
unterminated at the reentry module/adapter interface. This unterminated
wire, approximately 20 feet long, acted as an antenna picking up noise
which caused its "Z" channel to drive to zero when the ATM mode switch
coupled the wire to the IVI. The problem was left uncorrected only because
the IVI "Z" channel was not used with the ATM and no other IVI interface
problems resulted from it.
Another EMI problem became evident when operation of the HF whip antennas
(part of the communications system) produced a computer malfunction indica-
tion. This problem was encountered during Spacecraft ll production testing.
Transients greater than 80 volts and less than 1 microsecond duration were
observed on the excitation lines of the antenna's extension motor. The
power lines to the motor were in the same wire bundle with a large number
of computer signals. The problem was not applicable to flights, since the
use of the HF system in orbit was not an operational requirement. However,
as a precaution, a flight procedure was instituted to turn off the computer
before extending the antennas.
Conclusions - From the above mentioned problems, we can formulate
several design criteria:
,
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Design each circuit response time according to its intended
use. The HALT circuit, operated by a manual switch, could
have been designed with a much slower response time, making
it insensitive to most EMI.
(2) Scrutinize each potential EMI generator to assess its affect
on other systems. Early EMI suppression efforts were directed
at solenoids, pumps, relays, etc., to see that they were diode-
suppressed and isolated to the spacecraft DC control bus. The
rate gyros, operating on 26 volts AC, caused a serious problem
because their suppression was overlooked early in the program.
(3) Avoid unterminmted wires. An unused wire should be cut and
tied back at both ends to avoid its acting as an E_I antenna.
(A) Avoid placing signal and power wires in the same wire bundles.
Spacecraft 4 Power Sequencing Problems - During the flight of Gemini A,
the astronauts were unable to shut down the on-board computer in several
instances. The failures occurred when the power sequencing circuitry in
the computer failed to function. This circuitry powered up and shut down
the computer sequentially to avoid alteration of the memory, and was
activated automatically when the computer on/off switch was operated or
when power was removed from the IGS power supply. The Gemini 4 failures
were observed under both conditions. Removal of the computer power, after
failure of the sequencing circuit to operate, resulted in alteration of the
co_uter's memory, rendering the computer useless for the rest of the
flight. The exact cause of the failure was never determined.
l
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The failure could not be repeated during extensive post-flight testing.
However, seven possible failure modes were postulated, in either the
computer, auxiliary computer power unit (ACPU), or the spacecraft wiring,
which could have produced this type of failure. No evidence of any of
these was found during the failure analysis.
Since the failure was never isolated, no specific fix could be applied to
avoid the problem in the future. However, the following spacecraft changes
and operational procedures were instituted to circumvent it:
(1) All remaining flight computers were tested for 20 on-off cycles at
minimum operating temperature (&O°F).
(2) Detailed operational procedures were prepared for use in the event
of similar or other types of malfunctions in the computer.
(3) A manual sequencing switch was installed on the astronauts' control
panel on Spacecraft 5 and 6, to override the automatic sequencing
capability in the event of any of the seven postulated malfunctions.
This switch, however, was capable of causing an improper power up
or power down (with the same possibility of memory alteration) if
rotated in the wrong direction. It was not included on subsequent
spacecraft.
In addition, telemetry monitoring was added for computer on/off and
computer case temperature, to aid in failure analysis of any other
malfunction of this type.
An inflight memory reload capability was also considered but not immediately
implemented. However, on Spacecraft 8 through 12, the auxiliary tape memory
4/
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3 .l.h (Continued)
could perform this function. As a further insurance that the ATM would be
able to reload the memory, the "ATM read" subroutine was loaded into
"Syllable 2" of the computer memory. This portion of the memory was able
to be read only; writing into it was possible only by means of ground equip-
ment. Thus, it was much less susceptible to alteration by transients or
computer malfunctions than the other two syllables.
Spacecraft _ Computer/Radar Interface Problem- The Spacecraft 9 computer/
radar interface problem discussed in Section 2.% had an impact on the
computer programming. The computer's Math Flow #7 had been programmed to
derive range rate from the digital range; to do so, it was desired to
interrogate the radar every 15 milliseconds. However, during production
testing of Spacecraft 9, it was found that the radar could not be inter-
rogated at that high a rate, because of a 75-millisecond time delay in
the radar's resetting of its logic. Tests indicated that satisfactory
radar data could be consistently gathered every 150 milliseconds, so the
operational program was altered to interrogate at that rate. Range rate
accuracy was not severely degraded by this change.
i
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4.1 Attitude Control and Maneuver Electronics (ACME)
4.1.1 Requirements
The functional requirements for the control electronics and power
inverter are shown in Table 4.1-1. Additional requirements for control
modes are discussed in Section 4.1.2. The evolution of these parameters
is discussed in the following paragraphs.
4.1.2
Early Design Considerations_ Decisions_ and Tradeoffs
The ti_ history of the development of the Gemini ACME system is given
in Figure 4.1-1. The Gemini control system had to meet much more demanding
requirements then its predecessor on Mercury, including those associated
with long term orbital missions, rendezvous and docking with an orbiting
target, and controlled reentry. Because of these stringent needs, a new
design was decided upon rather than a modification of existing Mercury
hardware. The Mercury system had some basic shortcomings, in that it
employed electromechanical encoders as sensor pickoffs and did not permit
the precise control required on Gemini. Furthermore, the encoders caused
significant noise problems, further degrading the precision of the system.
Therefore, it was decided to use analog pickoffs on the sensors with
switching level detection to be done electronically. An additional reason
for choosing this method was the switching required between several
different input devices, which originally included the IMU, computer,
horizon sensor, radar and rate gyros.
j/
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(Continued)
The incorporation of control functions in the digital computer, rather
than in a separate package, was considered. The combination would have
produced a substantial savings in size and weight, but this mechanization
was ruled out because processing the fast changing rate signals would have
used a large amount of the computer capacity. Also, any checkout of the
control system would have required flight software for the computer.
Overall reliability requirements dictated a high degree of redundancy in
the attitude control system. Pilot-selectable, redundant circuitry was
included for switching logic, valve drivers, and bias power. The rate
gyros (Section 2.1) were redundant, and AC power redundancy was incor-
porated with the ACME power inverter and the IGS power supply. Additional
control redundancy was available through the choice of control modes.
Additional reliability could have been gained by incorporating redundant
rate preamplifiers and mode logic. This would have precluded failures in
these circuits from preventing mission completion. However, they would
have caused a substantial increase in size and weight. It was noted,
also, that failure in these circuits would not appreciably affect crew
safety.
An early decision was made to electrically isolate, within the packages,
all critical parameter outputs which were routed to other systems, such
as instrumentation or cockpit displays. Electrical isolation protected the
system from external damage, and was eventually incorporated on most
of the other spacecraft systems.
jl
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i 4.1.2 (Continued)
The control electronics was split into two packages, Attitude ControlEl ctr ics (ACE), located in the reentry module, and the Orbit Attitude
and Maneuver Electronics (GAME). The OAME was located in the adapter
near the Orbit Attitude and Maneuver System (OA_S) thrusters, as shown in
Figure 1.2-5, to minimize the number of wires crossing the reentry module/
adapter interface and also to reduce the length of the wires carrying the
high currents required for thruster firing. The components of the ACME
system are pictured in Figures 4.1-2 through 4.1-4.
The decision to incorporate a separate power inverter for the control
system was prompted by the low power requirement for the orbit mode during
long flights. It was thought to be more efficient to use a separate
inverter rather than the IGS power supply inverter, which was designed
for heavy loads. Originally, two power inverters were to be included
in the control system, but it was decided to use the IGS power supply as
a backup instead. The control system was automatically switched over
to the IGS inverter for power whenever the IGS was in operation. The
AC frequency was chosen to be 400 Hz because of the availability of
components.
Evolution of Control Modes
The attitude control modes were selected to permit maximum control by the
astronauts, but yet to incorporate provisions for automatic control. The
following modes were originally considered for the control system:
/
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(a) Rate Command - The astronaut could command a rate about each axis
by means of the attitude hand controller. Signals from
potentiometers on the hand controller were summed with rate gyro
outputs to produce an error signal. With the hand controller at
neutral, the spacecraft rates were damped to +0.2 degrees per
second using the Orbit Attitude and Maneuver System (OAMS)
I
I
I
I
I
I
thrusters and +0.5 degrees per second using the Reentry Control
System (RCS) thrusters. The original rate command mode deadband
was _+O.25°/sec for both OAMS and RCS. When the rate command/
attitude hold modes (see (j) below)were deleted, the rate command
mode deadband for the 0A_S system was reduced to _+O.l°/sec, to
permit accurate control to any attitude. This deadband was sub-
sequently increased to _+0.2°/sec when the effects of greater-than-
expected jet turnoff time, hysteresis, and rate gyro modulation
precluded damping at _+0.1°/sec. The RCS deadband was increased
from _+0.25°/sec to _+O.5°/sec because of the slow response of the
I
I
I
(b)
relays used as solenoid valve drivers for the RCS jets. The
_+0.2°/sec and _+0.5°/sec deadbands proved to be satisfactory.
Direct Command - The hand controller could be used to command
continuous thrusting about a selected axis when the hand controller
was displaced beyond a threshold. Two types of direct command
were available with the RCS thrusters; either through the control
electronics, or through two sets of additional switches in the
hand controller which directly engaged the appropriate thrusters
I
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4.1.2 (Continued)
without going through any electronics. This latter mode was
selectable by panel switches and was a highly reliable redundancy
option since no electronic circuitry was required for its
operation.
(c) Pulse - The hand controller would command a 20 millisecond thrust
increment for each displacement of the hand controller beyond the
threshold.
(d) Horizon Scan or Orbit - This mode was intended for loose control
during long duration flights. Its evolution is discussed in
detail in Section 4.1.3.
(e) Platform Attitude Hold (Horizontal I - The spacecraft was auto-
matically controlled to within +l ° of the platform synchro nulls.
This mode was always provided for in the electronics, but was
only wired on Spacecraft 5 and up. It was used to control the
spacecraft attitude during maneuver thrusting and for pointing
the spacecraft for experiments, thus freeing the astronauts from
having to control the spacecraft manually.
(f) Radar Attitude Hold - Provisions were incorporated for controlling
the spacecraft pitch and yaw attitude within +l ° of the radar
boresight. This mode was never mechanized on the spacecraft.
(g) Computer Attitude Hold - Provisions were incorporated for
controlling the spacecraft's pitch and yaw attitude to +l ° of the
commanded attitude from the computer. It also was never mechanized
on the spacecraft.
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4.1.2 (Contlnued)
I (h) Retro Attitude Hold - Provisions were incorporated to bias theplatform pitch signal to orient th spacecraft for retrofire.
This mode was mechanized only on the unmanned Spacecraft 2
I flight.
Ii (i) Reentry Mode - The spacecraft roll axis was controlled to +_2° of
the roll angle commanded by the digital computer. Pitch and yaw
i
rates were damped to +4°/sec. Original specifications for this
mode were +_l° deadband in the roll axis and +_2°/sec rate damping,
but were changed as a result of control dynamic simulations.
This mode was used with great success for the reentry of the
later spacecraft.
(j) Rate Command/Attitude Hold - This mode was to have provided a
feature in conjunction with the digital computer and inertial
platform, in which any attitude commanded by the hand controller
(+5 O) and fine (+i °) options were specified. However, this mode
was deleted from the spacecraft early in the program (late 1962)
because of its complexity and resultant size and weight penalty,
and because of a need to conserve display panel space.
In addition to these modes, a reentry rate command mode, discussed in
Section 4.1.3, was 8_ded. Also a paraglider control mode was incorporated,
but was dropped with the deletion of the paragllder from tb_ spacecraft
and was never fully developed.
!
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4.1.2 (Continued)
The maneuver thrusters were operated in direct mode only. Displacement of
the maneuver hand controllers would ccm_nand firing of the fore, aft, up,
down, right, or left OAMB thruster. Originally, computer controlled
maneuvering and a single pulse mode for maneuvering had been envisioned,
and relay valve drivers were incorporated in the OAME to provide an
interface with the electronics that would have been involved. These
drivers were retained in the system and were used on Spacecraft 3 and 4
to drive the maneuver thrusters. On Spacecraft 5 and up, a more reliable
direct connection between the hand controller switches and the thruster
solenoids was incorporated.
Mode Switching and Redundancy Selection
Latching relays were used to select the redundancy options built into the
control system: primary and secondary bias power supplies, logic
circuitry, and jet select. Relays were chosen to perform these functions
because solid state switching would have required a continuous application
of power, whereas latching relays required power for switching only.
Since the duty cycle of these relays was extremely low, a continuous
application of power would have been inefficient and unreliable.
A problem developed early in the program (late 1962) with the primary/
secondary Jet select relays. These relays carried large currents, so a
high-current relay was chosen. The contacts were designed to be cleansed
by the arcing inherent in switching high currents. However, the switching
between primary and secondary was invariably performed with no current,
i
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and contaminants built up on the contacts. The problem was solved in
early 1963 by changing to a lower current relay which could still handle
the higher currents after switching. Circuitry was added to preclude
switching while a Jet was firing.
Solid state logic was chosen for mode switching because it minimized
circuit complexity.
Use of Relays and Solid State Switching for Thruster Solenoid Valve Drivers
The Mercury spacecraft used only relays for driving thruster solenoid
valves. The Gemini had tighter attitude control requirements than Mercury,
and also a requirement for low fuel consumption, because of the longer
flights. Therefore, transistors were used for switching the OA_S attitude
thruster solenoid drivers, because of their faster response and their
greater consistency in switching time. These thrusters were used during
the orbital phase of the Gemini missions whp_ tb_ t_ _++_+I,_ .... +_
rate damping, and low fuel consumption requirements were critical.
Transistors were susceptible to damage from voltage spikes on the power
bus, which were initially estimated to be as high as 130 volts, but this
risk could be afforded because the OA_S thrusters were not required in
order to bring the astronauts back to earth safely.
The transistors chosen for the OA_S drivers could withstand up to
150-volt peaks, but if one of the bus spikes were to appear simultaneously
with a Jet turn-off spike, a transistor could have been lost. No attempt
i
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was made at suppressing the bus spikes, however, and as more data was
accumulated through integrated systems testing, these spikes were found
to be much lower than originally anticipated. No valve driver transistor
failures occurred during the program.
Silicon power transistors were chosen for their superior performance over
the anticipated temperature range and their low leakage current. However,
even the low leakage current that was obtained caused a steady drain on
the spacecraft batteries. On a future long term mission, this drain
could become significant and should be considered in system design.
Because of the anticipated spikes, more confidence was initially placed in
the reliability of relays. Therefore, they were used as valve drivers in
life critical operations or where other considerations did not preclude
their use, and thus were used as valve drivers for the RCS attitude
but on later spacecraft these thrusters' solenoids were driven directly
by the maneuver hand controller switches. The RCS attitude control dead-
bands and switching level tolerances were broader than those for the 0AMS
because of the use of relays.
Conclusion
Based on our experience with relay and solid state solenoid valve
drivers, we recommend the use nf........solid state a_ror= in a .new _es_gn.
The only exception may be for an attitude control system on a long
duration mission, where transistor leakage could cause a significant
power drain.
l
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I 4.1.2 (Continued)
Hot Side Versus Ground Slde Switching
A tradeoff was made between switching the thrusters from the hot side
versus switching these from the ground side. Hot side switching provides
i a fail-safe system, since wires shorted to ground do not turn the thrusters
on, whereas, in ground side switching, a short on the ground side of a
thruster causes the thruster to "fail" on. However, use of hot-side
switching would have required additional switches, so ground side switching
was used on Gemini. Another consideration was that the only silicon
transistors available at the time of the Gemini design which could handle
the current through the 0AMS thrusters were NPN, which would have required
a separate floating power supply for hot-side switching. Comparable PNP
transistors have since been developed, which can be connected for hot-side
switching with existing grounded power supplies.
Circuit breakers were provided to isolate a failed thruster. Each 0AMS
attitude and maneuver thruster was powered through an individual circuit
breaker. Each RCS thruster ring was powered through three circuit
breakers. A mission could be completed with one failed thruster.
One apparent electrical failure in a thruster circuit occurred during the
Gemini Spacecraft 8 flight, where the OAb_ Number 8 thruster commenced
firing without pilot actuation, was briefly interrupted, then recommenced
firing until its circuit breaker was opened. Although the thruster and
its associated valve driver circuitry was not returned from orbit, the
telemetry data indicated that the failure was probably produced by a short
/
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4.1.2 (Continued)
to ground somewhere in the thruster's electrical circuit. As a result
of this problem, a circuit breaker was added to the astronauts' switch
panel to remove power from all Jets at once.
Spike Suppression
Spike suppression circuitry was incorporated in the control electronics
to reduce the amplitude of the inductive spikes generated when the
thrusters were turned off. The main reason for this circuitry was to
protect the valve drivers, and not to reduce electromagnetic interference.
The additional circuitry was located in the Attitude Control Electronics
(ACE) and Orbit Attitude and _neuver Electronics (OAME) for t,he RCS and
OAb_ propulsion systems, respectively.
A tradeoff existed as to the location of the circuitry. Placing it
within the ACE package caused some problems, since the high currents
u i i .....
contributing to switch chattering. Also, during early tests, some double
pulsing of the minimum pulse generator was evidenced because of the
proximity of the spike suppression circuits. However, this problem
never occurred in any integrated spacecraft testing, so no action was
taken to eliminate it. The alternative location for the suppression net-
works would have been near the Jets. However, the Jets' temperature was
thought to be too high for the circuitry to withstand. Also, since the
circuitry was primarily to protect other electronic components, it was
desirable for them to be part of the same subsystems.
i
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4.1.2 (Continued)
A future system can probably be designed to better withstand the effects
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i 4.1.3 Problems and Design Changes
i Evolution of the Horizon Scan Mode
The orbit attitude control mode (horizon scan mode) utilized position
I signals from the horizon sensor to mintain the spacecraft pitch and roll
axes relative to the horizon. The original concept for this mode was a
I carry-over from the Mercury attitude control system. The vehicle was to be
stabilized by applying corrective moment impulses at each of several
I values of attitude error. The advantages of this system would have
been a low steady state fuel consumption and insensitivity to switching
hysteresis.
However, there were misgivings about its mechanization, because it required
close tolerances on the thrust impulses to remain stable, and may have
required the astronaut to damp out angular rates before it could be
effective. Also, it would have required entirely separate electronics from
(early in 1962) another mechanization was sought which would minimize, if
not eliminate, these disadvantages and still retain the low fuel
consumption required.
A lower fuel consumption could have been achieved by using rate gyros in
the loop. However, this mode was intended for use during the long periods
of orbital flight, where overall power and fuel economy and reliability
were primary considerations. A +_o_o-off _+,,_....... io_ ÷_o+ the use _
rate gyros would have caused an increase of approximately 8 ib in the
amount of fuel cell fuel required, and also would have reduced control
system reliability.
/
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4.1.3 (Continued)
A systamwas therefore proposed that would have employed the horizon
sensor, a lead network, a switching amplifier, a constant pulse repetition
frequency pulse generator, and the reaction Jets. The lead network, by
differentiating the attitude signal, would have provided a measure of
attitude rate. The switching amplifier would have turned on the pulse
generator and selected the proper Jet to be driven by the pulse generator.
The mechanization finally decided upon utilized pseudo rate measurement,
or derived rate increment stabilization. This method had advantages over
the lead network system, in that it was capable of overcoming higher
initial rates (2.5 ° per second versus 1 ° per second) and required fewer
new components to mechanize. Also, it was thought that, in addition to
being used on the orbit mode, this system could also provide a variable-
acceleration manual mode in the pitch and roll channels. This manual
mode was never mechanized, however, because the yaw channel would also
have needed modification and the mode switching would have been complicated
by the mechanization.
The pseudo rate system operated by feeding back the acceleration (jet
firing) pulses through lag networks, thus deriving the rate. This derived
rate was summed with the horizon sensor signals and fed into the switching
amplifier. The use of pseudo rate presented a potential problem in that
the pseudo rate could turn off the switch before the vehicle reaction jets
developed thrust. To avoid this, a minimum pulse generator was provided
which prevented the switch from turning off in less than 18 milliseconds
from the time of turn-on. By thus assuring a pulse of no less than
i
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(Continued )
18 millisecond duration, the possibility of the pseudo rate turning off
the switch prior to development of Jet thrust was eliminated. The output
of this system was a train of pulses whose FRF was proportional to the
input signal. Thus, the steady-state limit cycle consisted of a very
low pulse repetition frequency and the system was capable of very low fuel
consumption, on the order of .05 lb/hour, exclusive of the yaw axis
requirements.
Individual Circuit Breakers
The Gemini employed a bipropellant thruster system, with each jet
requiring solenoid valves for fuel and oxidizer. If one of these valves
failed closed, the other would operate on each firing command with no
resulting thrust, and thus much fuel or oxidizer would have been wasted.
To provide for this event, an early design change was made to provide bus
power to each _ attitude and maneuver jet through an individual circuit
breaker, so that power could be removed from both solenoids of a failed
Jet. At the same time, provisions were added to allow selection of either
the pitch or yaw Jets for roll control. These changes provided the
capability for completing a mission after the failure of one OAMS jet.
Incorporation of Reentry Rate Command Mode
In June 1963, a Reentry Rate Command Mode was added. This mode differed
from the orbital Rate Command Mode in that the control was less sensitive
and a roll-to-yaw cross-coupling feature was provided to permit the
spacecraft to roll about the velocity vector rather than about the space-
craft roll axis. (The difference in the two axes is caused by the offset
i
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center of gravity. ) The deadbands, corresponding to the rate deadbands of
the reentry mode, were originally +2°/sec in pitch and yaw and +_l°/sec in
roll, but were widened, in mid-1964, to +4°/sec in pitch and yaw and +_20/
sec in roll, since aerodynamic forces during reentry provided most of the
damping required in pitch and yaw.
Vibration Problems
Several changes were required in the control system packages to make them
capable of surviving the launch environment. These changes consisted
primarily of structural modifications and additional support for wire
bundles. The problems were partly due to the complex shapes required for
the packages and the resulting difficulty in analytically predicting
their behavior under vibration.
Conclusion
In the future it would be aavlsable Co perfuz_m vlb_ation ......._ _ _. a
representative mock=up as early in a program as possible, especially
where complex packaging requirements exist.
Effects of H_rmonics and Phase Shift
The Gemini attitude control electronics utilized AC signal summing, a pre-
requisite for which is "clean" signals; i.e. pure sinusoids with little
harmonic or phase distortion. It was recognized early in the program that
the signals supplied to the attitude control electronics from the Inertial
Measuring Unit, digital computer, and rate gyros would not be ideal, and
therefore steps were taken to minimize the effects of distortion.
l
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4. i. 3 (Continued)
The original design employed a half-wave demodulator. Early testing
revealed that the sensitivity of this demodulator to harmonics and quadra-
ture caused the switching deadbands to converge when high attitude and rate
error signals were summed. A full-wave demodulator was incorporated,
which, to a large extent, alleviated the problem. A Jet lock-out circuit
was also incorporated, to prevent opposing jets frun firing simultaneously.
Even after the demodulator change, harmonics and quadrature still were
causing some problems. Testing showed that a quadrature component in the
input signals would cause widening of the deadbands as the quadrature
level increased. This effect was due to saturation of the switching
amplifier and demodulator. Harmonics in the input signal could cause the
deadband to widen or narrow, depending on the phase relation of the harmonic
to the 400 Hz reference. Saturation of the switching amplifier and
d_m_du!ator p_vented the deadband from closing to zero.
A full-wave demodulator with infinite filtering is theoretically a perfect
quadrature rejection circuit. However, the system operation must be
linear, with no active element saturation, to get theoretical operating
characteristics. Thus, to remove the quadrature problem, the switching
amplifier would have had to be changed to allow a much greater swing in
output voltage. The demodulator would have had to be altered to handle
the large signal, and an active filter for the demodulator would have had
to be incorporated.
/
MCDONNELL DOUGLAB_
CO_POR_T#ON l _ _
i! i i_ MERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEYREPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
4.i.3 (Contlnued)I
I| These solutions to the quadrature problem would have increased the harmonic
problem, since the linear operation of the system would have allowed the
deadbands to converge to zero. Low pass filters would have been required
i in the signal inputs to reject harmonics. These changes would have been
r prohibitive in terms of size, weight, and power. Dynamic testing was
performed to determine whether the system as mechanized was satisfactory,
and the results indicated that the harmonics and quadrature would not
present a noticeable problem to astronauts performing a rendezvous. There-
fore, no changes were made. These findings were borne out during the
actual flights, where nominal performance of the control system was
indicated.
Conclusio_____n
In view of the fact that no operational problems existed from these
phenomena, it would be unwise to recommend the proposed changes for a
future system, without a detailed study of their effects on the total
system. Certainly, on a spacecraft with tighter deadband requirements
than Gemini, the effects of signal distortion would be more significant.
Part of the difficulty experienced with distortion stemmed from the
inadequate knowledge of the input signals by the control system sub-
contractor. If any recommendation can be made, it would be to learn
as much as possible early about interfacing signal characteristics, and
preferably to put tight specifications on sensor inputs to control the
interface.
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Noise Effects on Control System
In each axis of the attitude control system, error signals were amplified,
demodulated, and then fed into a low-hysteresis switch. This switch was
designed so that the input could turn the switch on but could not turn
it off. The first stage of the switch was automatically forced off 400
times each second by a dither signal applied to the switch internally.
If the input signal were below the switching level, the switch would
remain off. Thus, only an extremely small reduction in input signal was
required to allow the switch to remain off and hysteresis was for all
practical purposes avoided. However, if the input were above the switching
level, the switch would come back on and the process would be repeated.
The continual switching resulted in a square wave output of the first stage
of the switch which was unsuitable for operating the Jet drivers. To
obtain a usable signal, an integrator was provided in a later stage of the
switch to smooth the square wave ana provid_ _ _5ea&y-statc _ _ _ol +_
the last stage of the switch (inverter). The inverter then provided a
steady ground to operate the valve drivers.
Because of the extremely low hysteresis, noise on the input lines caused
the valve drivers to chatter when the input signals were in the region of
the switching level. This situation was significant only during system
testing because of the high noise environment of the test complex. To
evaluate control system performance, a testing specification for a chatter
band was formulated, based on results of early integrated system testing.
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(No evidence of chattering was apparent during flights. ) The chatter band
was reduced by the following modifications to the ACE package made in late
1964:
(a)
(b)
The low hysteresis switch was changed so that switching would
occur on the positive half-cycle of the dither. This change was
based on the subcontractor's empirical data, which showed that,
due to differences in loading, the positive half-cycle was less
susceptible to noise than the negative half-cycle.
The grounding in the ACE package was changed to separate the
ground of the low hysteresis switch from the analog signal
grounds. Previously, this gro1&nd was coupled into the system,
inducing an apparent hysteresis.
Both of the above changes reduced the chatter band significantly. Other
Improv_nts w_ld have further reduced it. These included the use of
internal shielding (with an attendant weight and volume penalty); the
removal of spike suppression circuitry from the ACE package; and an
increase in the dither frequency for the low hysteresis switch. The
last change would have reduced the time delay uncertainty by turning off
the switch more frequently. A trade-off exists between reduced time delay
and hysteresis, and so an increase in hysteresis was permitted, with a
resulting reduction in chatter.
Valve Driver Retriggering
The original minimum pulse circuitry was found to be susceptible to
transients at the input. This original circuit had a pulse transformer
/
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in its input circuit which rang when excited by a transient. The
circuit was redesigned in late 1963 to eliminate the pulse transformer.
Later, it was found that the valve drivers could be retriggered by
radiated or conducted voltage within the ACE package, induced by large
currents produced when the RCS jets were deenergized. These large
currents were the result of including the RCS spike suppression in the
ACE package. The RCS spikes could cause a refiring of an 18 millisecond
minimum pulse in two ways:
(a) The spike could appear at the output of the demodulator, whereby
the same jet or a jet in another axis could be triggered.
(b) The spike could appear at the input of the switching amplifier,
duplicating the above jet firing or firing the opposite jet in
the same axis.
The above problem appeared during qualification _estin_ wL_=, .... 9_ __
were commanded to fire four times per second. Even under these conditions,
however, the most frequent retrlggering was observed to be once per
minute. Extensive retesting during acceptance testing never produced the
problem.
It was our opinion that the condition would not exist during actual space-
craft operation and therefore no corrective action was taken.
Relay Solder Ball Problem
Considerable production problems were encountered with the power relays
used as solenoid valve drivers. In early 1964, solder particles, formed
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while sealing the can, were discovered. Some were large enough to cause
pln-to-pin shorts. The problem was resolved either by reworking the
affected relays (using an improved process that virtually eliminated the
possibility of solder particle contamination) or by using a new relay
design, incorporating a welded can.
The new relay design, however, introduced a hang-up problem, caused by
galling of the armature and pivot. This problem was solved by a change
in the armature material. Both of the above problems had an impact on
other spacecraft subsystems, in particular the computer and IGS power
supply, which used similar type relays. Although these systems did not
experience the same problems, the same precautions were taken.
ACME Power Inverter Design Problems
A power inverter design change was necessitated because other systems,
in particular the horizon sensor, were _u_c_Lible to ....._ ___+o._. _o....
inverter exhibited an output transient of up to 200 volts, peak-to-peak,
when first energized. Installation of back-to-back zener diodes limited
the transient to 60 volts maximum.
The power inverter was overly susceptible to input ripple of 120 Hz, due
to resonance of the input filter network. Several solutions were
suggested, including lowering the resonant frequency, mounting an
additional filter in a cable or plug, or including an additional filter
as a separate component. This problem, however, was not serious enough
t
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to warrant the weight and packaging penalties incurred with any of these
solutions. No problems occurred during systems tests or flights as a
result of this susceptibility.
I
The efficiency of the power inverter did not meet the original specifica-
tion requirements. The inverter was designed for input voltages from 22
to 30.5 volts and was required to operate during intermittent bus voltage
extremes of RO and 32.6 volts. Therefore, there was a trade-off between
frequency stability and efficiency, and efficiency was sacrificed for
better performance.
_ne inverter was protected against open circuits and dead shorts, but
not half-wave shorts. A future design should include such protection,
especially if zener diodes are used to suppress output transients.
CORPORATION
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5.0 Pilot Controls and Displays
The design evolution of pilot controls and displays for the Gemini Guidance
and Control System is discussed in the following paragraphs. These controls
and displays are pictured in Figures 5-1 through 5-3. The left hand and
right hand instrument panels of a recovered flight spacecraft are shown in
Figures 5-1 and 5-2, respectively. The following components are shown in
these photos: (1) Attitude Indicators; (2) Flight Director Controllers;
(3) Incremental Velocity Indicator; (4) Range and Range Rate Indicator;
(5) Manual Data Insertion Unit; and (6) Maneuver Hand Controller. The photos
also show the notations marked on the panels by the astronauts. A view of
a cabin mock-up in Figure 5-3 shows the center console with the following
controls (some of which were disc_ssed in previous sections): (1) Radar
Control and IMU Mode Selector; (2) Computer Controls; (3) Attitude Control
Mode Selector; (4) Horizon Sensor Switch; (5) Rate Gyro Switches; and
(6) the Attitude Hand Controller.
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5.1 Attitude and Maneuver Hand Controllers
5.1.1 Requirements - A design requirement was to provide the astronauts with a
means of manually controlling the spacecraft's attitude and translational
movement. This was accomplished by attitude and maneuver hand controllers
which enabled the astronauts to override all electronic control equipment,
thus giving them full spacecraft control capabilities.
5.1.2 Initial Design Tradeoffs and Decisions
Mercur_ Attitude Hand Controller Experience - Initially, a hand controller
which was mechanically linked directly to the thruster valves was
considered for Mercury. This was abandoned because of excess friction and
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5.1.2 (Continued)
hysteresis caused by routing translational linkage through pressurized
bulkheads.
"-l bThe Mercury attitude hand controller had two modes of operation, • y- y-
wire" and manual. For " "fly-by-wlre , the handle contained four switches
for each axis, two each for each direction (i.e. pitch up, pitch down,
etc. ) and two each for either high or low thrust, and utilized the auto-
matic reaction jets. The low thrust switches were actuated at 30% of frill
handle travel and the high thrust switches at 75_ of full travel. In the
manual mode of operation, the hand controller _as linked mechanically to
throttle valves inside the pressurized area (avoiding t_h¢problems
mentioned above). The manual thrusters were utilized in this mode, and
thrust output was directly proportional to the amount of handle
displacement.
The handle pivot point was at the center of the wrist. This location was
thought to be best because it utilized the natural human hand movement.
However, flight experience showed that mechanical constraints impeded
wrist motion and made this pivot point undesirable. The handle was not
redesigned for Mercury because of time constraints.
Three new concepts evolved from the Mercury attitude controller
experience :
i. The hand controller permitted three-axis control, either individually
or simultaneous ly.
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5.1.2 (Continued)
2. The movement of the hand controller handle should be analogous to the
desired movement of the spacecraft.
3. The center of the human wrist was not the best place for the handle
pivot point because of mechanical differences between the wrist and
the controller.
Gemini Attitude Hand Controlle_ - At one time we considered using a hand
controller for pitch and roll axls control and rudder pedals for yaw
control. This approach was abandoned because of space and weight limita-
tions and because the rudder pedals proved cumbersome. A conventional
aircraft hand controller was rejected because of unwanted inputs experienced
under high-g loads. We also considered a force field system hand
controller which used strain gauges to give a spacecraft control response
proportional to the handle motion. This controller was rejected because
it depended upon associated electronic equipment which was not reliable
enok_h.
The selected hand controller contained six switches for control about each
directional axis (i.e. pitch up# pitch down, etc.), a three-ganged linear
potentiometer in each of the three axes, and wiring for Rate Command,
Direct-with-ACME, Pulse, and Direct-without-ACME modes of operation. The
three-ganged potentiometer contained one potentiometer for rate signals
for attitude control, one potentiometer for instrumentation of the handle
positions, and one potentiometer for paraglider control, which was not
used. The pitch and yaw pivot points were located at the center of the
astronaut's hand and, due to the complexity of design, the roll pivot
/
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5.1.2 (Continued)
point was located below the astronaut's hand. This provided a clear
distinction of pitch, yaw and roll to prevent inadvertent cross coupling.
This design could be operated in both high and low level g fields with
negligible cross coupling.
Conclusions -
i. The attitude hand controller handle should have the pivot points
in the center of the hand for ultimate control. However, the roll
pivot point below the hand proved to be satisfactory in providing
clear distinction to pitch and yaw in preventing cross coupling.
2. The controller should not go through any electronics for direct
mode operations. However, this method tends to use more
thruster fuel than the automatic modes.
3. A non-linear potentiometer in place of the linear one used would
give the astronaut finer control at low rate levels.
4. The implementation of rudder pedals for the yaw axis control in
landing the spacecraft by paraglider would be worthwhile.
Maneuver Hand Controllers - Initially, a pulse system was devised for
translation control. The handle would be positioned for the desired
response and then a button would be pushed for a pulse jet firing. This
design was scrapped because it proved cumbersome to operate.
The selected maneuver hand controller required only one movement to actuate
a translation thruster or combination of translation thrusters. The
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5.1.2 (Continued)
handle contained one switch for each of the six translation directions
i (i.e., up, down, etc.).Early in the Gemini program it was decided to have two maneuver hand
controllers in the spacecraft, one for each astronaut. This allowed both
astronauts to gain experience in docking control, a maneuver which utilized
both the attitude and maneuver hand controllers. The second maneuver hand
controller was a miniature of the original, but used the same size grip.
I Two maneuver hand controllers were first installed in Spacecraft No. 5.
5.1.3 Development Problems_ Tradeoffs and Design Decisions - The time history of
the development of the Gemini hand controllers is shown in Figure 5.1-1.
I Gemini Attitude Hand Controller - Shaping the grip to satisfy individual
crew members was a major problem. Finally, a removal grip was designed to
be used for testing the handle only. It was intended that NASA would
replace the removal grips with grips customized for specific crews.
However, one grip design was used throughout the entire program without
being changed or replaced.
The forces required to position the handle of the attitude hand controller
i presented a continuing problem throughout the Gemini program. Undesirably
high forces were required to actuate the switches and position the poten-
tiometer in each axis. Switch and actuator movements were controlled by
springs with very tight tolerances to preclude any damage to the switches.
I Due to the limitation in the size of the box and the number of switches in
i each axis, the switch actuation forces were higher than the design goal.
These forces made the handle uncomfortable to use in an unpressurized suit,
/
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5.1.3 (Continued)
but did not degrade the crew's capability. The flight crews were
extremely patient and understanding with this problem and accepted the
tradeoff of comfort for improved system integration and confidence that the
handle positioning would not damage the switches.
The size and stiffness of the wire bundle were reduced to lessen the
hysteresis forces that were caused by the limited space inside the package
and the flexing of the wire bundle during handle movement. A smaller
gauge wire with a more flexible insulation was used. Even then, the
routing of the wire bundle was very critical to eliminate added forces and
possible binding.
In the last four spacecraft, the handle was changed slightly good
with
I results. The following changes were made:
(a) A "T" configuration was added to the original grip for an overhead
grip control. This improved the yaw control when the astronaut's suit
was pressurized (mainly during EVA) and the cabin unpressurized. The
change was necessary to reduce wrist fatigue experienced during
training for extended periods of EVA for these later flights.
(b) The roll rate output of the hand controller was changed to a maximum
of 15°/sec for a total handle travel of 9° from neutral. Originally
the maximum pitch, yaw, and roll rate output of the hand controller
was lO°/sec for a total stick travel of lO° from neutral. This change
was made to increase the roll gain capability during the reentry
phase of the s acecraft flight.
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5-1.3 (Continued)
(c) The deadband of the hand controller potentiometers, used in the rate
command mode, was widened from 1° to 1.1 ° of the handle movement from
neutral. This change was made because the potentiometer deadband
locations shifted slightly during qualification vibration testing.
This change had no measurable effect on the hand controller operation
or spacecraft control.
(d) Diodes were incorporated in series with the hand controller switches
" to rule out any possibility of improper Jet firing. In the rate
command mode, the closing of the direct command switches could produce
"sneak" circuits causing improper Jets to fire, in addition to those
jets actually commanded by the difference between the commanded and
actual rates. This condition could have caused a temporary loss of
control and an additional expenditure of fuel, although the commanded
rates would eventually have been achieved. Also, an excessive current
of up to lO amperes would have been drawn through the RCS relay
contacts, which were rated at 5 amperes, and current of 8 amperes
could have been drawn through an RCS thruster circuit breaker rated
at 5.4 amperes. The need for this precaution was questioned at the
time, because testing which simulated retrograde and normal maneuvers
failed to demonstrate "sneak" circuit conditions actually existed in
normal operation. Also, an original NASA directive which ruled out
any electronics in the RCS "direct-without-ACME" switch circuits had
to be violated.
/
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5.1.3 (Continued)
Switch failures were experienced throughout the Gemini program. These
failures fell into three major categories: (1) contamination, (2) over-
stress, and (3) hermetic seal leakage.
Contamination and excessive voltage drops accounted for the majority of the
failures. To minimize these problems the switch manufacturer incorporated
improved quality control and processing procedures which substantially
reduced switch contamination. Then the switches were subjected to a lO_
voltage drop screening test to eliminate any contaminated switches.
The mechanical overstress of the switches was attributed to the procedure
of setting the maximum allowable over-travel of the switch during the
assembly of the hand controller. This problem was eliminated by insuring
that the plunger assembly used to depress the switch actuator was adjusted
so it was retracted prior to switch assembly and attitude controller grip
assembly movement.
The hermetic seal leakage caused unwanted pressure differentials when
going into a pressurized condition after being in an unpressurized condi-
tion for a period of time. This was overcome by performing a lO0_o
altitude-actuation force decay test during the switch acceptance testing.
Conclusions -
1. The position of the hand controller in the spacecraft is critical
because of the sitting position and fatigue encountered during
extended periods of stick control.
t
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5.1.3 (Continued)
2. The switches, springs, and general handle assembly tolerances are
extremely sensitive. This is due to the limited amount of space
available and the excessive forces required to actuate the
switches if proper tolerances are not maintained.
3. A lO0_ screening of the switches must be incorporated to detect
hermetic seal leaks and contact contamination.
Maneuver Hand Controllers - The shape of the grip was the obstacle to
overcome in the development of the maneuver hand controller. A ball of
approximately l-l/8 inch diameter was accepted to be the best grip. This
provided the astronaut with adequate feel control whether his suit was
pressurized or unpressurized.
The miniature maneuver hand controller was positioned in the spacecraft so
that the astronaut had ready access to it while using the attitude hand
controller. However, the miniature maneuver hand controller then became a
convenient handle to help those working inside the cabin to move around.
Since the handle was not built to take these excessive loads, the stops and
mechanical linkage were deformed. A guard was built around the handle to
preclude inadvertent handling by anyone in the cabin.
/
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5.2 Manual Data Insertion Unit (MDIU)
5.2.1 Requirement - The basic MDIU requirement was to provide a means for the
crew to communicate with the computer.
5.2.2 Initial Design Tradeoffs and Decisions - Initial effort was devoted to
determining how data would be displayed and inserted, and to the merits of
housing the insertion and display functions in the same or separate
packages. We decided to house the insertion and display functions in
separate packages because of (1) the physical limitations of the instru-
ment panel (it was easier to mount two small units than one large one), and
(2) human factor considerations.
Consideration was given to what type of device would be best for insetting
data. Thumbwheels were originally considered, but discarded because of slow
insertion speeds and difficulty in sealing the required rotary switches.
A telephone-type dial was evaluated and found to be satisfactory from a
human factors viewpoint, but a dial was significantly slower to use than a
keyboard. Different schemes for increasing the dial rate of return were
examined, but a keyboard was eventually selected. After evaluation of
several different keyboard configurations, an adding machine configuration
was selected because a minimum amount of training was required for a crew-
man to become proficient in using it. "Egg-crate" guards were placed
around the keys to prevent the depression of more than one key at a time.
A decimal format for insertion was chosen over binary or octal to minimize
crew training requirements.
Numerical displays on electro-mechanical (wheel) devices and binary displays
on lamps were Judged to be the most promising readout approaches.
/
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5.2.2 (Continued)
Electro-luminescent devices were not considered because the circuitry
required for them was too complex, and the display intensity would have
been insufficient in bright sunlight. The wheel devices were relatively
slow in displaying a data word but were easily interpreted by the operator.
Binary devices could display a word more quickly and had less complex cir-
cuits. However they were subject to misinterpretation because it was felt
that the crews would have insufficient training time to become proficient
in binary conversion. Therefore, to minimize the chance for error, decimal
wheel devices were selected for the readout.
5.2.3 P_nges During Development and Qualification Testing -
No significant problems occurred during development and qualification test-
ing. The time history of the design and development of the MDIU
is similar to that of the computer.
5.2.4 Problems and Design Changes Associated With Systems Tests and Flights -
The keyboard switches provided no positive indication of actuation. While
this did not create any problems in the classical sense, it was a source of
irritation and concern to the crew. In future programs, switches which
provide a positive indication of actuation should be specified.
During certain parts of the Gemini mission the MDIU operation would be
required to read out certain parameters over extended periods of time.
Each readout required an action on the part of the ..... +_
Conclusion - In future programs consideration should be given to
including a computer program which would automatically update
certain parameters periodically.
/
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5.B Incremental Velocit_ Indicator (IVI)
5.3.1 Requirement - The IVl provided visual indication of incremental longitu-
dinal, lateral, and vertical velocity components, and the associated signs
for each, to be imparted to the spacecraft by maneuver thrusters.
5.3.2 Initial Design Tradeoffs and Decisions - The original philosophy for the
IVI was to have a display, driven by means independent of the computer,
capable of assisting the crew in the execution of a maneuver in the event
Of a failure of some other spacecraft component. The system complexity and
the resulting cost and size of an independent unit capable of participation
in a closed loop maneuver was considered prohibitive for a redundant
function. Conversely, it was considered that the advantages of an open
loop timing device were not sufficient to justify its size and cost. After
considering the various aspects, it was decided to make the IVI a natural
extension of the computer for closed loop operation.
5.3.3 Development Problems I Tradeoffs and Design Decisions - The time history of
the design and development of the IVI is similar to that of the computer.
The IVI consisted of three B-digit indicators, one for each axis of motion.
The indicators were designed to be capable of manual reset. This was
provided by three knobs (one knob for each indicator) which drove the indi-
cators at a rate proportional to deflection. This type of slewing control
was found to be quite time-consuming in setting in precise quantities.
Therefore, different and discrete slewing rates were substituted for the
proportional control.
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Problems and Design Changes During Development and Qualification Testing -
Two minor problems were encountered as a result of the vibration qua&i-
Vibration caused some transistors to fail. The mode of
w orting between the posts (base and emitter) and the can
Transistors with larger clearances between the posts and
ituted with satisfactory results.
(case sealing) was also experienced as a result of vibra-
blem was corrected by adding a "T" bar across the width of
ive support.
esign Changes Associated With Systems Test and Flights -
trated itself to be very satisfactory throughout the Gemini
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5.4 Attitude Display Grou_
5.4.1 Requirements - Spacecraft crews required a natural and continuous display
of spacecraft attitude and rate information to perform the following
control tasks :
Mission Phase
Launch
Spacecraft Separation
Orbit Adjust
Orbit
Rendezvous
Rendezvous -
Terminal Phase
Rendezvous Docking
Rendezvous Docking
MCDONNELL DOtlOL_
CORIDCPRATION
Display Information
Attitude and Rates
Attitude and Rates
Attitude
Attitude and Rates
Attitude and Rates
Attitude and Rates
Attitude and Rates
Attitude
Crew Control Task
Monitor booster
attitude control
Damp rates, then
assume small-end-
forward attitude.
To align spacecraft
roll axis along the
orbit correction
vector for thrust
application.
To assume and main-
tain orbit attitude.
To align spacecraft
for the thrust
application during
slow catch-up
maneuver.
Maneuver Thrust
Application
Verify swing-a-round
onto docking radial
(Primary control is
visual)
Attitude control during
final closure so that
the visual offset
defines translation
required for alignment
with the docking
radial.
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Mission Phase
Re-entry
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Display Information
DownRange and Cross
Range Errors and
Roll Attitude and
Rate Commands
Crew Control Task
Re-entry Control
and Splash-down
Prediction
5.4.2 Initial Design Tradeoffs and Decisions - Various existing display techni-
ques were investigated for suitability to the Gemini program. These
techniques were:
(a) Single Axis Gimbal Position Indicators - This device, the type used on
the Mercury program, provides individual gimbal position readout and
thus inherently can not account for mutual interaction of the three
axes of rotation. An exaggerated example of the lack of mutual inter-
action of the display is shown by maneuvering 180 ° in yaw, then 180 ° in
pitch. Now the yaw and pitch gimbal position indicators both read
180 ° but the roll indicators still read 0° when in effect, this
maneuver results in an apparent roll of 180 °, with 0° yaw and 0°
pitch. From this example it combe seen that this device is not
capable of displaying the apparent effect of a complex maneuver
involving more than one axis of rotation.
During the Mercury program, when man's abilities in space were unknown,
attitude changes were made about one axis at a time in a sequential
manner. In order to return to the original attitude, the sequence was
reversed. The single axis gimbal position indicator was suited to the
Mercury program because its single axis readout only served to enhance
the "one axis at a time" maneuvers. However, for the Gemini program,
where the astronauts were to fly the spacecraft through the
fl
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I 5.4.2 (Continued)
complex maneuvers of rendezvous, this device was essentially
useless.
(b) Moving Airplan_e - This display is currently being utilized in some
limited attitude transport type aircraft. It uses a single display
element representing the vehicle, which is capable of being positioned
in roll, azimuth and elevation with respect to the face of the indi-
cator. Its primary capability is to provide limited pitch and roll
information as well as providing director information for instrument
approaches, etc. It cannot be mechanized as an all attitude instru-
ment, and hence could not provide the range of information required for
the Gemini spacecraft. General useful range is _30 ° in pitch, +60 ° in
roll, and in yaw as a director of course error indicator.
(c) Two-Axis Attitude Sphere, with Separate Heading Indicator - This method
of presenting attitude is the conventional one utilized in early
"century-series" fighters and the majority of the operational aircraft
flying today. It provides a true readout of attitude, being normally
coupled to the vertical gyro's pitch and roll gimbals, and becomes
ineffective only near the zenith. It is suitable for most aircraft
installations which provide sensors in the form of a vertical gyro and
a compass system. Complications arise when it is utilized with a
stable platform reference system. Hence, a third axis gimbal control
unit is normally employed to keep track of the interaction effects
which the azimuth gimbal imparts.
/
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I 5.4.2 (Continued)
(d) Three______-
gimbal
yaw axes.
to relay
directly
platform.
from the
• back into
naut, in effect,
relation to the
due to its simpl
complex transfoz
Comparative Evaluatic
ESTIMATED MUTUAL
WEIG_ INTER-ACTION
OF AXES
Mercury 4.0 lb. No
Type
Moving 4.0 lb. No
Airplane
2-axis 5.0 lb. Yes
sphere 2-axis
only
3-axis 6.0 lb. Yes
sphere
*Needed to _ e ruggedized to G
/
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-Axis Attitude Sphere - This device utilizes a sphere which is
ed to allow 360 ° degrees of rotation shout its pitch, roll and
By the use of synchro transmitters and control transformers
gimbal position information, the sphere can be positioned
and identically to the position of the stable member of the
The transformation which occurs in reading out the position
from the platform is naturally compensated by reading these angles
back into the similar gimbal structure of the sphere. Hence the astro-
can see the actual position of the spacecraft in
relation to the stable member of the platform. The solution is unique,
icity in achieving what is normally considered a
rmation of spherical geometry.
on of Displays Considered
STATUS OF INTERFACE DISPLAY
BASIC WITH CAPABILITY
INDICATOR PLATFORM
Production l:l Synchro
(ambiguous)
*Production Limited
Excursion
*Production l:l Synchro
needs 3rd
gimbal control
*Production Direct l:l
Synchro
be emini environment.
Poor. Predeter-
mined sequential
attitude changes
only.
Unsatisfactory
Not all attitude
Poor. 2-axis
interaction only,
ambiguity at
zenith.
Good. All attitude
unlimited control.
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(Continued)
Selection of the Three-Axis Attitude S_here for Gemini - Previous studies
performed on the simulators at McDonnell for the rendezvous and reentry con-
trol problems indicated the necessity of an unambiguous all-attitude display
for control reference. It was also found that rate and attitude command in-
formation is a necessary part of the displays where accurate and efficient
control is required. For these reasons, a three-axis attitude sphere with
superimposed flight directors was selected for the Gemini program.
5.4.3 Deyelo_ment Problems_ Tradeoffs and Design Decisions - The time history of
the development of the Attitude Display Group is shown in Figure 5.4-1.
Adaptation of the Attitude Indicator - A three-axis attitude sphere which
had been successfully employed in the F-4 Phantom aircraft was adapted to
the Gemini program.
In addition to the electrical and mechanical interface adjustments, much
effort was expended to make the sphere and flight director needles look
natural to the astronaut and react in an unambiguous manner. The lower half
of the sphere was painted darker than the top half in order to create an
artificial horizon and simulate visual ground contact when the platform was
referenced to local vertical. The polarity of the sphere movements was
made such that the miniature airplane could be "flown" on the sphere.
Thus, attitude changes could be traversed directly, eliminating the need
for sequential attitude ch_ugeso This same philosophy was incorporated
into the movements of the flight director needles. The astronaut responded
to any flight director command by "flying" the miniature aircraft into the
command.
,
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(Continued)
Development of the Flight Director Controller - Since the flight directors
were to display commands from the computer, inertial platform, rendezvous
radar, and rate gyros, an intermediate controller was added to allow the
astronaut to select commands from each of the command sources and to
insure command signal compatibility with the flight directors.
5._.4 Problems and Design Changes During Development and Qualification Testing -
Attitude Indicator - Since the indicator had undergone extensive environ-
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
mental qualification for the Air Force, the only questionable areas were
shock and vibration. In order to find specifically where ruggedization
would be needed, a development unit was vibration tested. The results
revealed four areas which failed to withstand the vibration levels. These
areas, their failure modes, and required design changes are tabulated below.
Area or Failure
Component Mode
Roll Gimbal
Flight Director
Needles
Rear Cover
Gear Train
Design Change
Aluminum gimbal support
ears holding the slip-
rings were both completely
severed.
Change gimbal material
to stainless steel.
Excessive needle movement
during vibration and
permanent needle
deformation.
Change needle material
to beryllium and add
supporting struts.
Excessive movement
during vibration.
Add screws to attach
cover to inner support.
The right sphere half Gears which move the 2
displayed large dis- sphere halves were heat
placements during vibration treated for improved
and was permanently dis- stiffness and elasticity.
placed 1/8" after test.
l
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5.4.4 (Continued)
The reworked prototype unit with the above changes then passed its vibra-
tion test requirements and its shock test requirements.
Flight Director Controller - During early development, electrical "ground
loops" among the various command signal sources necessitated a design change
to improve electrical isolation. Also during development, humidity caused
electrical variations in the summing networks and led to a design change to
environmently seal the area surrounding the summing networks.
Conclusion - Any new design of a controller should give consideration
to both electrical and environmental isolation.
5.4.5 Problems and Design Changes Associated with Syste_msT_e_stsand_F_lights
Attitude Indicator - During spacecraft systems testing, it was noted that a
manual range switch should be added to the face of the indicator in order
to make effective use of the range and accuracy of the command information
to be displayed. The range switch added to the indicator allowed an
attenuation of the input signals (Hi range) to the flight directors so that
a greater range of information could be displayed. When the attenuation
was removed (Lo range), smaller ranges could be read to a higher accuracy.
This feature was useful in making small attitude corrections or in maintain-
ing a desired attitude.
i
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(Continued)
During rendezvous, a crew task was to furnish manual rendezvous backup
capability to the computer. This was done by aligning the spacecraft with
the target using the boresight and periodically reading the angle between
the local vertical and the spacecraft; this angle was continuously dis-
played on the attitude sphere and also could be read with the flight
directors. This angle and the rate-of-change of this angle were used to
compute thrust vectors required to accomplish rendezvous. As the astronauts
became familiar with this operation during simulated rendezvous missions_
it became highly desirable to (1) increase the number of divisions along
the pitch gimbal scale from one mark every 5° to one mark for every degree
and (2) add a scale for the pitch and yaw flight director needles. A
change was made to the attitude indicator late in the program, incorporating
these additional scales and markings, which provided more accurate and
repeatable angular readings and therefore better back-up capability during
rendezvous.
/
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5.5 Range and Range Rate Indicator
5.5.1 Requirements - The indicator was required to display that information
needed by the crew to permit a qualitative evaluation of proper closing
rates and ranges during rendezvous.
5.5.2 Initial Design Tradeoffs and Decisions - Originally, the indicator was to
accept and display analog range and range rate data from the radar. Ranges
of 0 to 300,000 feet and rates of -200 to +500 feet per second were to be
displayed. It was intended that a manual control would provide three scale
ranges.
However, human factor considerations indicated that manual scale factor
control would detract from other critical crew operations during the
rendezvous and docking phases of the mission. Consequently, it was decided
to display range data in a logarithmic manner and to add a third "vernier"
rate indicator to display rates between +lO feet per second. The vernier
range rate requirement was subsequently changed to +5 feet per second. The
range indicator displayed data in three decades: O to 3000 feet, 3000 to
30,000 feet, and 30,000 to 300,000 feet. The indicator movement was linear
with range gain changes provided by the radar.
Space restrictions limited the panel area that could be given to this
instrument. To take advantage of the maximum possible scale length for a
given amount of area, a circular display was selected in preference to a
vertical display. The range and range rate scales were mounted concentri-
cally and the range rate scale was designed so that its numeric value was
approximately equal to the square root of the range radially opposed from
it. This scale selection permitted an easy qualitative evaluation of proper
closing conditions.
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5.5.3 Development Problems, Tradeoffs_ and Design Decisions - There were no sig-
nificant development problems. The time history of the indicator design
and development is similar tothat of the radar (depicted in Figure 2.4-1).
5.5.4 Problems and Design Changes During Development and Qualification Testing -
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
5.5.5
The range and range rate indicator failed the 12.6 g RMS vibration test.
Structural failures occurred in the meter movements due to high amplifica-
tions in the case and movement mounts. Structural changes were incorporated
and the indicator passed development tests at the ]_2.6 g RMS level. Subse-
quently, the qualification test vibration level was reduced and the
indicator was qualified at 8.8 gEMS.
Problems and Design Changes Associated With Systems Test and Flights - No
problems were associated with the original requirement to provide the crew
with quick, qualitative information related to rendezvous. However, as
mission success grew, it was attempted to use the range and range rate
indicator in a quantitative capacity. The instrument was unsuited for this
function because the indicator pointers were so large that they covered the
numerals to be read and they seemed to point to the wrong scale. Further-
more, range readings greater than 6000 feet were difficult for the crew to
interpret.
No changes were made to the range and range rate indicator in spite of its
inability to function in a quantitative capacity. If this were to be a
requirement at the beginning of a new program, consideration should be
given to decimal display.
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6.0 S_stem Design
6.1 System Integration Design Changes and Problems
I This section discusses some specific problems and design changes, involving
I systems integration, which occurred in the Gemini program.
6.1.1 Addition of Ascent Mode
Ascent back-up guidance for the booster radio guidance system became an
I Inertial Guidance System (IGS) requirement in May 1962. The back-up
guidance capability was obtained with relatively few hardware additions
since the inherent accuracy of the IGS was sufficient to perform ascent
i guidance. However, the computer software requirement was increased
considerably with addition of the ascent mode. This addition made pre-
launch alignment of the IM_ necessary, and added a new interface
I between the digital computer and the booster autopilot.
Three different methods of providing the necessary accuracy in IMU
I azimuth alignment were considered:
(1) Gyrocompassin______similar to that used on Centaur. This method was
ruled out because it required a complex interface with the computer
and additional computer capacity.
(2) Optical alignment - This method would have required a llne of sight
from device the ground to the platform in the spacecraft.an optical on
This was not feasible because of interference from the launch complex
structure and because optical access through the spacecraft structure
would have been required.
I
/
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6.1.1 (Continued)
(3) Platform synchro electromechanical alignment with ascent update -
This method was chosen for azimuth alignment. Launch pad alignment
utilized IMU ground test equipment and was performed as follows:
(a) The roll and pitch accelerometers were autoleveled to hold the
(b)
azimuth axis of the platform vertical within 90 arc-seconds.
The platform was aligned in azimuth by torquing the roll gimbal
with the roll synchro on the Alignment Reference Unit (part
of the ground test equipment). The azimuth angle (roll gimbal
angle) was read out through the computer to provide better
(c)
alignment accuracy.
After lift-off, the computer utilized azimuth velocity updates,
transmitted from the ground 3 to calculate the azimuth misalign-
ment angle, which was employed to correct navigation and azimuth
steering data. The azimuth velocity updates were calculated by
the ground system on the basis of GE M0D III tracking data.
Update data was automatically transmitted to the computer at lO0
and 140 seconds after liftoff.
The basic guidance equations were an outgrowth of the radio guidance
equations used during the Mercury program. Modifications to the guidance
equations were necessary to make them compatible with the Gemini inertial
system.
The additional booster interface requirements caused by the addition of
ascent back-up guidance are itemized below:
I
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(a) DC analog steering signals (pitch, roll and yaw) from the
computer to the booster autopilot.
(b) A swltchover discrete (fade-in) from the booster to the computer.
(c) A gain change discrete from the computer to the booster
autopilot.
(d) A second stage engine cutoff command (SSECO) from the computer.
(e) A guidance switchover command to the booster (activated by a
cabin switch).
(f) Booster guidance malfunction detection system signals to
Gemini displays.
6.1.2 IGS Static Power Supply (SPS) Initial Design Considerations
The SPS was designed as a common power supply for the IMU and the computer
in order to minimize weight and volume. Responsibility for the design of
the SPS was given to the IMU subcontractor because the IMU interface with
the power supply was the most complex.
In June 1962, the capability of the SPS was increased to include:
(1) Separate turn-on capability for the IMU and computer to permit better
utilization of the IGS. This allowed the computer to be updated
in flight without turning on the IMU, thus conserving spacecraft
power. The SPS was divided into three sections, the IMU DC section,
the computer DC section and the 400 Hz AC section. Each of the
above sections had its own pulse width regulator (FWR) which
increased the reliability of the power supply.
l
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6.1.2 (Continued)
(2) An output capacity increase of lO VA in the 400 Hz inverter to
eliminate the horizon sensor inverter.
(3) Use of the IGS 400 Hz inverter as the primary 400 Hz source for the
ACME system with capability added to permit the astronauts to switch
to the ACME 400 Hz inverter as a back-up power source.
6.1.3 SPS Development Problems_ Trade-offs_ and Design Decisions
Auxiliary Computer Power Unit (ACPU) Incorporation
The IGS specification required that it operate with a power bus
interruption of 30 milliseconds. However, the static power supply could
not maintain regulation during this interrupticm and could cause the
computer memory to be altered by improper shutdown. An ACI_J was
incorporated in December 1962 to prevent alterations during bus inter-
ruptions and depressions, or uncontrolled power shutdowns.
The ACPU contained a small battery with sensing and timing circuitry which
buffered the computer against a voltage depression sensed at the output of
the computer section pulse width regulator (PWR) in the SPS. If the
depression exceeded lO0 milliseconds, the ccmputer was shut off for 30
milliseconds and then turned on automatically. However, this design
caused two additional problems.
A power interruption would initialize the computer program to the point of
turn on, and without an indication to the astronauts, the data out of the
computer would be meaningless. Interruptions during ascent (calculations
in real time) could have caused an abort of the mission if IGS guidance
/
MCDONNELL DOUGL_ 181
(_ORPOR_'r#ON
I
MERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEY
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
6.1.3 (Continued)
were being used. Interruptions in the computer modes would have resulted
in the loss of all previously accumulated data and affected each mode
differently. An interruption during reentry would have resulted in the
spacecraft missing the target area. Interruptions during rendezvous
phase would have had the least effect, because target data could have been
reacquired prior to performing an orbit maneuver.
The second problem involved ACPU oscillation which could be started if the
bus voltage (with computer off) was slightly above the ACPU turn-off
threshold. If the computer was turned on, the bus would be depressed by
the computer load causing the ACPU to turn off the computer and then turn
it back on after 30 milliseconds. Turning on the computer again would
start an off-cycle which would discharge the ACPU battery in approximately
4 minutes.
The design change which corrected these problems consisted of providing the
astronauts with a visual indication of computer turn-off via the computer
malfunction light when an ACPU shutdown occurred. Positive action by the
astronaut was then required to reset the ACPU prior to computer turn-on.
Conclusion -
Equipment susceptible to power interruptions should have an interrup-
tion buffering capability built in during the initial design phase.
If undervoltage sense circuits with power shutdown sequencing are
used, their design should allow for bus voltage variations due to
power unloading.
l
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I 6,1.3 (Continued)
Computer 28VDC RFI Filtered Power
The computer required 28VDC filtered power because spacecraft bus power
contained transients which could have caused computer malfunctions. The
IGS power supply wiring was modified so that computer 28VDC power was
obtained from a point just after the RFI filter. However, this caused an
RFI problem since filters were employed in the hot side and the return for
all 28VDC power. The circuits susceptible to EFI problems were those
which utilized the 28 VDC filtered power and were returned directly to
spacecraft ground. The circuits in question were the booster gain change
rclay, computer running light, computer malfunction light, _ud the SSEC0
and computer malfunction inputs to telemetry. These circuits were driven
by discrete output modules in the computer which utilized the 28 VDC
filtered power. The DC returns for these modules were tied to a point
after the RFI filter, which put the filter in series (through spacecraft
ground) with returns for the above circuits. With this configuration, the
possibility _f a false booster gain change could exist if noise in the P_I
filter (nois_ was rectified by spike suppression diod__s on the relays)
reached a level which could pull in the gain change relays. In the case
of the telemetry inputs, the noise would appear at the input to the
telemetry signal conditioners, causing the signal to appear ragged. The
computer display lights were not affected by this configuration. A
modification was made to rewire these modules to utilize the 27.2 VDC
computer power which was returned directly to ground. This modification
was incorporated in December 1962.
/
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I of each interface should be made to insure adequate
I problems.
i 400 Hz Power Sup_l_
Systems Test Unit (ESTU) in early 1963,
errors were caused by distortion and
erter. This was caused by an
for a power factor of 0.8 lagging,
a PF near unity.
400 Hz inverter was cross-coupling
dynamic loading reflected low
DC section power supplies onto the
noise modulated the IMU DC section
compensated for by the following
I incorporated in the 400 Hz section to tune
load.
regulation was improved by modifying the feed-
I raised the computer voltages approximately
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i After these modifications were made, problems were encountered with phase
shift resolver readouts of gimbal position, during the predelivery
acceptance testing of the first production IMU. The problem was evidenced
as a readout instability that was caused by distortion and coupling
within the power supply which appeared on the 26 V 400 Hz output. The
instability on the 400 Hz output appeared as a jitter, or lack of period
stability, on the output. Since the phase shift resolvers operated on a
single period basis, the readouts showed a wide variation for a stable
gimbal position.
This problem was corrected by incorporation of a separate precision 400 Hz
inverter which supplied excitation only to the platform phase shift
resolvers. Filters were also incorporated in the computer to reduce the
effects of distortion and noise. This precision power supply was flown as
a separate unit on Spacecraft 2, and a precision 400 Hz phase shift
resolver supply was incorporated into SPS during major modifications which
are discussed in a later paragraph.
Static Power Supply Leakage Voltage Problems
During Compatibility Test Unit (CTU) testing, transients appeared on
the computer interface power lines when prime DC power was applied to the
power supply (with the computer section turned off). The hold circuits in
the IGS power supply were unable to completely inhibit the computer
section pulse width regulator when the power switch was sequenced on; thus
a small leakage current passed through the pulse width regulator sections.
To prevent this transient from altering the computer memory, a relay was
/
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i 6.i.3 (Continued)
installed in the power supply to open the 20.7 VDC line which provided the
I bias for the computer series regulators. This insured that no leakage
voltages would get into the computer.
Conclusion
During development testing, all power supply solid state switches
should be checked for passage of transients in the off-state when
prime power is applied.
Major Redesign of SPS
A major redesign of the SPS occurred in November 1963 to correct the
problems noted earlier in this report. The modifications incorporated were
as follows :
(1) The pulse width regulator (PWR) frequency was changed from 2400 Hz to
15 KHz, and magnetic amplifiers on the output of PWR's were replaced
with transistorized switching circuits. These changes were made to
reduce dynamic loading and cross-coupling.
(2) A separate internal precision 400 Hz power supply was added for
phase shift resolver excitation.
(B) During testing, several power supplies were damaged due to
inadvertent shorting by test personnel. Therefore, overload
protection was added to minimize damage due to excessive current
drain on any of the SPS sections. The overload protection during
ground testing consisted of (manual - reset) turn-off of AC, IMU, and
computer PWR,s if current drain became excessive. The 400 Hz output
also included sense circuitry to shut down the AC section, and to
/
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6.1.3 (Continued)
automatically reset it after an off time of 7 to i0 seconds. This
automatic reset capability remained active during flight. The 400
Hz power was utilized by all G & C equipment, and this reset
capability permitted fault isolation of defective units. In addition
I
I
I
I
I
to shutdown capability, each SPS section was fused. In the event of a
short in flight, the fuses were designed to open the affected section;
the input stage and the other sections of the SPS would remain
operable.
Conclusion
All power interfaces should be carefully examined for regulation,
distortion, and noise, especially those which are supplying excitation
to sensor circuitry.
Provisions should be made for protection of power supplies during
I
I
I
I
ground testing and during flight.
6. i. 4 Gimbal Angle-Computer Interface
Initial Trade-off of Techniques
Two methods were considered for digitizing gimbal angles: (i) a servo
repeater with a shaft encoder, and (2) a phase shift resolver used in
conjunction with a crossover detector (COD) in the computer.
The servo repeater with a shaft encoder _i=-^_ ,._¢w_not chosen because it
I
I
I
was heavier, required more volume, and was less reliable and not as
accurate as the phase shift resolver.
i
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The phase shift resolver determined gimbal angles in the following manner.
The camputer measured the time elapsed between the reference )bOO Hz phase
shift resolver excitation) zero phase crossover and that of the 400 Hz
phase shifted signal (shift proportional to gimbal angle displacement)
from the resolver. The computer-accumulated count between the two cross-
overs (i count equal to 2.16 arc minutes) represented the gimbal angle.
This technique was simple in its theory of operation but was very
susceptible to phase shift, harmonic distortion and noise. These problems
will be discussed in later paragraphs.
Packaging Trade-off
The crossover detectors and 400 Hz filters discussed earlier were
installed in the computer because volume was not available in the platform.
Therefore, line capacitance and noise pickup became error sources. These
error sources could be reduced with an integrated assembly in the plat-
form.
Phase Shift Resolver Modification
One of the major contributors to phase shift, harmonic distortion and
noise errors was the phase shift resolver itself. The subcontractor
improved the resolver design by incorporating the following modifications:
(1) Reduction of harmonics by lowering the 400 Hz excitation from 20 V to
15 V, and use of an ultra-linear magnetic material for laminations.
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6.1.4 (Contlnued)
(2) Use of selected components to minimize mismatches in the resolver
tuning networks. These networks were used in parallel with resolver
sine and cosine windings.
(3) Incorporation of improved shielding for the resolvers to minimize
crosstalk.
ESTJ Gimbal Angle Accuracy Testing Problems
During Electronic Systems Test Unit (ESTU) testing in early 1963, two
conditions were encountered which affected the accuracy of the phase
shift resolvers. During gimbal angle interface testing, harmonic
distortion on the 400 Hz excitation caused errors about 2 to 2.5 times
greater than that of the specification. This problem was corrected by
adding a 400 Hz precision power supply in the IGS power supply and
filters in the computer to filter the 400 Hz excitation.
The second source of noise and harmonic distortion which affected gimbal
angle accuracy was the accelerometer temperature control amplifiers (TCA).
The TCA output transistor wiring was routed through the same slip rings
as the resolver and synchro outputs. Therefore, during the "on" condition
of the TCA's, harmonic distortion was twice that of the "off" condition.
The gimbal angle error observed was 3 to 4 times that of the specification
value.
The TCA wiring was rerouted through the opposite set of slip rings to
correct this problem.
/
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Subcontractor Gimbal Angle Accuracy Testing Problem
Subcontractor data on component level testing of phase shift resolvers for
gimbal angle accuracy did not correspond to data obtained in platform level
tests. The platform level tests were less accurate than the component
level tests because of the routing of the wiring for the accelerometer
dither bias current. The bias current came in one slip ring assembly and
was routed out on the opposite set of slip rings. This effectively caused
a one turn magnetic field to be set up which distorted the phase shift
resolver magnetic field. The bias wiring was routed through the bore of
the resolver which put it in close proximity to the resolver. This
problem was corrected by rerouting the bias current wiring in and out on
the same slip ring assembly to cancel the one turn magnetic effect.
400 Hz Phase Lock Effect on Gimbal Angle Accuracy
During subcontractor testing on production unit No. 2, the phase shift
resolvers exhibited unstable characteristics from run to run. This
problem was caused by phase shift between the main 400 Hz power supply and
the 400 Hz precision supply. Both supplies were synchronized to the same
2.4 KHz reference, but the supplies could sync in on opposite phases of the
2.4 KHz source. Since the synchro (excited by high power 400 Hz) and phase
shift resolver (excited by precision 400 Hz) are "pancake" components,
interaction caused by the above phase shift (increments of 30 degrees)
caused the gimbal angle instability. The desired repeatability was
obtained with incorporation of a phase lock circuit which insured that both
400 Hz supplies would sync to the same phase of the 2.4 KHz reference.
ft
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Conclusion
Careful examination should be made of all wiring and packaging
techniques used in high density circuits to eliminate electro-
magnetic coupling and interaction between these circuits. Precision
outputs involving two or more voltages of the same frequency, or
incremental ratios of the frequencies, may require more than
standard precautions to prevent distortion and heterodyning.
6.1.5 Accelerometer Digital Interface
Accelerometer Digitizing Method Trade-off
Two methods were considered to digitize acceleration data for the computer:
(1) an analog rebalanced accelerometer with an analog to digital (A/D)
converter, and (2) a pulse rebalanced accelerometer.
Three different types of A/D conversion were considered for the analog
rebalanced accelerometer:
(1) Ladder Network A/D Conversion - This network would have operated off
the accelerometer rebalance loop and would have used an ll-bit ladder
network to digitize the acceleration analog rebalance signal. A
three-channel multiplexer would have been used in conjunction with
the ladder network. This method of digitizing was not used because:
(a) This circuit had not undergone temperature or reliability
analysis by the subcontractor.
(b) The packaging volume was large due to the very large precision
resistors required.
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(c) It was questionable that this conversion technique was
accurate enough to meet the desired accuracy of 1 part in 3000.
(2) Integrator and Discriminator A/D Conversion - In this device the
accelerometer rebalance DC voltage would have been first checked for
phase, then integrated until a predetermined threshold voltage was
exceeded. This generated a phase sensitive pulse of known duration
which was used as acceleration data by the computer and also to reset
the integrator. The pulse frequency was proportional to the
acceleration. At a preset time interval the integrator would be
reset if threshold was not exceeded. This was a new device, and
since no test data was available to evaluate its design, it was
decided not to use this approach.
(3) Voltage Comparison Network A/D Conversion - This method compared a
precision voltage reference applied across a precision servo driven
potentiometer to the accelerometer analog output. A mechanical
digitizer was to provide the digital input to the computer. This
method was considered impractical because it required a precision
voltage source with 0.005% regulation.
Pulse Rebalauce Accelerometer Method
The pulse rebalance accelerometer ultimately used was a modified Centaur
approach. This method used a series of accurately timed current pulses
(+ current) at a 3600 Ha rate to torque the accelerometer to null.
Acceleration data was then taken directly from the accelerometer torquing
loops where the net of + pulses monitored by the computer represented the
w
total acceleration.
/
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6.1.5 (Continued)
This technique was chosen to digitize the acceleration data because:
(1) Its accuracy was best and it had no A/D conversion error.
(2) It required fewer parts, and therefore was more reliable, weighed
less, and needed less volume.
(3) It required the least power.
Accelerometer Digitizing Problem
The onlymaJor problem was the flight anomaly during the ascent of
Spacecraft 2. The problem encountered was the "pulse lockup" discussed
in Paragraph 2.2.5.
6.1.6 Grounding Philosophy
The grounding philosophy for the Gemini SG&C systems was to have a single
point ground for the spacecraft. This philosophy was used to eliminate
ground loops for DC and lower frequency AC circuits and to establish
adequate grounds for those frequencies. However, suitable regard had not
been expended on the HF (EMI) grounding problem; a wire which appears as a
short at low frequencies acts like a high impedance at the frequencies
used in the computer. The intent to keep the computer signal ground at
spacecraft ground potential was defeated because the ground wire was too
long. To alleviate this problem a shorter computer ground strap was
incorporated.
Conclusion
A workable SG&C grounding philosophy, cognizant of the hardware
realities of the equipment used, must be developed early in a program.
l
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6.2 Switching Device Design Considerations
Both solid state and electromagnetic switching devices were used in the
Mercury and Gemini SG&C systems. The majority were armature type relays
(electromagnetic) as opposed to semi-conductor switches (solid state). The
application, including performance, environmental, and operational require-
ments, governed which type was selected. Most test failures were
attributed to misapplication rather than to deficiencies in the switch gear
or relays.
Relays were employed in applications that required multiple outputs, double
throw action, power off latched control, power switching, noncritical
response timing, or design flexibility. Semi-conductor switches were used
when the application necessitated minimum size and weight, where response
timing was critical, or in low power switching circuits.
Although armature type relays have a reputation for poor reliability, no
flight anomalies were attributed to relays during the Mercury and Gemini
programs. This phenomenal success was achieved by accepting for use only
relays that had been thoroughly evaluated, destructively analyzed, and
subjected to special tests. The circuit designer was given a family of
relays from which to select, each of which had been previously proven
acceptable for the Mercury and Gemini programs. 0nly approved relays
could be used in circuit design. If a new relay was required, it had to
first pass the stringent preselection evaluation.
/
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The family of approved relays was created by establishing performance
specifications in excess of those of existing MIL specifications. In
particular, both maximum and minimum values were established for each relay
performance parameter. Relay candidates were subjected to comprehensive
tests to validate conformance with the specifications. The tests were
conducted under all applicable environments and performance parameters were
measured during the test, in addition to the normal procedure of measure-
ments before and after test. Emphasis was placed cn _king sure that the
procurement specification contained clear requirements to assure quality
control and predelivery screening. The following list illustrates the type
of performance parameters specified.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(lO)
(11)
Maximum and minimum input bus voltage.
Maximum and minimum pickup voltage.
Maximum and minimum dropout voltage.
Reflected voltage transient.
Maximum release time.
Minimum and maximum operate time.
Contact bounce time.
Contact crossover.
Maximum coil current at specified voltage and temperature.
Contact arrangement.
Contact rating for resistive, motor, inductive, and lamp loads for
a minimum of 50,000 cycles.
(12) Minimum current rating.
(13) Time delay characteristics.
i (14) Latch and reset requirements.
/
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Mortality=time characteristics were obtained from life test data. To
eliminate relays that fail early in their life cycles, each relay was
burned-in as part of the acceptance testing. Critical parameters were
frequently monitored during the burn-in cycling. Each relay installation was
vibrated as part of the acceptance test. The vibration test was
conducted under the critical temperature environments and each relay of the
installation was operated during the test. Each relay visibly damaged during
the build-test cycle was replaced, regardless of how slightly damaged. To
avoid the effects of inductive transients on other susceptible electronic
equipment, a separate, independent battery was used to power all relays.
Two major problems were encountered in the design of Mercury and Gemini
relay systems. The first was caused by the inductive transient associated
with the collapsing field when the relay was deenergized. The Mercury
program used brute strength bus filtering for relay-associated transients.
The Gemini solution was the addition of diode suppression to each relay.
The effects on the response time caused by the added diodes were evaluated
in each application. In the design of other equipment, filtering was added
to reduce susceptibility to relay transients.
The second problem was failures during installation vibration tests. Vibra-
tion transmissability in relay panels caused relay failures, which were
o
corrected in most cases by the addition of panel stiffeners. At times,
circuit redesign was necessary to avoid actuation of the critical relays
during the high vibration portion of the flight.
/
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6.2 (Continued)
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One major problem was found in the solid state time delay switches used.
During vibration, the liquid tantalum capacitor used in these devices
tended to become slightly charged, thereby causing an out-of-tolerance time-
out of the device when subsequently energized. Two approaches were used to
(1) For time delays less than 5 seconds, solid
c c re substituted for the liquid tantalum capacitors.
o ances the solid tantalum capacitors were too large to
eir u ime delays greater than 5 seconds. Instead a small
e device to short out the liquid tantalum capacitors
e gh ion portion of the flight.
Stringent y control, screening, and tests are necessary to obtain
r for spacecraft designs. Extreme care is necessary to
insure that the relay fits the application. More consideration should
b g semi-conductor switches in lieu of armature type
r tate-of-art of solid state devices progresses.
197
7.0
MERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEY
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
Conclusions and Program Philosophy - Wherever appropriate in this report,
we have presented conclusions reached as a result of our experience with
specific space vehicle SC_C systems. Some of the major conclusions, pertaining
to the design of space vehicle SC_C systems, are restated in Section 7.1.
Section 7.2 describes the general program philosophies, including the impact
of Mercury experience on Gemini design, and conclusions that apply to
spacecraft designs, not to the SG&C systems alone.
Some of the statements given may seem intuitively obvious; ho_ever, even with
the proven success of the Mercury and Gemini programs, occasionally we found
these factors had been overlooked in the early design phase. In these cases,
they usually necessitated redesign later in the program.
7.1 The following conclusions are presented elsewhere in this report where the
particular SG&C problem is discussed. They are reinterated here because
they are applicable to the design of most space vehicle SC_,C systems.
(i) When moving parts are used in a system, they should be isolated from
the space environment to avoid the effects of large variations in
temperature and pressure.
(2) Particular heed should be paid to outgassing of materials in a low
pressure environment. The effects of outgassing may appear as
(i) a deterioration of exposed lubricants; (2) deposition of contaminants
on senstive parts; (3) arcing of vacuum-exposed RF components; (_)
deposition of an insulating layer on sliding electrical contact_.
(3) Circuitry in RF equipment which generates or carries high RF power
should be pressurized where feasible. The pressure seal design
employed for these components must consider the long duration of space
missions.
I
MCDONNELL DOtlGLAm_ 198
M
ERCURY/GEMINI PROGRAM DESIGN SURVEY
REPORT F917 • 31 JANUARY 1968
7.1 (Continued)
(_) Positive control of the system thermal environment, by means of an
active cooling system, is desirable. With the use of such a system on
Gemini, it -was possible to avoid the cost of de._igning equipmenb to
operate over the large temperatures excursions of outer _pace.
(5) _ploratory environmental tests should be performed early in the
system development phase to preclude costly redesign later. Care
should be exercised to assure that the _pecif_ed environments are as
realistic as possible and that the interaction aJsociated _th the
application of multiple environments simultaneously is conJidered.
(6) All critical input and output signals should be electrically isolated
(7)
to preclude damage or overstress to components from ancillary loadJ.
Overrating of components must be employed judiciously to avoid
additional problems. For example, a relay overrated to accommodate
the high current carried but actually switched under e no-load condition,
resulted in contaminants building up on the contacts.
(8) In manned operation, astronaut confidence in ,SG&C equipment must be
maintained by providing a positive visual indication of malfunctions
and of critical equipment operation. Operational procedures _hould
be developed and practiced to permit mission completion in the event
of malfunctions, and to preclude astronaut-initiated malfunctions.
(9)
(In general, equipment should be designed to avoid malfunctions caused
by erroneous operation but sometimes it is not economically feasible
to do so.)
A thorough timing analysis should be conducted on digital interfaces
early in the program. The analysis is especially important where delays
are introduced by long wire lengths, complex interfacing circuitry, etc.
/
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Initial system design should take into account the effects of electro-
magnetic interference (EMI). _I control plans should be established
early in a program by the major contractor and his subcontractors in
order to avoid costly later redesign and the addition of filters.
plans should specify such requirements as:
The
(a) Suppression of potential EMI generators.
(b) Separation of wiring based on signal categorization.
(c) Designing circuits so that they will not be overly susceptible
to EMI.
(d) Isolation of power for low signal circuits from the major power
source.
(e) Judicious placement of components and use of shielding where
necessary to avoid mutual interference, especially in high density
packaged equipment.
(f) Adherence to a good grounding philosophy.
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Spacecraft Design - The Gemini project organization and procedures were
established so as to derive the nmximnm benefit from Mercury experience.
Thus, Mercury experience provided the base from which the Gemini design
philosophy evolved. From the first, the Gemini spacecraft was designed:
(1) to be versatile and capable of quick adaptation to different missions;
(2) to be quickly and easily maintained under prelaunch conditions; and
(3) to possess high operational reliability.
Typical elements of the design included:
(a) Provision for equipment accessibility so that last minute changes
could be made if necessary.
(b) Provision of sufficient test points to speed checkout and to eliminate
the requirement to disconnect equipment to isolate malfunctions.
(c) Emphasis on redundant components and systems, and on multiple alterna-
tives in the case of failures which involved crew safety. Although
a major objective was to maximize the probability of mission success,
crew safety was of paramount importance to the extent that all design
decisions were Judged either to affect or not affect crew safety. A
special "watch-dog" committee ruled on any changes affecting crew
safety.
(d) Provision for the late installation and checkout of pyrotechnic
devices used to accomplish critical functions.
(e) Recognition that astronauts could function effectively in space and
that their full participation in the mission would increase the
spacecraft 's flexibility and reliability.
(f) Inclusion of secondary power supplies with the using equipment,
rather than using one secondary supply for all spacecraft functions.
i
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7.2.2 Design Implementation and Control - Our experience with spacecraft design
indicates that problems can be classified as resulting from deficiencies
in component control, design control, and interface control. These problem
areas are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Component Control - Component control must be exercised for both singular
components (resistors, capacitors, transistors) and the more complex
components, such as cavity oscillators, DC motors, printed circuit boards,
etc. Component problems are the most prevalent and the most difficult to
detect early.
Preparation and use of a Qualified Parts List (QPL) is one solution to this
problem. However, preparation, administration, and continual updating of
a QPL is a very large task. The QPL removes some design prerogative from
the subcontractor, and if not kept up-to-date, can result in an obsolete
design.
Another component control technique is lot control with sample testing of
each lot. Lot control usually is advisable even if a QPL is used. Lot
control requires that components be stored by lot and records kept to show
which lots are used in which end items. Satisfactory lot control also
entails obtaining a guarantee from the component supplier that all members
of the lot are identical. In general, component suppliers make
"improv_nent _ changes without changing part numbers or notifying their
customers. The contractor can only insure that all components are identical
by buying from a single lot. But the component might then spend a long
time in storage prior to use, and its reliability may be jeopardized as a
result.
/
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An alternate effective approach is to subject each component or component
assembly to an acceptance test and to perform destructive analyses on
sample "in-service _'specimens to verify the adequacy of the quality control
practices being employed.
Design Control - Most design changes are required: (1) to improve perform-
ance or reliability; (2) to eliminate overstressing of components; and
(3) to meet environmental requirements. These changes can be avoided with
good communications with the equipment manufacturer and if attention is
given to the detail aspects. To minimize changes, we suggest the following
control measures :
(a) Early in the program a meeting should be held to insure that the
equipment manufacturer fully understands the equipment-defining
specification.
(b) The prime contractor should assign an engineer to monitor the detailed
design effort. Consideration should be given to permitting the
engineer to attend the subcontractor's internal design reviews.
Further, all subcontractors should be requested to report their
progress during the design stage.
(c) The prime contractor should keep an engineering representative at
the qualification facility throughout the qualification test program.
(d) Each equipment supplier should supply and maintain a detail electrical
overstress analysis of his design.
(e) Tests performed on engineering models should be extensive, well planned,
and documented to insure that the production prototypes can be
qualified with a mininmm of redesign.
l
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7.2.2 (Continued)
Good system engineering, which is the composite result of the proper
application of the experience, Judgment, and ability of individuals, can
assure design control. No insurmountable problems were encountered on
our SG&C systems, and we feel it was because of our close supervision
and control of our subcontractors during the design phase. We found it
beneficial to issue a report defining the spacecraft system for release to
all major subcontractors.
Interface Control - Control of interfaces, including the resolution of
interface problems, should be the responsibility of a systems integration
group. Our experience indicates that effective interface control is
possible if :
(a) Detailed interface specifications are prepared and released as early
in the program as possible.
(b) A comprehensive electromagnetic compatibility control plan is
implement ed.
(c) All interfaces, including those with ground equipment or associate
contractors, are considered together with the spacecraft equipment
int erfa ces.
(d) Development test reports include detailed characteristics of each
input/output parameter under the various test conditions.
(e) Input/output breadboards are used for early compatibility tests.
(f) h realistic compatibility test unit _'spacecraft" is a'_i!ab!e for
test early in the program.
,
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Spacecraft Testing
Test Philosophy - Test design for the Gemini spacecraft began early in
the design stage to insure that system operational status would and could
be monitored. A compatibility test unit "spacecraft _ was manufactured to
provide an early opportunity for integrating test equipment and training
test personnel. The equipment pre-delivery acceptance and pre-installation
acceptance tests were conducted utilizing realistic input and output
circuitry so that the results of the tests could be correlated with
integrated spacecraft test results.
The integrated spacecraft tests were performed at the St. Louis facility
and key tests were repeated at the launch site. Verification and monitoring
of critical functions were maintained until launch. The following testing
ground rules were implemented:
(a) Uniform test equipment was used for all tests.
(b) Uniform test procedures were used for unit pre-delivery and pre-
installation acceptance tests.
(c) Uniform test procedures were used for integrated spacecraft tests at
St. Louis and at the launch site.
ODerational Philosophy - Early in the Gemini program, key personnel from
Mercury launch operations were assigned to McDonnell' s St. Louis facility
and teamed with the engineers responsible for the development of the
major Gemini systems. This insured that the Gemini system design would
reflect the practical experience gained from Mercury flight operations, and
enabled launch personnel to become familiar with the spacecraft.
Additionally, direct lines of communication were established between
responsible individuals at St. Louis and Cape Kennedy.
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7.2.3 (Continued)
During the latter stages of production and testing, a spacecraft manager
was assigned to each vehicle. This engineer was responsible for tests and
modifications to his spacecraft prior to launch and evaluation of its
launch readiness. He also played a major role in post-flight analysis.
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